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A . A B S T R A C T 
The thesis examines resilience and change in traditional systems of authority, with a 
specific focus on traditional systems of administration and conflict resolution. The aim is to 
examine social change and social continuity among the BeRa refugees in Tchad by looking at the 
effects of conflict and conflict induced migration on their traditional forms of leadership. The 
thesis focuses on leadership expressed through the ability of elders to be Ajawd (mediators) and 
thus to achieve Judiyya (amelioration). This work will theorize conflict and conflict resolution 
without removing it from its environmental, historical, cultural and political setting. The thesis 
will also historicize regional conflict and examine how current conflicts affect the lives of Darfuri 
refugees and their leadership in Eastem Tchad. This kind of analysis can best be accomplished if 
one takes a broader look at regional phenomena before trying to decipher the meaning of locally 
or culturally unique elements. Key findings of this work include the fact that Judiyya has 
continued in spite of four years in the refugee camps. Figures in Idara Ahdia [Native 
Administration] from Darfur, though unable to form reliable links with counterparts in Tchad 
due to ethnic rivalries and tensions, have been able to establish working links with Tchadien civil 
authorities, much as existed in Darfur prior to the war. 
B . P R E F A C E 
This thesis is the cuhnination of close to eight years of engagement with the Horn of 
Africa as a whole and Darfur in particular. I initially travelled to Egypt and the Sudan to hone 
my Arabic skills in summer of 2001. However, what began as a short trip to Egypt and the 
Sudan during the final year of my undergraduate degree at Durham, soon evolved into a research 
career long engagement with the region. My time in north Darfur laid the foundations for much 
of my post-graduate research. 
Embarking on this PhD was no small task. Many of the universities I had applied to told 
me bluntly, that no umjersity would send a reseanher to Darfur or Tdxtd isith the situation beir^ vhat it ms. 
Others had claimed my research was not 'anthwpdogkal enou^', and belonged in the halls of a 
stuffy smoke filled political sciences department, sonvuhere ebe. Both of these had been recuning 
themes I had been dealing during my Master's research in Ethiopia in 2002. Refused a research 
permit for the Sudan in 2002; I decided to do my Master's research in Ethiopia instead. My 
hope was that the research on ethnic federation would be useful to both Sudan and Ethiopia. 
To make sure it was useful to planners and thinkers in both sides of the border I decided to 
cross this border illegally and share my findings with SPLA commanders and Sudanese 
dissidents. Thus, I began honing some of my more clandestine research skills: forging 
documents, dealing with gatekeepers and crossing borders (Ulegall) .^ 
Less than a year later, even before I had finished my master's, Darfur was engulfed in 
flames as the central govenmient utilized a combination of scorched earth and ethnic cleansing 
to deal with a regional rebellion. In 2004 I enrolled on a PhD m program at Durham University 
and became even more determined to return to Darfur to document the local tradition of 
conflict before it was totally wiped out. Looking back now I am not sure that the university 
really understood what I was proposing to do: enter a oorfiict zone to doamsnt a system cf corfiia 
resdutian and local adrrimtration by interdewr^ r^i^es. I assumed they thought I would do a library 
based study, if the situation in Darfur did not change for the better. 
The situation did not change and as a result, my supervisors and I agreed that a cross 
border study would probably be impossible. The plan was for me to travel to Tchad and 
conduct research there if the situation in Darfur did not improve. None cf us rmlistiadly expected the 
situation to char^. As a result, this research has dual focus on both Tchad and Darfur. 
During my time in Tchad I faced numerous hardships, including, but not limited to: 
knifings, hijackings and being shot at. Numerous colleagues were kidnapped and others 
seriously injured. It seemed I had arrived in Tchad at a particularly inopportune point in time. 
The period 2005-2006 saw Tchad convulsed by violence as nvunerous rebel groups tried to 
overthrow the ruling party. Like the Darfuri refugees I was a reluctant spectator. Without 
ethnic, tribal or clan alliance in Tchad, both I and the refugees among whom I worked, were at 
times ui^ets of various competing groups. 
Immediately prior to leaving for Tchad I co-authored a report on conflict resolution in 
the Sudan. (Mark Bradbury, John R)4e, Michael Medley & Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge. Local 
peace processes in Sudan: a baseline study (Rift Valley Institute, May 2006) 
http://www.riftvalley.net/ documents/Local_Peace_Processes_in_Sudan_-_May_2006.pdf). 
Sections of this report written by this researcher, particularly those on Darfur, have been 
updated and appear in this thesis pages 108-130 and pages 217-227. 
C . A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S 
The material presented in this thesis is by no means the fruit of the labour of one 
Durham student. It contains a part of the history of both Ouaddai and Darfur. As it is with 
works of this nature there are many whose efforts and help go unseen, is to them that I dedicate 
this work. 
I would like to thank my family for their support and unwavering belief that I could 
accomplish this. Special thanks go to my supervisors Professor Robert Layton and Dr. Peter 
Collins for their help, guidance and encouragement throughout the work on this thesis. I also 
would like to express my deepest gratitude to those who helped with the plaiming of my 
research, in particular Steve Reyna, Jan Coebergh and Andrea Behrends. I must also thank those 
who saw in my work something of value and were willing to fund me: the Dean of the Graduate 
School Douglas Halliday, the Emslie Homiman Anthropological Scholarship Fund and the 
Royal Anthropological Institute. I thank those in Tchad who helped with my research: Khalil 
Allilo, Ismael Mahamat Adam and Khassim Mahamat Assad. Fellow researchers who were 
willing to provide me with much needed guidance and comradery, MarieMe Debos, Babett and 
Tmi Janszky as well as Grit Jungstand. Thanks also go to CARE staff members Nedjilem 
Mayade, Samir, Issaka, Khalil, Jessica, Carine Malardeau, Martin Masumbuko, Jean-Qaude and 
Juma, along with Emmanuelle of UNHCR and Amadou of P A M 
Lasdy, I wish to thank those who were willing to accommodate me, those who acted as 
my impromptu translators, guides, and most importantiy, friends. To those who took active part 
in my work- this research is as much yours as it is mine. To the inhabitants of Mile and Am 
Nabak, in particular Salih Haroun and all the OldShdkhs, I say... ShukranKathir, Kadai 
This work is dedicated to two close friends from the camps that died before this work 
was completed: Omda Tahir Hariga Boyo, who died in 2006 and Shirley Case, a CARE staff 
member, friend and colleague from Tchad, killed in Afghanistan on August 2008. 
C H A P T E R 1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
P A T T E R N S R E O C C U R . . . A G A I N 
. . . A N D A G A I N 
/n order to conzey t^e ^istorica/explanations wit/; c/arity, it is o/ten t/?e case t/^atone /^as 
to assume org/ide ozertAe exposition o/t/;e/orma/interrelations i>etween uiriai?/es 
(Wallerstein 1974: 347). 
Presented in this work is an analysis of social change and resilience in the face of conflict-
induced displacement. In the vast majority of cases, the movement of refugees and intemally 
displaced persons is a complex and often chaotic affair. The events prior to during and after 
their flight leave them scarred both emotionally and physically. In addition to mental trauma 
refugees suffer from the very real loss of country, community, family, prestige and property. 
Social bonds and familial relations are often tom asunder, frequendy this leads to a decline in the 
moral authority of traditional leaders. As a result displacement can become the focus for far 
reaching social and cultural change and upheaval, thus any study of displacement is inherendy a 
study of societies in change and cultural adaptation. This thesis wiH focus on conflict-induced 
forced migration and the processes of adaptation and change they have forced on Darfuri 
refugees in Tchad. 
The pattem of conflict in Africa is perhaps best described as cyclical and resilient; with 
not only weapons but also personnel traversing borders and frequently taking part in numerous 
separate, but linked conflicts. The history of the Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region is perhaps the 
most striking example of this phenomenon.^ The history of this region has been dominated by 
conflict. In both the pre- and post-colonial eras, the region has been the scene of periods of 
' By Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region the writer means Darfur, the Tchadien border regions of Ouaddai, Wadi 
Fira, and die eastem borders of B . E T . (mainly the Ennendi sub region). 
intense warfare. The most recent of these conflicts began on the 18'*' October 2005, a mere four 
days after the commencement of this case study in NDjameiu. As a result I had a ringside seat 
to this, the region's latest struggle in a string of bloody conflicts. 
Map I: Sui^anand Tc^ac^ 
C H A D 
i 
1 
Key: Map highlights the 12 camps for Darfuri refugees and 2 camps for Central African refugees in Tchad 
(UNHCR Darfur Maps) 
7 
This however, is not the first time the Tchad-Darfur/Sudan border has been engulfed by 
conflict. For the past forty years, this porous border has served as the lynchpin in a network of 
covert, and some not so covert, rear bases for regional insurgency movements. This network 
connects governments, military officials, opposition figures, insurgents and plain old bandits 
from Darfur^, Tchad, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Central African Republic. 
In fact, most of the region's conflicts have been linked to, or form integral parts of wider 
intemational conflicts. As a result the term 'civil war' is one that is increasingly peripheral to the 
understanding of conflict in the region. 
While local level conflict is no new to the region; over the past forty-five years many long 
standing grudges and some brand new sources of animosity have resulted in large scale and wide-
ranging violence. Some of these iostances of conflict are clearly related to conpetition between 
pastoral and agricultural communities. Many however arise from a complex array of what can be 
seen as a mix of 'greed and gnemnoe' (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This array includes historical 
grudges, economic deprivation, asymmetrical access to resources and a lack of democratic 
political competition. In this region many of these factors have been used by both internal and 
external actors as a reason for violent competition. 
In spite of this, few analysts have placed Tchad and the current 'Darfur Crisis' in their 
proper place. Instead, most analysis of Darfur has centred on issues of maiginality, resource 
conflict and etimicity (Abdalla 2006, M-Dinar 2003, Ali-Dinar 2004a, Ali-Dinar 2004b, 
Bromwich 2007, Ibrahim 2004, Suliman 1994, Suliman 1997 and Suliman 1999). Those who 
work in or on Tchad have tended to stick to discourses of weak states, greed and grievance and 
2 Darfur has been separated from the rest of the Sudan for sake of analysis and because the region in its current 
form and it political and historical evolution is very different from the rest of the Sudan. This form of analysis 
need not be deemed a radical departure as many have attempted to analyze the political trajectory of Southern 
Sudan by first acknowledging the fact that southern Sudan is political and culturally distinct from Northern 
Sudan. The same can be said of Darfur. 
8 
monopolization of state resources (Marchal 2005 and Azevedo 1998). While these discourses are 
not invalid the lack of analysis of the wider border region and its international connections and 
ramifications leave the analyses unable to consistendy explain the changes being witnessed. To 
understand the resilience of traditional systems in Darfur, one must first come to terms with four 
salient features of the region -. These are: 
1. The complex nature and history of states in this region 
2. The role of traditional leaders 
3. The necessity of alliances between the state and traditional leaders 
4. The cyclical nature of conflict in the region's history 
These four phenomena can be seen as the only constants in the region's history, both 
pre- and post-colonial. That is, in the various pre-colonial states that have emerged, expanded, 
flourished, declined, decayed and died in the region - the pattern of alliance between the state 
and traditional leaders, fragmentation and warfare has proved to be a resilient, if not defining, 
feature of the region, and the border regions in particular. Burr and Collins in their work on 
conflict in the region write: 
The routes across the Sahara today are the same as they nere ishen the carrd replaced the 
bulkxk in the jmrth century; the four vheded idnde is sinply a modest inprouement at the end <f the 
tuentiedo century (Burr and Collins 1999: 3). 
This resilience means that the roots of conflict in the region are difficult to comprehend 
and the trajectory even more complicated to discern. Thus, one must frequendy step back 
(historically) and look at the wider picture (thematically) to gain a clear understanding of what 
may initially appear to be an isolated local level phenomenon. Seen in this light conflict, ethnic 
fragmentation, a volatile international border and violent conflict in the region need to be re-
examined and cast as integral parts of the region's historical trajectory. 
As a result of this resilience one can discem certain reoccurring themes in history of the 
Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region. One can argue that even the recent massive displacement 
caused by the Darfur conflict and the political instability that has characterized post 
independence Tchad, are not only linked to each other, but they are also linked to events that 
extend far back into the pre-colonial period. Thus, conflict must be seen as an integral feature of 
Central Saharan history and as a result local conflict resolution becomes an important feature in 
understanding the region's past and predicting future trends. These four themes: state 
formation, the role of traditional elites, the cyclical nature of conflict and changing alliances have 
not only shaped the region but have also shaped the way the region's inhabitants have reacted to, 
and coped with upheaval and indeed with each other on a day to day basis. 
This work is best described as an examination of resilience and changes in traditional 
systems of authority, with a specific focus on traditional systems of administration and conflict 
resolution. The aim is to examine social change and social continuity among the BeRa refugees 
in Tchad by looking at the effects of conflict and conflict induced migration on their traditional 
forms of leadership. The thesis focuses on leadership expressed through the ability of elders to 
be Ajaieid and thus to achieve Judiyya. This work will theorize conflict and conflict resolution 
without removing it from its environmental, historical, cultural and political setting. The thesis 
will also historicize regional conflict and examine how current conflicts affect the lives of Darfuri 
refugees and their leadership in Eastem Tchad. This kind of analysis can best be accomplished if 
one takes a broader look at regional phenomena before trying to decipher the meaning of locally 
or culturally unique elements. 
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The analysis presented in this work will be divided into two sections: 
• Section A:- will examine the current anthropological literature on conflict and 
conflict resolution, as well as the methodology of the ethnographic research. 
• Section B: - will provide a historical overview of pre-colonial and linguistic links 
between Darfur and Eastem Tchad (Ouaddai). It will provide the reader with an ethnographic 
and historical outline of the BeRa people, the focus of this work. It will also examine the various 
ways in which power has been credized 'm the region- creating Idara Ahalia, as well as the pre-war 
and current role of traditional leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, both in Darfur and 
now in Tchadien refugee camps. 
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S E C T I O N A 
L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y 
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C H A P T E R 2 
L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 
Today there are more than 8.4 million refugees registered with UNHCR, the Sudan is 
second to Afghanistan for having the largest number of its nationals registered as refugees in 
other countries. 
Table 1: Major Refugee Populations 
ORIGIN OF MAJOR REFUGEE POPULATIONS - 1 JAN 2006 
[Four Largest] 
O r ^ 
fghanistan 
Sudan 
Burundi 
DR Congo 
Main Countries of Asylum 
Pakistan / Iran / Germany / 
Netherlands / U K 
Tchad / Uganda / Kenya / Ethiopia 
/ Central African Rep. 
Tanzania / D R Congo / Rwanda / 
South Africa / Zambia 
Tanzania / Zambia / Congo / 
Rwanda / Uganda 
Total 
1,908,100 
693,300 
438,700 
430,600 
IJNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/3b028097c.html 
13 
Along with refugees UNHCR's mandate also covers some 6.6 million IDPs (internally 
displaced persons). 
Table 2: IDP Populations 
MAJOR IDP POPULATIONS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR 
[at 1 Januar}' 2006] 
Country IDPs 
III Colombia (UNHCR estimate) 2,000,000 
HiTraq 1,200,000 
841,900 
Azerbaijan 578,500 
mm Somalia 400,000 
Sri Lanka 324,700 
Serbia & Montenegro 246,400 
lllllll^^ libetia 237,800 
Georgia 234,200 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 182,700 
UNHCR littp://ww.unhcr.org/basics/B7\SICS/3b028097c.html 
The Sudan again features in the top five. In fact the Sudan along with Azerbaijan are 
probably misrepresented in the above statistics, since the U N statistic only include refugees and 
IDPs registered with the UNHCR. Thus, the vast majority of Darfur's 2.5 million IDPs who 
have no assistance from the UNHCR do not feature on the above chart. A more realistic 
estimate of the world IDPs is close to 25 million. The Sudan alone is home to more than 5.5 
14 
Million IDPs. Added to this is a probable refugee population of 9-10 million (Internal 
Displacement. 2005: 6). 
Table 3: IDP Key Facts 2005 
Total IDP population: 23.7 million (December 2005) 
Number of countries affected At least 50 
Number of separate IDP situations monitored 63 
Worst affected continent: Africa (12,1 million IDPs in 20 countries) 
Largest internal displacement situations: Sudan (5.4 million IDPs), Colombia (up to 3.7 million), 
Uganda (2 million), DRC (1,7 million), Iraq (1.3 million) 
Number of conflicts generating displacement in 2005: 27 
Major new displacement during 2005: Zimbabwe, DRC Colombia, Iraq, Sudan 
Major return movements during 2005: DRC, Sudan, Liberia, Iraq 
Worst displacement situations: Burma (Myanmar), Sudan, DRC, Zimbabwe, C6te d'lvoire, 
Colombia, Iraq, Somalia, Uganda, Nepal 
Estimated number of IDPs at risk of death through violence: 14 million 
Governments or occupation forces directly or 
indirectly involved in displacing people in 2005: 
Burma (Myanmar), Central AfriGn Republic, Colombia, 
Cote d'lvoire, Indonesia (West Papua), Iraq, Mexico, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Israel (Palestinian Territories), Philippines, Rus-
sian Federation (Chechnya), Sudan (Darfur), Togo, Turk-
menistan, Zimbabwe 
Estimated number of IDPs without any signif lant 
humanitarian assistance from their governments 
Nearly 6 million in at least 12 countries 
Estimated number of IDPs unprotected by their 
governments 
6 million in at least 13 countries 
Number of countries without UN involvement in IDP 
assistance or protection 
16 (nearly one third of all countries affected) 
Proportion of women and children among IDPs 70-80% 
(Internal Displacement. 2005: 5-6) 
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A very different picture emerges when one moves away from the official statistics of the 
UNHCR and looks at the overall situation. The major distinction between r^ ^^as and IDPs is 
not only locational, but also legal. The term r^u^ means that the individual has fled their 
country of legal residence and is now seeking refuge in another country, whereas the term IDP 
means the individual is still resident in their own country but has left their home or region. As 
the term states they are internally cUsplaaed. It is often much easier for the U N and other aid 
agencies to provide assistance to refugees than it is for them to assist IDPs, because in many 
instances individuals are actually fleeing their own governments. In such cases governments may 
obstruct the flow of aid or even commandeer aid for their own purposes, as in Somalia during 
the early nineties. As a result refugees often have better legal protection and better access to aid. 
This holds true, not only for Darfvui refugees and IDPS, but also in most situations of 
displacement, as Barbara Hendrie's work on refugees in IDPs and refugees from Tigray in 
Ethiopia highlights (Hendrie 1996). In the mid to late 1980s Hgray refugees fled war in 
Ethiopia and moved to the Sudan with litde to no external assistance, as the province was a 
military theatre. Those in government controUed regions of the Ethiopian province had some 
access to aid but those in rebel held areas were forced to either fend for themselves or make the 
dangerous journey to the Sudan where they could receive some international support (Hendrie 
1996: 37-39). 
An in depth analysis of the war in Darfur would be beyond the scope of this work, 
however this is not an attempt to gloss over or minimize the real suffering caused by the conflict 
nor the wanton disregard for human life shown by Khartoum, its proxies and the rebek. 
Though a more in-depth account of the factors that led up to the conflict wiU be examined, for 
the time being it is sufficient to say that in 2003 Darfuri rebels took up arms against the 
16 
Khartovim regime which responded with disproportionate force and its now notorious Jatyawed 
proxies. 
Map 2 
(§UNHCR 
DaWIMiOilAgmir 
Chad - Sudan, Refuse and IDP population 
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PGDS in DOS 
O^Mlw M S«iignifftc Qiti Victor 
Iriiim^ (flriba 
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1 LEGEND 
1 • 
WaQsaltiarQsl 
a War x« ' •Mice 
1 - „ 
RBtugeepoputation 
ISouicw; 
IDP Popuuition: XHA - Hunirltsr^ n PmtOi, ^vvnor 7W-. 
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El f uhH 
IntsmaJly displaced persons 
Fore Diirunga 
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*iRt»ijralCNAa)-»»pnl!l«)S. 
htip://ww.reliefweb.mt/rw/ful]Maps_Af.nsf/0/AC6BED4A49FElEE9852570820070E0F4/$Fae/unhc 
rJDP_tcd-sdnl7Q505.pdf?OpenElement 
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Darfur itself is home to 2.5 million IDPs, who eke out a living in the region's 75 or so 
IDP camps. Another 235,000 have fled to Tchad. Here in the Tchadien regions of Wadi Fira 
and Ouaddai 210,000 Darfviri refugees have found some sanctuary in 12 refugee camps, while 
another 25,000 try to survive along the border with Utde or no assistance from the outside world. 
It is among the Darfuri refuges in Tchad and more specifically those in the camps of Mile and 
Am Nabak that this research took place. 
The humanitarian crisis in the region has grabbed intemational headlines, but this 
attention has not been translated into action. Estimates of the human cost of this manmade 
disaster vary from 150,000 to 300,000 casualties. In addition over 250,000 Darfuri have fled to 
Tchad, while another three million are internally displaced (ICG 2004). What began as a 
rebellion in February 2003 evolved into what the United Nations called the ""leorst humanitarian 
crisis in the varid todaf when the Khartoum regime and allied militias launched a scorched earth 
tactic. It is among the 250,000 or so Darfuri that fled to Tchad that this research took place. 
Darfur, a border region in the far west of the Sudan, is an area larger than Kenya, France 
or Texas, and displays a h i ^ degree of geographical and ethnic diversity. Darfur borclers the 
former province of Kordofan in the east and the Tchadien regions of Ouaddai, Wadi Fira, and 
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti in the west. It extends southward to Bahr el Ghazal and northward to 
the Libyan Desert. The far north of the region is primarily desert, the south is savannah land. 
The central region is dominated by the Jebel Marra massif and this region is one of the most 
fertile rain-fed areas in northem Sudan. 
Before its incorporation into Sudan in 1916, Darfur was an independent polity with three 
successive dynastic traditions, culminating in the Fur Sultanate from the 1650s. In 1874 it was 
briefly incorporated into Mahdist Sudan. After the fall of the Mahdi, Darfur was once again 
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recognized as an independent state (CFahey 2004: 1) and it was only in 1916, two years before 
the end of World War I , that the Sultanate finally lost its independence. Up to that point Darfur 
had been one of very few African territories, along with Ethiopia and the nominally sovereign 
states of Liberia and Egypt, which remained uncolonized. This history of independence has 
conditioned relations between the region and the Sudanese nation state. Due to these realities 
Darfur mtist be seen less as a normal part of the Sudan and more as a region with its own history 
and regional identity. Darfur's history as an altemative centre of state power contributes to local 
understandings of its conflict with Khartoum. 
The current rebellion in Darfur emerges from a history of small and medium-scale local 
conflict. Since the independence of the Sudan there have been more than thirty-five small and 
laige-scale armed disputes (Mohammed 2002: 1). Many of these conflicts are clearly related to 
competition between pastoral and agricultural communities. They also bespeak an array of issues 
that can be contained under the rubric of "gmiandgieiano^ (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These 
issues include, local rivakies, historical complaints against the central state, lack of services and a 
perceived absence of political representation. 
Many of the conflicts in the region have been articulated along ethnic and linguistic lines, 
but such ready-made divisions often mask deeper societal fractures. This is illustrated by the 
conflict between the Fulam and the Gimr of south Darfur in 1984. The initial spark was a 
murder, both groups were soon engaged in a series of raids and counter raids, that left dozens 
dead. However upon closer examination the murder and subsequent acts of violence were 
merely the spark that ignited already smouldering tension that lay beneath the seemingly peaceful 
surface. Indeed much of the hostility stemmed from local and national politics, in particular the 
proposed division of the Fulani and neighbouring Gimr rural districts (Morton 2004: 11). The 
aim of this administrative re-organization was to allow those Fulani who farmed traditionally 
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Gimr lands to be incorporated into the Fukni district at Tullus rather than remain in the Gimr 
district at Katalia. Actors on both sides of the divide, while repeatedly asserting that the 
occasion for violence was this murder, did not deny that local power rivalries also played a role. 
Ethnicity was used as a ready-made principle of mobilization (Fukui and Markakis 1994), thus 
illustrating how batdes for resources- and by extension group survival- tend to be expressed in 
terms of ethnicity. 
It must not be supposed that local conflict is the norm in the Greater Ouaddai-Darfuri 
Region. Even today, when large parts of the region are verging on anarchy, there are other areas 
where small-scale local mediation continues to be effective. As far as it is possible to tell from 
the historical record, during much of the earlier era of the Sultanate, there was less violence and 
more cooperation along fault lines where ethnic groups met. The latter featured the exchange of 
goods and services and the rule-bound sharing of renewable resources, such as water and 
grazing. Competition over resources has intensified in the last few decades due to a combination 
of political, social and economic pressures coupled with environmental changes and degradation. 
All of these factors have been exacerbated by administrative incompetence and in many cases 
deliberate elhmc ^rryrmnderir^. In the face of this sustained onslaught, rules for the sharing of 
scarce resources that have previously prevented rivalries from becoming full-blown conflicts 
have increasingly broken down. 
Even when violence could not be avoided, the rules of engagement, disengagement and 
compensation have acted as checks on the level of conflict. In Islamic Northem Sudan in 
general, this system of communal mediation and peace building is known as Judiyya 
(amelioration). A group of elders acting as Ajawd (mediators) preside over a Mutarmrat al Sulh 
(reconciliation conference). Generations of intermarriage and coexistence between ethnic 
groups have also led to a common understanding of these institutions. But only a few instances 
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have been documented in detail. An examination of particular cases of Judiyya. and Mutarmrat al 
Sulh is therefore the central feature of this case study. 
In recent years anthropologists have been challenged to reconsider both what they study 
and the methodology of their discipline. Strides made in development, govemance and peace 
studies have highlighted shortcoming in anthropological research. However, our greatest 
intellectual stimulation and indeed competition has taken place because of iimovations made in 
the fields of economics and political science. Though anthropology has a long history of 
comparative research, anthropology and anthropologists have excelled at exploring microcosms. 
References to the wider economic and political world are often neady confined to the 
introduction or the field setting sections of anthropological works. By almost exclusively looking 
at local culture many anthropologist have been unable to explain, or even see, those aspect of 
local culture that are responses to extemal stimuli. Having said this, the top down ^mM liew 
approado' espoused by political scientists fails to fully explain the variation in local level responses 
to the same stimuli. Unlike anthropology's micro level approach, the macro oriented works of 
political scientists and economist have until relatively recendy, rarely engaged with units smaller 
than states. 
Thus, a gap has been developing between studies located at the local level on one hand 
and their global connections, on the other. The necessity of combining both approaches can be 
clearly seen in the shortcomings of the anthropological study of conflict. One of the aims of this 
research project is to provide a case study that is sufficiendy connected to global phenomena to 
be useful in a comparative sense. 
The study of conflict and conflict resolution has been a key feature of anthropology since 
the early days of Malinowski. Epstein, Turner, along with Godfrey and Monica Wilson's early 
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studies were unable to break from the simplistic notions of 'trihtl vars' or 'ethnicstr^'. Gluckman 
(1955; 1965) argued that conflict resolution was an in^ortant vehicle for studying culture 
because it gave a glimpse as to how a society reproduces it norms and values. 
The growth of counter culture on the 1960s and the increase in publications that could 
be called Marxist Anthropology, led to an increase in the study of social conflict (Feipason 1984: 
5-7). The anthropological study of borders and frontiers can be traced in part to the work of 
Fredrick Earth (Earth 1969). Though his work focused on ethnic and group boundaries, he laid 
the foundations for the study of border peoples and border regions. As the discipline grew, 
researchers began to investigate more problematic topics. Thus the discipline has a long record 
of tacking such topics as nationalism, political economy, class, migration, stateless societies, 
violence and political conflict and as a result, a body of work both on group and intemational 
borders emerged. 
It seems that though anthropologists study societies in which war occurs, or people 
engage in warfare, thus until relatively recendy they rarely studied war itself. Therefore, what 
emerges is a picture of 'tribal conflict' between 'isolated ethnic entities' with no connection to 
state structures. Proponents of this approach regard warfare and conflict as inherent in social 
relations. It is in peoples nature to engage in conflict unless they are restrained by the 
institutions of social control. This approach reflects both the Hobbesian and Durkheimian 
perspectives. The former paints a picture of a humin propensity for aw^ia, which must be mitigated 
and controlled by the state through violence, or the threat of violence. This human propensity 
towards violence in pursuit of self-interest is a fact of human nature, hence the purpose of the 
state is to keep various forces in check. The latter, Durkheimian view holds that the source of 
peace and order in society lies in the moral authority exerted by the group over its members. 
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Contemporary anthropology has gone a long way in showing the shortcomings of these 
approaches. The very nature of fieldwork allows anthropologists to see the state as do its 
citizens and in some cases its victims. According to Kenyan Scholar iE. Njeru the defining 
feature of the anthropological study of conflict and conflict resolution it focus on attempts to 
explain armed conflicts as a universal feature of the human condition manifesting itself in 
culturally specific terms (Njeru 1998:4). 
Georg Simmel was perhaps one of the first academics to conduct an in-depth study of 
conflict and violence from a culturally EMIC point of view. His 1902 work that focused on 
violence as a synchronic event in the relationship between individuals and groups striving to 
achieve certain implicit goals though simplistic, can nonetheless be viewed as the foreruxmer of 
the modem anthropological study of confrontation and confrontational groups. As this basic 
structural approach was modified and refined, however the field has become more and more 
fragmented. 
Building on Simmel's approach Schmidt and Schroder (Schmidt and Schroder 2001: 1) 
aipje that the more one tries to categjrize a^rfiict the more umaddy the categmes beocne. In an attempt to 
add validity to their work, the authors h^hlight the fact that all of these strategies make certain 
assumptions. Namely (Schmidt and Schroder 2001: 3): 
1. Violence is never completely idiosyncratic. 
2. Violence is never completely senseless or more correcdy meaningless especially to 
the participants, observers and victims. 
3. Violence is never totally isolated. 
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It is also important to realize that implicit in all forms of conflict is the notion of 
performance, that is, without an audience violence is meaningless. Therefore, for violence to be 
effective it must be real as well as symbolic (Schmidt and Schroder 2001: 6). Tayior in his 1999 
work on the Rwandan Genocide highlights how acts of violence and torture are locally symbolic 
'since sodal system inscribe lawuntx) the bodies (f djdr subjects' (Ta)dor 1999: 104-106). During the 1994 
genocide the world was flooded with images of corpse-choked rivers. According to the author 
even this was a symbolic act, since it was only the rivers that flowed north, to the 'mythical 
homeland' of the 'Tutsi invaders', into which the extremists dumped their victims (Taylor 1999: 
128-130). 
The same is true in the case of Sierra Leone, where Richards highlights the fact that the 
severing of villagers' hands had a dual purpose. It firsdy deterred voting and stopped the 
harvesting of rice which threatened the Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) ability to recrviit what 
Richards called 'hun^ conscripts' among the starving rural populace. It also to serve as a warning 
to locals to remain loyal to the rebellion and as a message to their enemies that attack and similar 
punishment is always imminent (Richards 1996: 6). Such a locally symbolic form of violence is 
also common in Darfur and now in Tchad, where Arab militias frequendy bind their victims in a 
form reminiscent of the slave raids of the past. Directed towards the region's African 
communities who as Muslims had never been subject to such raids, their purpose is to negate, 
not only the history of these populations, but also to disinherit them from them protection 
afforded to them as Muslims against such raids, even during times of open warfare. \ 
Margaret Mead described warfare as a state in which ''the oorfiict is orginized and socially 
sanctioned, and the kiRir^ is not regirded as rrmder' (Mead 1968: 215). According to Schmidt and 
^ In fact many of the region's African populations were responsible for raiding and enslaving non-Muslim 
populations to the south. 
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Schroder' War in the sirrplest sense, is a state <f oarfrataikn vhere the tee and more inportandy the perpetual 
threat cf valence are re^dar and kgtimct^ (Schmidt and Schroder 2001: 1). Geoige Elwert, in his 
1997 work, used the term 'rmrkets <f vdenoe' to describe states of long-term upheaval, during 
which norms and overarching power structures are absent. During these periods, rational actors 
will employ violence as a means of achieving certain goals, such as access to resources or power 
(Elwert 1999). In common with most Game Theory oriented analyses of war, those who 
commit acts of violence are merely pawns in the power games of elites. All actors are culturally 
motivated, that is, the values attached to the benefits of violence are culturally relative, in the 
same way as specific acts of violence may be culturally relative. The benefits of Elwert's 
approach are that it allows for a more permanent character to episodes of war and conflict. 
Giinter Schlee however aigues that the drawback of this approach is the myopic focus on 
what is contested and not ^isho fi^ iihon^ (Schlee 2004: 150). According to him the problem 
with the ^Markets of Violence' approach is that the state is not an actor, it is merely the referee. 
However, in today's complex wars this is simply not the case. In many instances states 
themselves are either participants in markets of violence or prizes to be won. Other drawbacks 
of the Markets of Violence approach lie in its focuses on the actions of individual actors, whUe 
ignoring the role of larger socio-cultural structures and forces. 
During the cold war era, a rise in violent conflict led to a pressing need for thorough 
analysis of conflict by both academic and development planners. As a result, a host of think 
tanks, institutes and centres of conflict resolution sprang up throughout the world's metropolitan 
centres. Many were attached to well known universities, and boasted a multidisciplinary 
approach to the study and analysis of conflict. One of the earliest works of this period was 
Thomas Schelling's 'StrateQ/ cf Corflict', which took a game theorist approach to the study of 
25 
conflict and exposed how in some situations actors may act irrationally to gain the advantage 
(Schelling 1960). 
No two works are perhaps more represenutive of the pessimism and hyper-hysteria that 
characterized the late cold war than Huntington's Oash (f Ciiilizcmons and Kaplan's The Ccmr% 
A mnhy Haw Scarcity OVTB, Oierpcptdatim and Disease are Rapidly Destrayir^ the Social Fabric cf Our 
Planet. These two works, though extreme in outlook, do however touch on two important points 
- the role of environmental scarcity in increasing conflict and the flawed foundations of most 
nation states. 
Consider the mtp cf the norid, mdo its 190 or so countries, eado sigvfied by a bold and 
laifarm odor, this mtp, zeiih nhido all cf tis haze gvun up, is ^nerally an invmtion cf modernism, 
spedfically cf European colonialism Modernism, in the sense cf iihich I speak, be§zn mth the rise cf 
narionrstates in Europe ard wzs oarfLrmed by ihe dazth cf feudalismat the erd cf dx Thirty Years' 
War-an eient that nas interposed betueen the Renaissance and the Erii^Ttenment, ishido toother gtve 
birdotornodemsdenoe. Pecpkvierestdderiyjhehmdjanent^ Themtp, 
based on sdent^ tedyrnques cf m^urenvnt, cf^redamty to classify newnatiorud or^nism, rrakir^a 
ji^awpuzzle cf next pieces mthout transition zones betaeen them Trontie/ is itsdf a modem concept 
that didn't exist in the faidal rrind And as European nations carzjedout far-flung (ionnins at the sanv 
tirm that print technology wis mtkir^ the reproduction cf rraps doeaper, otrto^aphy came into its aim 
as a leay cf creating facts by ordervr^the wzy ne look attheuorid" (Kaplan 1994). 
In his book Irmgned Comnurnties: Rflections on the On^ and Spread cf Nationalism 
(Anderson 1991), Benedict Anderson demonstrates how the map enabled colonialists to think 
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about their holdings in terms of a 'tatalizir^dass^katorygid.. It wis bounded, detmrincOe, andther^bre-
•in pnnciple--courjtable.' To the colonialist, country maps were the equivalent of an accountant's 
ledger books. Kaplan takes this point even farther when he aigiues that maps, ^shaped the^arrmtr' 
that would make possible such questionable concepts as Iraq, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and 
Nigeria (Kaplan 1994) 
Tainter's work in the volume The State, Identity and Violence aig;ues that rather than 
screaming that the sky is falling, a quick examination of the historical record shows that periods 
of collapse and reconstitution are the norm (Tainter 2003: 67-74). Kay Warren arg;ues in the 
same volvmie that conflict and violence are not exceptional moments in history, but rather 
integral parts of the social fabric (Warren 2003: 105). 
Much of this period was characterized by the dissipation of the optimism that had 
permeated early post cold war writing. Confronted with the global realities of internal, regional, 
ethnic, religious and state level conflict many academics, writers and indeed planners began to 
speak of a new global chaos. With the dramatic series of state collapse and incessant warfare in 
the Balkans, Caucuses, Colombia, Central, South and South East Asia, the Great Lakes Region, 
Tchad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan, the topic of state building and redesignii^ 
the state cannot be considered merely an academic debate. Given the poor record of state 
consolidation and the inability of many states to effectively project power, it becomes clear that 
debate must begin in order to find out what are the alternatives. The question must be asked: 
Are all (f the current states indxpcst-colcmd norid, especially in Africa, TiaUeinthelongtemi 
Though there is a growing literature on failed states in the fields of economic and 
political science, these are mainly geared towards putting failed states back on track as quickly as 
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possible. Most of the literature fails to address the root causes of state collapse, that is, the 
genesis of African states. Ackno^^dedging this reality McRae and Zwi argue that: 
^dabilitycf reimentir^ arid inpcsir^ the Western dsnixratic tradition is sardy questicmi in 
the current Africxn conteKt Modds (f devdcprrent'idjido faii to adzrmile^^ 
aOm vhoha-wa Tjested interest in urderrrirm^^j^^ 
or sedz to disarpouer distinct population gr»^, igTore the potential for ocffiict that exists ard the 
std^ecp^ threat to stetaimh^ and eqtdtabkckidcprnmt, (McRae and Zwi 1994: 22). 
With this as a backdrop, access to and control over resources becomes even more 
important in maintaining a way of hfe and since the central government in a sense holds all the 
keys, the struggle for control of this resource (the government) has become more violent. The 
nature of and rewards to be had from, conflict have changed dramatically in post-colonial Africa 
and as a result, the objective of the central government is to secure its own position not ordy by 
defeating a foe on the batdefield but more importantiy by removing its ability to mobilize. One 
can see the dilemma this creates when mobilization is along ethnic lines. 
Political scientists McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly have coined the term contentious politics to 
describe struggles for the state itself. They describe contentious politics as: 
^isodic, ptMic and oolkctiiB interaoim arra^ makers cf dains ard thdr objects tehen (a) at 
least one gjvsmrmnt is daimtnt, an object cf dains or party to the daimand(b) doe daim zwuld i f , 
realizedc^ect the interests (fat least ere (f doe daimtnts (McAdam et al 2001: 5). 
The authors divide political contention into two broad categories: contained is. transgfessviE 
or institutional is. unccnuenticnaL The distinguishing feature between the two kinds of contention is 
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that in the former the actors involved are aheady established as political actors, while in the latter 
at least some of the parties are ^neulysdf ident^wdpditicd actors and or at least some (f the parties errploy 
inrtouxdi£ ooUecti'ie action' (McAdam et al 2001: 5). According to these authors action is innovative 
if it includes means of collective action that are deemed unprecedented or illegal by the 
governing regime. One can ai^ ;ue that the modem history of the African continent has been a 
contentious one, in which political innovation rather than conformity has been the norm. 
Ferguson takes the idea of contentious politics even further and aji^es that the state 
itself mvist be seen as not only an actor but also as a political innovator. The resource 
reallocation role of the post-colonial state, with its swollen civil service, cannot be denied, but 
more importantly this role makes the state itself an inviting target for those who seek to: 
1. alter \n4io controls the state 
2. alter who the state controls 
3. alter how a goverrunent rules 
Thus, William Reno's arg;ument that government weakness causes intemal violence is not 
totally correct (Reno 1998), since the government itself is the prize. Ferguson a r ^ s that 
conflicts in which capturing the government is the objective, usually follow three trajectories 
(Ferguson 2003: 30): 
1. radically altering or replacing the social base of those who rule and the premises 
of government 
2. tearing apart old states into new domains with different geographic centres of 
government 
3. the retraction of rule away from peripheral areas of the state 
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Klaus Jui^en Gantzel points out that svch conflicts are far more intractable than 
interstate wars since, firstly, the international community lacks a well defined procedure for 
dealing with them and secondly, internal wars are usually fought with small arms which means 
that decommissioning is easily avoided when a setdement is reached. The third and perhaps 
most important difference between inter-state and intra-state wars is the fact that the latter are 
particularly detrimental to the lives and livelihoods of civilians who are invariably the main 
targets. Thus while in WWI and WWII civilians accounted for 10% and 52% of all casualties 
respectively, it has been estimated that in contemporary intra state wars civilians account for as 
much as 90% of all fatalities (Tuiton 1997: 1-3). The reasons for this phenomenon lies in the 
fact that intra-state wars are usually fought with irregular poorly trained and paid infantry 
(notable exceptions are the American and Spanish civil wars), thus looting and crime become 
legitimate methods to obtain personal wealth. Also, the ability of fighters to blend into the local 
populace makes leaders of both side suspicious of, and insensitive to ,crimes committed against 
the civilian population (Kalyvas 2001: 5). 
What becomes apparent from the literature is that a comparative analysis of all aspects of 
conflict has been lacking. That is, conflict can be divided into cavises, incidents, and results, 
which can all be studied in conjunction or analyzed comparatively as entities in their own right. 
More recendy, anthropology has moved away from this form of analysis, which is rapidly 
becoming the norm in Political Science. In the former discipline a more EMIC view of conflicts 
has become fashionable, that is, the analysis of the insiders' experience of violence as opposed to 
the imposed categories of types and results of violence. Though both approaches have their 
benefits and drawbacks, it caimot be denied that an approach that utilizes strides made by both 
disciplines will be far more beneficial. When seen in a multidimensional light one can tie various 
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elements to themes relating to nationalism, and ethnicity since these are the most common 
causes of large scale violence. 
The upsurge of ethnic conflicts described previously has elicited a wide variety of 
theoretical explanations from scholars with a whole host of differing theoretical and ideological 
backgrounds. To some, violent and non-violent conflicts between different ethnic groups within 
a given state are a normal phenomenon, \ ^ c h emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as 
violent manifestation of a people's quest for self-determination- based on cultural perceptions of 
difference. In many cases, violent conflict can therefore be understood as a manifestation of the 
political and cultural failure to ameliorate or resolve societal cleavages through negotiation or 
other forms of accommodation. 
Just as culture is an important component of many conflicts it is also an important 
element in conflict resolution (Burton & Dukes 1990; Kozan 1997; Bryne & Irvin 2000). Burton 
affirms that culture and more importandy cultural symbols are vital because they are easily 
recognizable and important to most members of a given community. He argues that traditional 
societies are more inclined towards rituals and symbolism that leads to co-operative problem 
solving, rather than the confrontation and 'power bargaining' which has become the vogue in 
the west (Burton & Dukes 1990). 
Lederach and Goner in their 1990 work also advocate the necessity of culturally sensitive 
and indigenous approaches to conflict resolution. In the African context, this would involve 
incorporating various traditional practices and approaches into the conten^orary mechanisms of 
conflict resolution (Lederach and Coner 1990). Augsburger argues that in traditional cultures, 
there exist what he calls 'pathways' in the ethnic wisdom for managing conflicts, which can easily 
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be eroded by outside interference or political manipulation (Augsburger 1992). The latter is 
particularly resonant with this work on Darfur. 
Qioudree, in a similar vein, argues that the role of such culturally specific forms of 
conflict resolution is to restore balance settle as well as conflicts (Qioudree 1999: 11). He 
suggests that a key feature of the success of such 'informal lit^ation' is the role and position of 
traditional leaders. 
The heacbrm or doi^ nho preside oier traditicmL courts are ^ nercdly dxirisrratk and, farrdiar 
wth doe pqndaoe doat tee doe courts, are reuered to an extent that jud^ are not, are wont to 
playanacdue rde in doeprooBedir^ ardarenatshytosti^trrBdiationatalrnostanypoint in 
doeprooeedir^ in rrtttters susceptible to dMtfcmi(fres(htion{ChoudTee 1999: 14). 
The management of conflicts is thus dependent on understanding not only the causes of 
conflict, but also the culturally specific method of conflict management. In Africa traditional 
forms of conflict resolution have tended to be communal affairs. According to Grande dispute 
resolution in the Horn of Africa is only inddentaUy indiudml, what matters is the communal peace 
within the group and with its neighbours (Grande 1999: 64). 
Today African societies as a whole, and those displaced Darfuri in particular, are 
undei^omg a socio-political transformation that involves a change in values, often reflected in 
loss of traditional reference points. In states such as the Sudan and Tchad there is an uneven 
and unequal distribution wealth and power, coupled with the competition for scarce resources, in 
some cases conflict becomes almost inevitable. In the case of the Sudan, the problem is further 
complicated by a number of other factors including, but not limited to cultural, ethnic and 
religious divisions. As is to be expected in conflict prone societies forms of conflicts mitigation 
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have emerged. In northern Sudan, particularly in the Darfur region, the practice is known as 
Judiy)a. The people who act as mediators are called Ajawd - singular Ajmtdi According to 
Adam Azzain Mohamed a Darfuri expert on conflict and conflict resolution in the Sudan: 
In its historical context, Judiyya. is perfomed by the tribal elderly isho are lersed in custcm and 
traditions and are reputed for their irnpartiality ard peace ladng. In ^neral, in rural Sudan the elderly 
teed to ergoy hi^ re^rd from all members (f the local oorrmiraty Their wotds cf isisdom are rardy 
disputed Over the course (f time Judiyya aapdred sarictity To fail to respect Judiyyi rulir^ sulyects one 
to considerable oommrkdpressure. One mill be labded as "deiiant" - a chrimmtal wrdict in situations 
inhere groi^ solidarity ard support are vXal for one's security and udl-being (Mohamed 2002b). 
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C H A P T E R 3 
M E T H O D O L O G Y 
Fie/c/work is a form o/ in^^uiTy in w^ic^ one is immersed persona/fy in t/?e 
ongoing socia/ activity o/some indiza^Jua/ or group /or t^e purposes o/research. 
Fie^work is c^aracterizei^ l>y persorral invo/zement to ac/?ieve some /eve/ o/ 
understanding t/rat wi//he s/>ared wit/> ot/rers 
(Walcott 2001: 66). 
In his 2001 work, Kevin Avruch arg;ued that relative to the number of conflicts, there are 
surprisingly few anthropological accounts of 'var, oorfiia, and lidencE- or, in the more fortunate cases in 
ishixh the oorflicts haie 'gjne inaoi'iE'... (f post corfiict transfimatims, wcmdliatian and peace hdldb^' 
(Avruch 2001: 638). The aim of this work is to help fi l l this gap by theorizing social change, 
conflict and conflict resolution without removing them from the environmental, historical, 
cultural, political and indeed human setting, in which they lay. This kind of analysis can only be 
accomplished if one steps back and takes a broader look at regional phenomena before trying to 
decipher the meaning of local or culturally unique elements. This work wiU historicize regional 
conflict and examine how current conflicts affected the lives of Darfuri refugees and their 
leadership present in Eastem Tchad. The aim is to examine the effects of long term 
displacement in Tchad on traditional structures of authority among Darfuri refugees. 
The ethnographic research for this PhD took place between October 2005 and August 
2006, a period of just over nine months. For the majority of my research I travelled six days a 
week with the CARE staff to the refugee camps of Mile and to a lesser extent Am Nabak and 
conducted about 3-6 interviews a day. I had hoped to stay in the camp permanendy but this was 
dismissed out of hand, because of security concerns. It was not until much later when I had 
34 
proved the value of my research and also built up a rapport with the CARE staff in the camp and 
more importantly with the managers in Abeche, that permission was given for me to live in Mile 
can^. I did so for two periods of about a month each. While in Mile I shared a tent with my 
interpreter Salih and his brother Ahmat. Salih would become the engine that drove my research 
and his enthusiasm and indeed knowledge about Idara A halia proved invaluable. 
Throughout the research period, frequent trips were made to Abeche to buy supplies and 
brief CARE and the UNHCR on my research. My arrangement with CARE was a straight 
forward one. In exchange for being allowed to conduct my research in the can^ I would share 
my results with the NGO and conduct research for them if they required. As a result, I would 
return to Abeche for short periods to brief them on my research. However, in spite of the fact 
that both Abeche and Mile were both comparatively safe, the road between them was not and I 
was often stranded in Abeche for long periods. The research period can be broken into the 
following phases: 
Phase 1: three weeks in N'djamena for permits 
Phase 2: three weeks in Abeche for contacts with NGOs 
Phase 3: 4 days in Darfur 
Phase 4: 4 months of daily research in Mile and Am Nabak 
Phase 5: 2 periods of just under a month each living in Mile 
During these phases, 74 formal but open ended interviews were conducted and 
numerous conversations and informal interviews recorded. The interviews can be divided 
according to the interviewee. 
CARE st^^ 7 indi-udualsJbra total (f 11 inteniem 
• 35 
Tdktdien host oomnwuties 18 indivduals 5 interdem 
OdoerNGOst^ 2 indiiidmis 2 inteniem 
UNHCRst^ 4 indiuduak 7 intervem 
16 iruimdmls 52 inteniezis 
The types of interviews I conducted can be divided into three categories: 
• Background interviews with NGO and UNHCR staff 
• Information 'gathered' on Tchadien politics and rebel movements 
• Research in the Refugee camps 
Backffvund inter'uem iiido Ngy and UNHQi st^ 
The earliest and perhaps the most structured of the interviews conducted during the 
course of the research were interviews with the staff of intemational NGOs and UNHCR. 
These interviews were organised around ten or so key questions and designed to get as much 
information as humanly possible from these busy officials. They usually lasted about thirty 
minutes and were conducted in English and consisted of me asking fairly general background 
questions about the NGOs work in Tchad. 
Irfonmtion 'gidoered' on Tdxtdien politics and rdxi rrtnenvnts 
By the end of my research period the information I had come to possess on Tchad's 
political and military situation constituted a large portion of my work. One simply caimot be in a 
country and not be bombarded with information on the politics of that state. Some of the 
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earliest notes I made in fact were on the origins of a military revolt that started a mere three days 
after I entered the country. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic no interviews were 
conducted to collect information on this revolt and subsequent civil war, rather I reconstmcted 
newspaper reports and U N security briefings and corroborated rumours. However my main 
sources of information were informal unrecorded conversation with Tchadiens, most of whom 
were willing to talk about politics and the various rebellions, but in private. Being ad hoc and 
informal, any information gleaned from these sources had to be corroborated either by other 
such sources or by events on the ground. 
In addition to information from ordinary Tchadiens, due to pure happenstance over my 
time in Tchad I was able to form friendships with Tchadien rebels and government military 
commanders, who were stirprisingly open with the information they provided me. I would 
regularly update UNHCR safety and security officials on what I had learned and in turn they 
would do the same to me. Goverrunent officials, military personnel, reporters, and ordinary 
Tchadiens provided me with blow-by-blow accounts of the political and military situation in 
Tchad. 
Research in the Gmps 
Perhaps the most ethnographic of the various categories of information gathered, was 
research on camp life. This was made up of first hand ethnographic accounts of life in the 
refugee camp as I saw it and through my interactions with refugees, as well as interviews with 
key sources. 
In his work on interviewing, Collins notes that the dichotomy between structured and 
unstructured interviews is somewhat misleading since even the most unstructured interview is 
structured to some extent and vice versa (Collins 1998). With my own research I was not an 
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objective or disengaged interviewer, I was living in the camp with the refugees and on many 
occasions it was not the researcher, but the refugees who directed the course of the interview. 
People would come to my tent 'to talk mth about subjects they hoped would be interesting or 
useful to my research. When I initiated the interview, I usually had a few core questions or 
issues I wanted to discuss. I kept these to about ten per interview, since I noticed that with ten 
core questions and the inclusion of other follow up or tangential questions and topics the 
interview would last just under one and a half hours. 
Most of the research was conducted through interviews and conversation with just over a 
dozen key residents of Mile refugee camp and three such members of Am Nabak. I call them 
key members because of their knowledge of Idara Ahalia or Judiyyz or the administration of the 
camp made them the focus of my research. Most were experts in one area, i.e. Idara Ahalia or 
the administration of the camp, and a handful were knowledgeable in all areas. 
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Table 4: Key Residents Interviewed 
Name Ethnic and tribal Village and Position in Idara Notes No. of 
! 
1 
I 
affiliation Region I n / I n the Camp Interviews 
Musajibril- BeRa-KaUba Kerenga-Komoi Mandul>l S/?eik/p Mandul> and S/;eik/; of 2 
head of the Kerenga 
Mahkama 
Narja Khalif- BeRa-Kurru Keienga-Komoi Mandul>l S^eik/?- 74 years old, has been S/;eik/> 2 
sits on the for 53 years since 1952. He is 
Mahkama Sheik/y for 8 villages 
Abu dam, Guieada, Key ba. 
Naimti, Kerenga, Optilli , 
Mujurand Salti. 
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I Haroi 
Gani 
Tahir Hariga Boyo 
BeRa-Kumi 
BeRa-Baga Indi-Kamoi 
Komoi 
>nda in Abu Gamia since 
1990. 72 years old. I n an 
unusual case two names here 
put into a bag and one 
selected to be the SAeik^. At 
the time he was a wealthy 
trader and did not what to be 
OmdahyxM was told he could 
not refuse by his family. 
96 year old when I met him, 
died in 2007, bom in I i d i close 
to Kamo. ^ p o i n t e d as Omda 
in the late 1940s. 
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BeRi-
Rahman Flarba Gatiua. He moved to Saref 
Omia at the age of 60 and was 
a S/feiM there for 24 years. 
He was subordinate to Omda 
Diah Abdullah of the Hotiyya. 
Munsar Madi Ni l BeRa- Hilaliya-Komoi 1 
Abdullah BeRa- Abu Gamia- Sj^eik/; of Abu Ganua, has 1 
Muhammad been S/;eik/;s since the deadi 
Gadem- ofhis father i n 1991 
Mahamod Anu BeRi-Kapka Habilah 1 
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Hassan Borgo 
Ab<M Malik Bahar 
Yousuff Nour 
Terayo 
BeRa-Kapka 
BeRa 
BeRi-Baga 
Tundebay 
Giigiia 
Iridi- Komoi 
Sultan 
Amir 
Member of Komoi 
court and 
Mahkama 
66 years old from I r idi . Went 
Quf'anic school in Kuttum at 
the age of 13 for 11 years of 
t ra in i i^ i n Islamic 
Jurispmdence. Upon his 
graduation he married and 
few years later he was selected 
by the government to sit on 
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Salih Muhammad 
Shumu 
Adam Abdul 
Rahman 
BeRa-Baga 
BeRa -Kurm 
Adar-Kepkabia 
Giigo Rahat 
Kasha-
Kepkabia 
Omdds secretary 
Deputy Omda 
u i t to ret 
the Baga tribe. 
Educated, and was a high 
school teacher and secretary 
of Omda Abakr Bashar of 
Adarwhowas Omdaiotd-l 
years prior to the conflict 
Salih was secretary for 4 years. 
Bom in U m m Burro moved 
permanently to Rahat Kasha 
in 1983. He was the Natb of 
Omda Abakr Bashar of Adar 
who was Omdaiox fy7 yt^rs 
prior to the conflict Adam 
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'Doctor'Adam Fur-Kunjara Shau Shau- OmdJs aide Trained as a doctor's assistant 5 
Musa Kuttum in Darfur, he also served as 
for Yahyia 
Muhammad Adam, the latter 
was (9/^ ^?^ for 5 years and the 
former assistant for 3 prior to 
the war. The 6fe7^2^had20 
S^eik/ps under him. 
ZelH Ibrahim Tama Mile Chef de village de S&eiMA of Mile village for the 2 
(Tchadien) Mile past for 34 years. He took the 
role after his father was 
replaced by the army of 
^ ^ ^ ^ Hissene Habre because he 
44 
Nour Adam 
Dunkas 
Sadiq Arhab 
Arab (Tchadien) 
BeRa-Baga 
Toluk-Mile 
Abu Ganua ChefdeBlockl 
Arabic well 
enough to act as a liaison 
between the military and the 
village. At the time his father 
had be sultan for over 45 years 
and was mote than 90 years 
old. He had inherited the 
position when his own father 
died. 
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Adam 
Makboul 
Muhamimd Abakr 
BeRa Bir Karsaid -
Komoi-Komoi 
CCf community 
service assistant 
President of 
women's 
committee 
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All participation in the project was voluntary. No participant received any form of 
monetary compensation. AH participants were approached direcdy either by myself or my 
interpreter Salih and briefed about the research project in Arabic or BeRa depending on who was 
doing the briefing. Interviews were organized into sittings. During the first interview I gave 
them a detailed biography of myself in Arabic and outlined the purpose of the interview. The 
first interview usually lasted between 30 - 60 minutes. I f the interviewee had to leave, to 
complete a task or anything else, the interview would end and be resumed the following day. 
Interviews were conducted in a mix of Arabic, BeRa and English with a BeRa to Arabic 
interpreter present. My interpreter Salih, who was fluent in BeRa, Arabic and English, had 
previously been employed in the camp as an interpreter for an intemational NGOs. In addition 
to being professional, Salih was very knowledgeable about the issues of Idara Ahcdia and was 
genuinely interested in the research. On numerous occasions he actively sought out indiAaduals 
to be interviewed, even carrying out preliminary interviews in some instances. 
Questions were usually asked by the researcher in Arabic and responses given in Arabic 
by most of the interviewees. The fact that the vast majority of the BeRa speak Arabic as a 
second language meant that almost all of the inhabitants of the camp had some knowledge of 
standard Arabic -or the Ouaddai-Darfuri Arabic dialect at least. Some however, notably many of 
the older interviewees and a large portion of the camps' female population, felt more 
comfortable speaking in BeRa. In these instances questions were asked in English through the 
interpreter and BeRa responses were translated into English by the interpreter. All interviews 
were written up in English by hand and typed up the same night. 
All names and identifiers were removed and respondents given pseudonyms to make 
them unidentifiable. Interestingly all of my key interviewees wanted their names to be included 
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in the study. For them it was a matter of pride having helped to ensure the longevity of their 
culture. Most asked me to make sure they were mentioned and took pains to make sure I spelt 
their name properly. Thus, I continued to use ciphers and pseudonyms for all respondents, 
except my key sotirces. 
Since I was living in the camp and also collecting ethnographic information on the BeRa 
and their life a large portion of the interviews and of my daily routine was dedicated to issues 
relating to problems in the camp. Many of the refugees knew me, or had leamt of my research 
and they saw me as a first point of contact -wdien there was a problem. Since I made regular trips 
to the field office in Gureada I was seen as being close to the CARE bosses. This meant that 
many refugees would seek my assistance with their daily problems. My policy on offering 
assistance was clear from the start. Any help or assistance I could offer the refugees I would. As 
a result I was frequently involved in bringing their complaints to the attention of CARE and the 
UNHCK In most instances I was able to bring a satisfactory solution to problems ranging from: 
the non-payment of refugee salaries to the construction of more latrines and the refurbishment 
of schools. 
The fact that I was willing to live in the camp and take the refugees' complaints to the 
CARE officials meant there were some questions asked by the Tchadien staff in the camp. They 
could not understand why someone would want to put themselves through such an experience. 
The generally poor relations between the refugees and the Tchadien camp staff meant that when 
I highlighted problems to the CARE management it seemed as though I was taking the side of 
the refugees. To combat this I tried to spend as much time with the camp staff as possible when 
I was not in the camp. However time spent with the Muslim staff meant that Christian staff 
members, who aheady thought of me as a Muslim sympathizer, because I wore a jallahiya, were 
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less willing to socialize with me. The fact that I do not speak French also meant that the 
Southemers who worked in the camp could not readily socialize with me. 
In the camp I was not fully an outsider. I ate meagre rations communally with the 
refugees, lost we^ht with them when food supplies were low, and had parched and cracked lips 
when the water pumps did not work. I walked the can^ freely and took part in all aspects of 
camp life, sports, visitir^, and socializing in addition to conducting my research. However I was 
never really an insider. Though I was knowledgeable about Islam I did not pray, I could not 
speak BeRa, even with the all the effort I devoted to learning the language. My position was best 
characterized by the nephews of my interpreter Salih who never leamt my name (I had Arabized 
it to Kwaisi which means gxd or OLK but they did not speak Arabic). They initially called me 
Salth-ow(Sdih'spenaj and later tm-owfOurpersa^. Not quite a BeRa but ours none the less. 
Thus, a complex picture of shifting alliances and definitions of self, other, insider, 
outsider is painted. Research and writing on such situations will never be a simple matter. 
Speaking on research in (and or on) conflict situations Robben and Nordstrom argue that 'Vested 
interests, personal histories, ideologml Icyzldes, prcpagtnck ard a ckarth cf firsthand irforrmtim ensttre that 
there are rrarvf d^irntions... and riegtiatedhalf-truths'(Kohhen, A & Nordstrom, G 1995: 5). 
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C H A P T E R 4 
R E S E A R C H SETTING 
Map 3: The Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region 
O U A O 
C o n f l l e d 2 o n M i 
BBCnem ledsite 
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/ physical Setting 
Jiatier t/?an determimng socialpractices, eco/ogy seems to provides a wide framework 
/orifuite distinctpattems o/adaptation (Schlee 2004: 141). 
The Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region lies between 22 and 8 degrees latitude north and 27 
and 20 degrees longitude east. The area encompasses the Tchadien Regions of B.E.T. (the 
Ennedi sub region onl)^, Wadi Fira, Ouaddai* and Salamat; moving from north to south and the 
Sudanese States of North, South and West Darfur (the historical Darfur' region). The Greater 
Ouaddai-Darfur Region is broken up by numerous mountain ranges that typically run on a north 
to south axis. These include the Jebel Marra Massif in Darfur (13.0N, 24.5E), which towers to 
3042 meters at its highest point. West of this is the smaller Kapka range. Still travelling west 
one encounters the Ouaddai Highlands running 50km from north to south, averaging between 
500 and 1000 meters in height. These Highlands mark Tchad's eastern bonder and also divide 
the Tchad and Nile watersheds (Ministere Du Plan 2005:10). The picture is basically of a 
highland core and wooded savannas and forests to the south, the Sahara to the north and 
lo-wdand savannas to the east and west. The entire region is generally arid with one rainy season 
from July to August when as much as 36 millimetres of rain can fall. During the cold winter, 
November to January, temperatures can drop to 33 degrees. The hottest time of the year is May 
when temperatures can reach 46. 
The region can be divided into three geographical and climatic zones that run in 
horizontal bands: 
•* The name Ouaddai refers to both the pre-colonial state (1650s-1905) and the modem Tchadien region. The 
latter occupies and the truncated southern portion of the former. 
' The name Darfur refers to both the pre-colonial state (1400s-1916) and the modem region in the Sudan which 
includes West, North and South Darfiir 
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The Saharan Bard-
Covers all land north of approximately 15 degrees north. Most of this area 
receives only traces of rain during the entire year, some areas as litde as three centimetres 
as year. Scattered oases and wtdis provided water for the regions agriculture, mainly 
mOlet/dukhttn, Gum Arabic, and date palms. This region covers most of North Darfur, 
Wadi Fira and all of the Ennedi sub-region of the B.E.T. 
The SaMian Band: 
A 500km wide band of semi-arid land runs south of the Sahara and includes all of 
Ouaddai and the vast majority of Darfur. The dominant life forms are thomy shrubs and 
acacia tree which grow wild and date palms and Gum Arabic which are cultivated around 
oases. The region is also home to numerous species of drought resistant grasses and 
small shmbs and receives about 15 to 50 centimetres of rain a year. 
The Souckraan Band-
The Soudanian region is predominantly savaimah or plains covered with a mixture of 
subtropical grasses and woodlands. Though plants grow well here in the rainy season, the land 
become brown and dormant during the dry season November to March. It is wetter than the 
Sahelian Zone with greater expanses of grassland broken by islands of shrubs and trees. 
Permanent open water sources are not found in the Saharan, or Sahelian Zone; in fact 
even in the Soudanian Zone the Bahr Salamat is the only permanent water source. Following the 
rainy season, water may flow through wadis for a few days or weeks. The most important Wadis 
in the region are the Batha, and the Wadi Howar known as the Wadi Kobe, Shedi and Komoi in 
its various courses. 
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2 Ouaddaiand ]^difira: T^e Re/uciant Hosts 
T/;e Lands o/t^e Big Stone 
Vou ^ave seen t^is p/ace... Tciad is a zast country; /wm /;ere to 
N djamena ^ow many ki/o metres is t/;at^ In some parts / am even to id t^ere are 
trees and water t/;at is in rizers a// t^e time. Places w/;ere t/;e sons of Adam do 
notlrave to dig /or water U^y not take tire refugees tie re. Here tie re/ugees are 
like a lig stone on our leads and now tie agencies want to Iring more, add 
anotler stone on top o/tlat Tlis is not/ust/ 
Tchadien Chef de Village, Wadi Fira Region, 2006 
The Tchadien Regions of Wadi Fira and Ouaddai have played host to the Darfuri 
refugees for almost five years. The first camp for Darfuri refugees in Tchad, Karwungi, was 
opened in January 2004 and the last, Gagi, became operational in 2""* May 2005. Today close to 
250,000 Sudanese refugees from Darfur reside in 12 refugee can^s, scattered in the Regions of 
Ouaddai and Wadi Fira close to the Darfur border. The name Ouaddai sometimes encompasses 
both Wadi Fira and Ouaddai, since Wadi Fira was previously a part of the Sultanate of Ouaddai 
and was only separated from the latter in 1949 by the French colonial regime. 
Prior to the arrival of the Darfuri refugees, the two host regions had a very low 
population density, on average less than seven inhabitants per km2 (Ministere Du Plan 2005: 23). 
The host regions of Ouaddai and Wadi Fira were home to 48,058 nomads in 1998, representing 
some 13% of the total nomad population in Tchad (Ministere Du Plan 2005: 22). 
Wadi Fira is home to some 15,708 nomads representing some 8.5% of the region's 
population (Ministere Du Plan 2005: 22). The remainder of the population is almost entirely 
rural and Muslim. The vast majority of the population, some 86% are iUiterate. Male illiteracy 
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stands at 72%, while female illiteracy stands at some 96%. The region is thus just below the 
national average of 89.2% illiteracy (Ntoteie Du Plan 1998: 43-45). 
Map 4: Ethnic groups in Ouaddai and Wadi Fira 
Carte N*8 Repartition Ethniquede la Population 
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(Ministere Du Plan 2005:22) 
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This multi ethnic region is home to numerous ethnic groups the most important being: 
The BeRa, the Tama, the Arabs, the Maba, the Abu Charib, and the Mimi (Ministere Du Plan 
1998: 12). Since 2002 Tchad has been divided into 18 Regions, which are composed of 50 
departments and 202 sub-Prefectures. The region Wadi Fira where this research was conducted 
is administered as follows: 
Table 5: Administrative system in Wadi Fira 
Region'" Department Sub prefecture Canton 
Wadi Fira 
184,807 
Iriba 
35,562 
Iriba 
Tine 
Matadjana 
Guteada 
58,262 
Gureada 
Kalonga 
Serim-Biike 
' Note: All population statistics are approx and taken from the 1993 census (Ministere Du Plan 2005:22). 
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Biltine 
90,000 
Am-Zoer 
Arada 
Biltine 
Mata 
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J. T^e Camps 
When the Darfuri refugees arrived, the UNHCR and the various NGOs in eastern Tchad 
were primarily concemed with the four key areas of refugee welfare: food, water, shelter and 
health care. The unspoken rule of the U N seemed to be that camps should be kept at a 
population of around 10,000 and the agency tried to ease this pressiore by opening new camps 
when necessary and feasible (Black 1998: 104). As a result twelve relatively small camps are now 
located in the Ouaddai and Wadi Fira Regions. The distribution of these camps in Tchad can be 
divided into five distinct zones: 
1. Dar Sila Camps of: 
Dar Assoungha Camps of: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Djabal 
Kou Kou 
Gaga 
Farchana 
Treguine 
Bredjing 
Dar Tama Camps of: 
Dar Kobe Camps of: 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Mile 
Konoungu 
Iridimi 
Tollum 
AmNabak 
Dar Bideyat Camp of: 
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Oure Cassoni 
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Map 5 
UNHCR Ethrudty of Sudanese refugees-Eastern Chad !^ £P„?J,!^ f 
TO UN At of Jar 200e 
OKIOLl 
Indimi 
Touloum o 
TQiogon 
cDurini . 
Am NabaM Bordoba 
Oure Casson Bougouradi 
IgPCuereda 
S U D A N 
ONoursi Adya 
Orgaybao 
Iridimi 
Tologon 
um - -a 
C okmErt ^ 
C H A D 
E?* Gobrmoga 
(B)Guereda 
Kounoungo ' • pFohal 
oGarada 
oVgout OSatgon 
aaamo^ma 0 A m ,;oer 
OGoroumi;;; 
etouminge / 
qMata ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Gaga \ 
Gaga 
\ 0 
* Farchana 
ach4 ; 
0 oGinedile 
Badind 
Farchana D)ambQ Fiikarfl 
m Dout Goz 
oVomaajamal 
fn Baram Dad)o OChokov 
oChechan ; 
D4sa ; ; . ^ " ^ ^ 
V .' pTarhach. V ^ y ^ ^ 
Bredjing 
Main refugees ethnicity •Kl •Korkoro reauine 
lere Am Gena_^  
DZafai CCciibara 
bard '"-OKSS Dja^al , oKm 
GozBalda _ 
oGandaglrs 
DRafina 
Dajo 
Erenga 
Fur 
_ Massalil 
LJ Messeria_Djabal 
Tama 
Zaghawa 
• Others 
L E S E N O 
(M UNHCR sub office 
ig^ UNHCR TflkJ office 
UNHCR Prevonco 
A Rohjflee Camp 
O Seconaary lown / vtUego 
Kou Kou - Angarana 
.VGozAmer 
Owloudjoud Mam road 
SocondBry road !!jx kilometers 
DTchalak I pSodlfrMaram 
tMbaldia Prtlt ted: 2 3 / 0 1 / 2 0 0 6 
The bounoanes and names shown ard the destinations used Oh this map do net iinpty offKial enooiMmenl or acceptance bv me UnRed Nations. Soutces: UNHCR Globar tnsinht dional manniiw^a ICWl F.imna T»H,nninoi.. i M 
59 
TheDarSikGtmps 
Located in the department of Sila, in southern Ouaddai, are the camps of Djabcd and Kou 
Kou. These two camps are positioned in the area known as Dar Sila; the home region of the 
Daju ethnic group. The majority of the refugees in these two camps are Masaalit but there are 
also minorities of Fur and Daju. Relations between the Daju and the Darfuri refugees are 
generally good. The main ethnic group in the region, the Daju, actually claim to have lived in 
Darfur en route to Dar Sila from Yemen. Their history tells of their flight from Darfur when 
their kingdom was conquered by the Tunjur. The story may have some truth in it. Thoi^h they 
would have been Daju in Dar SUa long before the collapse of the Daju kingdom in Darfur, it is 
probably true that their royal family fled to Tchad as refugees and set up a new kingdom in Dar 
Sila. 
As a result of their own status as migrants, refugees if you like, the Daju royal family has 
always tried to shore up their own position by integrating migrants into the Daju ethnic group 
thereby increasing the taxable population and the potential military. As a result of this 
assimilatory approach, the Daju are willing to have outsiders in their midst as long as they abide 
by Daju rules and show some willingness to integrate into the society. The low population 
density in Dar Sila and the availability of both land and water means that there is litde conflict 
between the modem refugees and Daju. However, conflict between the refi^ees and the 
region's Arabs, the second largest ethnic group in Dar Sila, is an ever present problem The 
largest Arab group in the area the Salamit live on both sides of the Tchad Sudan border. Those 
of the Sudanese side have become a major part of the Jar^amed that drove the refugees from 
their homes. Those of the Tchadien side have sided with anti-goverrunent rebels who have allied 
with the Janjaweed to atuck government forces and unarmed refugees. In an attempt to counter 
this growing threat the Tchadien government has created and armed the Daju militias. Thus, the 
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cycle of violence and retribution, previously confined to the northern portions of the Tchad-
Darfur border, has now spread south. The camps are managed by the Italian NGO 
INTERSOS from a field office in Goz-Beida run by 54 staff members and 35 staff members 
from other NGOs. 
The A ssatr^ Carrp 
In the Department of Assoungha in eastem Ouaddai are the camps of Gagi, Tregmie, 
Bm^ir^andFardnna, which are located in the home region of the Masaalit and Asungur (Tama) 
ethnic groups. In this region the both the majority of the refugees and the majority of the 
people in the host community are Masaalit. A high level of cross border contacts and 
intermarriage prior to the conflict has meant that relation between the refugees and host 
communities are very good. The camps are run by the 25 staff members from the NGO 
COORD and 35 staff from the UNHCR and otiier NGOs. 
The Dar Tana Cznps 
Located in the department of Dar Tama, in the south of the Wadi Fira Region, are the 
camps of Konoungu and Mile. The camps lie in the boundaries of the home region of the Tama 
ethnic group. The majority of the refugees in these camps are BeRa but there are also lai^e 
minorities of Tama and Fur. Relations between the Tama and the Darfuri refi^ees are strained 
and the problems associated with this will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The camps are 
managed from the Gureada field office, although prior to January 2007 Mile was managed by 
CARE and Konoungu was managed by SECADEV (the local Tchadien branch of the Catholic 
NGO Caritas . Today both camps are managed by SECADEV. 
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The Dar Kohe Carrps 
Located in the department of Kobe, in eastern Wadi Fira, are the camps of Iridini, Tdlum 
and AmNahak. These three camps are located in the area known as Dar Kobe which is the 
home region of the Kobe subsection of the BeRa ethnic group. Almost all of the refugees in 
these camps are BeRa of the Tuer dialectic group. However, unlike the camps in Assoungha 
where relations between the refugees and the host community of the same ethnic group are 
good, this is not the case in Kobe camps. These camps are run by CARE with 20 or so staff 
members and another 24 from UNHCR and other NGOs; the field office is located in Iriba. 
The Dar Bideyat Canp 
Located in the department of Bahai, the camp of Oure Cassoni falls in the home area of 
the Bideyat subgroup of the BeRa. Relations here are even more strained than in the Kobe 
department due a long running blood feud between the BeRa of Bahai and their Darfuri 
counterparts. The Camp is managed by the IRC from a field office in Bahai. 
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4. Jiesean:^ Site: 
a: Mile Refu^ Canp: Na just A mther HiUa? 
For the more than 2.5 million Darfuri who are internally displaced in Darfur and the 
230,000 or so who are refugees in Tchad; their becoming displaced is invariably seen as a turning 
point in their lives. Entire communities lost everything they had accumulated and sacrificed for 
over the course of generations. The loss of livestock, property, land and relatives were a few of 
the negative impacts. However, displacement often allowed many Darfuri their first contact with 
the world beyond Sudan. For most, this was the first time they had to depend on the outside 
world for their very survival. Being unable to plant crops or herd animals they became totally 
dependent on the NGOs and U N organizations. 
In many respects, the site of a refugee camp is of paramount importance in predicting the 
nature and indeed the severity of a whole host of problems that a camp and its population will 
encounter. Since the initial movement of people from Darfur into Tchadien refugee camps was 
over a year after the first refi^ees arrived, the camps are well planned and well managed when 
compared to larger camps in Darfur, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia. The exception is Am 
Nabak, which is considered a 'spontaneous camp' or 'transit site'. The primary concem in the 
selection of sites for permanent camps is the location of underground aquifers. 
The camps of Am Nabak and Mile were chosen as case studies rather by accident, as they 
were the only camps where the implementing partners were willing to work with researchers. 
However, in the long run, the camps of Nfile and Am Nabak, work excellentiy as comparative 
case studies, due to their similarities: 
^ Hilla being the Tchadien Arabic word for a small village or hamlet 
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• Both are run bytheNGO CARE 
• Both are predominantly inhabited by BeRa 
• Both have similar administrative structures 
But also because they exhibit numerous differences: 
Mile is surrounded by the Tama ethnic group on whose territory the camp is located 
Am Nabak is surrounded by the Kobe tribal section of the BeRa ethnic group 
Mile is an established can^ whereas Am Nabak is classified as a transit camp 
Mile is dominated by the Tuer-GaUa dialectic group of the BeRa 
Am Nabak is dominated by the Kobe-Kapka dialectic group 
It is these differences, that make the two camps an ideal comparison, in terms not only of 
the basic administrative structures but also with regard to the role of traditional leaders in the 
camps. The camp of MUe is located in Wadi Fira, in the Department of Gureada, in the sub 
prefecture of Gureada/Lima and the Canton of Koursige. The campsite was selected by the 
UNHCR simply because of the underground aquifer, which was located some 2km from the 
Tama village of Mile. The camp's location was based on the underground aquifer and did not 
take into account the long-standing and often violent nature of conflict between the BeRa and 
the Tama, in whose heardand Mile is located. There are also numerous Arab, Bideyat, and 
Gur'an nomad camps in the vicinity and relations between the refugees and the nomads are not 
much better. The Canton of Koursige has some 31 Hilla. Mile is located some 22km north west 
of the capital of Gureada Department, Gureada. 
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Mile refugee camp was opened on the 6^ May 2004., after a three way 'Memorandum of 
Understanding' was signed between CARE, the Government of Tchad and the UNHCR. The 
Community service program was initiated on the 1" June 2004. In late 2005 when my research 
was undertaken the camp had a population of 13,419 persons (interviews with Camp Manager 
2005). 
Map 6: Mile Refugee Camp 
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Mile and Am Nabak are managed by CARE Canada, on behalf of the UNHCR. The 
CARE administration consists of 45 staff members based in Gureada, who make trips to the 
camp every weekday from 0830 to 1530- security situation allowing. On paper, Mile can^ is 
divided into 10 zones, each with five blocks of approximately 80 tents or 350 inhabitants. Each 
zone is headed by a do^de zone or Sheikh al- zone, and each block by a d)^de block or Sheikh d harr. 
The Shakh al- zone are selected from among the Sheikh d harr. The camp has a Principal 
Committee or Majlis al-Sheyuk, which has 16 members the 10 Sheikh d- zone and six other 3 of 
whom are women (Interview with Ibrahim Idriss Sabil and Fatima Muhammad Khamis; Mile, 
Tchad 23/12/2005) 
The vast majority of the refugees in Mile are Darfuri BeRa who came from at least 50 
different villages and arrived chaotically over a long period. As a result, many do not know if 
their Omda or Sheikh is present in the camp. The fact that each of these villages would have had 
a Sheikh of their own means that finding or including any of these traditional leaders in the of the 
camp is not wholly feasible. 
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b A mNabak R^i^ Canp: Wekcwre toKardihar 
Am Nabak was esublished in May 2004 is known by the care suff who work there as 
Kandahar. * Ebwever, the camp came into existence some time before this as a spontaneous 
transit camp. In most respects. Am Nabak is very different from Mile and the other camps. 
Firstiy, since the area of Am Nabak contained no underground aquifers water had to trucked 
from 43km away in Gureada to supply the camps need's. As a result the UNHCR and the 
implementing partners are constandy planning to move the camp to a better location farther 
north. This move is opposed by both the refugees and the host community. Further, because 
the camp is not seen as a full blown refugee camp like Mile means that the budget allocated by 
UNHCR is much smaller and that there are no permanent structures, only tents. Due to security 
problems on the road between Am Nabak and the field office in Gureada, the management of 
the camps was moved from Gureada to the Iriba field office, which was already in chaise of 
management of the camps of Iridimi and ToUum. 
Unlike Mile, Am Nabak is divided into 10 zones each with 4 blocks. However, the camp 
is organized into 4 clusters which represent the home villages of the refugees. The refugees of 
Am Nabak, unlike their counterparts in MOe, are from the Kobe dialectic group of the BeRa. 
The majority of the Kobe reside on the Tchadien side of the border. There are only a handful of 
Kobe villages in Darfur, the largest being Tine. Links across the porous border are strong 
among the Kobe and as a result when the Darfur conflict began the inhabitants of four border 
villages of Tine, Gir^ra, Hahila ard TunckbT)iweie invited to ride out the conflict with their kin and 
neighbours in Am Nabak The fact that many Darfuri Kobe had very close kin in Am Nabak, 
and that annual miration routes brought the herders of Am Nabak and the four villages to the 
' Due to the large amount of BeRa rebels -both Darfuri and Tchadien- who use the camp as rest spot and logistical 
hub. Since the Darfuri rebels took to calling themselves Tora Bora -after the hills in southern Afghanistan where 
Osama Bin Laden was thought to be hiding in early 2004- the name Kandahar has been applied to camp and its 
inhabitants who maintain contact with Darfuri rebels still present in the mountains to the west of the camp. 
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Wadi Sheadi in Darfur, meant many of the inhabitants of Am Nabak knew the refugees 
personally and thus were willing to have them take up residence in the village. The refugees 
arrived with their Sheikhs and Omdas and as a result there are interesting differences between the 
camps, both in terms of the CARE administration in the camp and the role of traditional leaders. 
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S e c t i o n B : 
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C H A P T E R 5 
A H I S T O R I C A L S U R V E Y O F T H E G R E A T E R O U A D D A I - D A R F U R R E G I O N 
Wow can / te//', said t^e man, 't^at t^e past isn 'tafiction designed to account/or 
t^e discrepancy hetween my immediate physicalsensations and my state o/ 
mindi' (Adams 1980: 166). 
A number of wider issues are germane to in the study of Tchad and Darfvu-. Before we 
can understand the current conflicts in Tchad and Darfur we must first understand their roots. 
These conflicts are best discussed in a chronological and thematic manner. The following 
chapter will deal with: 
• The pre-colonial links between Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region 
• the BeRa ethnic group 
I Pre-co/onia/Links in t^e OuaddaiDarfurBorder Jiegion 
T^e More Things Change t^e More T/rey... 
The development of states in the Sahel and central Soudanian region of Africa is a 
fascinating phenomenon. Though the introduction of Islam and the opening up of linkages with 
the wider Islamic world played a significant role in this process, state formation in the region has 
much deeper history . The introduction of the camel to the Sahara and Sahel 4000-6000 years 
ago was integral to this. The Beja of the Sudanese Red Sea coast were the first to see the 
potential of the Dromedary. Their use of camels during their raids against Egypt and Nubia 
made a lasting impact on both states, but it was not imtil much later that populations came to 
appreciated their true value, when the camel helped Trans-Saharan trade to flourish and allowed 
for the spread of urbanization. 
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Salt, gold and enslaved peoples were the main goods traded across the Sahara. As may 
have been expected, the capture of such slaves was an endeavour that involved high levels of 
violence, so much violence that a wise ruler would not visit this on his own population but rather 
on a neighbouring states or society. Thus, from about the thirteenth century onwards, state 
formation and expansion in the Sahel and into the Sahara was an increasingly violent affair 
(Azevedo 1998: 22). 
Nowhere was this clearer than on the periphery of the state. Here at the border between 
states or at the zone where the state met stateless societies, violence and conflict were at their 
worst. In anthropology, a debate has been r^ing as to the universality of war and conflict. 
Authors like Dtiffield (1994 and 2001), Warren (2003) and others argue that war and conflict are 
universal. Duffield presents a seductive aipoment that conflict is ever present in human societies 
and is used both to construct barriers between self and others and to reorder the social, cultural, 
economic and political spheres of communal life. Thus, one must see war as a foci of innovation 
and change. For a group to avoid defeat, and all that it entails, it must match and indeed 
counter, the innovations of its adversary. According to Duffield, warfare, or more correcdy, the 
threat of warfare, has been an important force in the global spread of scientific, economic and 
political innovations and of the nation sute (Duffield 2001: 13). 
Though Duffield's aipjment on the role of war as a force for innovation is compelling, it 
is incorrect to assume that warfare or the threat of conquest was the major catalyst in the 
development of 'the modem and centralized nadon state'. The sheer preponderance of 
contradictory examples renders this thesis void. The work of numerous anthropologists on 
warfare in stateless societies such as the Nuer, Dinka, Hamer, Kayapo, Yanomami, Dani, Omo 
river and a host of others, shows that even in regions where warfare and raiding are endemic or 
ritualized, parts of 'everyday life,' the nation state, or indeed any other form of the state, is not 
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the main form of political association. Duffield's almost structxiralist need to explain the role of 
war in himian life can be seen as part of a wider trend in the modem study of -and the study of 
modem- conflict, rarely takes into account the role played by alliance and fragmentation of 
alliances (Schlee 2004 being a welcome exception). 
The earliest written references to the Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region come to us from 
Arab geographers. These records are lacking in detail for many reasons, including: 
• Arab geographers were more interested in the affairs of the states like Kanem-Bomu 
rather than Ouaddai or Darfur, and paid even less attention to the border regions. 
• Arab travellers arrived in the 16* century, almost a millennium after states first emerged 
in the region. 
• As Muslims, many of the early Arab explorers were either, not interested in, or painted 
the pre-Islamic origins of local states or painted them in an unimpressive light. 
• Very few outsiders spent long periods in these volatile border regions. 
As a result of these shortcomings most historians tend to rely on sources from the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These sources take the form of colonial manuscripts and 
correspondences. For the purposes of this work these records have been examined and also 
found lacking due to many of the same reasons as the Arab sources. Though largely beyond the 
scope of this work some kind of historical bacl^round is necessary, so presented here is brief 
history of the region focusing on interactions between pre-colonial states. 
The earliest state to emerge in the region was without a doubt Kanem, which or^inated 
in the ninth century AD to the northwest of Lake Tchad. The kingdom is credited as being 
founded by the BeRa. The state probably began as a confederation among BeRa, Daza and 
Kanembu tribes who today live in the far north of Tchad and southem Libya. In fact the word 
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'Kaneni is actually a Dagaza word meaning 'south'. The Kanembu people and language are closely 
related to the Daza and the Daza interviewed ia the course of this study believed the former to 
be nothing more thari sedentary Daza. Whatever their origins the Kanembu and Daza were the 
originators of the state of the Kanem under the first Mai (king) of the Magxtni clan, thus 
beginning the Sa/aiia dynasty (Encyclopaedia Britannica Concise. 2007). 
Kanem was at the peak of its power in the middle of the thirteenth century when it was 
able to exact tribute from Ouaddai, Darfur and the Hausa kingdoms of Nigeria and Niger 
(Azevedo 1998: 25-32). During the fourteenth century however, internal conflict and pressure 
from the Btdula forced the Mai Umar Idrismi to abandon the capital city of Njini and move laige 
portions of the population to the southwest into Bomu (Encyclopaedia Britannica Concise. 
2007). After conquering and assimilating the Bomu a new ethnie was created from the merger 
of the Kanembu and the Bomu, the Kanuri; much in the same way that the Kanembu were 
probably a meiger of the Daza and some earlier people present in Kanem. During this period 
Kanem, now known as KanemBomu lost control of Ouaddai and Darfur. However, even today, 
there are the large number of locations with known, or probable, Kanembu and Kanuri names. 
Menaweshi in Darfur, Abeche Tchad, and even Al-Fashir are all important towns that attest to 
the presence of the Kanembu or Kanuri in the region. 
The last two states to occupy the Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region were the Sultanates of 
Ouaddai' and Darfur^° along with their numerous tributary petty states. What we know of the 
history of these two states is surprisingly similar in nature to the relationship between Darfur, 
Sudan and Tchad today. In the era before European colonization both were part of a string of 
Sudanic states, stretching from Tukrur along the Senegal to Sennar and the Funj located along 
' The name Ouaddai refers to both the pre-colonial state (1650s-1905) and the modem Tchadien region. The 
latter occupies and the truncated southern portion of the former. 
'° The name Darfur refers to both the pre-colonial state (1400s-1916) and the modem region in the Sudan which 
includes West, North and South Darfur. 
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the Nile. Three such Sudanic states were located within the borders of modem Tchad, Kanem, 
Bagirmi, and Ouaddai; while Darfur, Talodi, Sennar and Funj were located in modem day Sudan. 
The histories of Darfur and Ouaddai were characterized by intense struggle for control of the 
border itself, as well as the petty sultanates that sprung up in this no man's land, that extended 
along their unstable frontier regions (OTahey 1980). 
The current poliucal sittution in the region can be described, in a word, as ttnstahle. There 
are numerous rebel groups operating along the Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region and deep into 
both Darfur and Tchad, with varying levels of popular and cross border-support. Both regimes 
support insurgents in the hope of either using them as a means of obtaining concessions from 
the other, or as an option for regime change. Even this does not differ much from the pre-
colonial era. 
Initially ruled by the Tunjur^' until 1635 (Azevedo 1998: 26) Ouaddai was reconstituted 
as an Islamic Sultanate supposedly hy Abdd Karim a Ja'di Arab from Shendi on the Sudanese 
Nile. Some sources tell us that Abd al Karim was a Wdi (Governor) in Ouaddai under the 
Turgur (Zelmer 1997). The archaeological and historical records show us that the Tunjur 
established their capital in Kourimn, just south of BUtine. Abd al Karim may have been a petty 
chieftain who ruled over the Siliha clan of the Maba in the vicinity of Kadamt (Tubiana et al 1978: 
6). Over a week's march south of his Tunjur overlords Abd al Karim would have had a great 
deal of autonomy. It is claimed that he led a revok against the Tunjur due to their un-Islamic 
practices and drove them out of Ouaddai. After he ejected the Tunjur, they fled to Kanem 
under the leadership of their King Daud (MacMichael 1922). 
" The Timjur, are widely credited as being one of the earliest dynasties in the Central Sahara. Most likely 
Nubian refiigees from the Nile region, the Tunjur probably arrived in the region in the mid 1300s and took 
control of both Darfiir and Ouaddai through intermarriage with the local dynasties. They were expelled from 
Ouaddai in the 1650s and fled to Kanem to become integral figures in the court of the Kanembu Mai/king. 
Tunjur can still be found in the Kanem region of Tchad today. The Darfiiri Tunjur intermarried with the Fur 
who finally superseded them,. Today there are large numbers of Tunjur in North Darfur. 
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Abd al Karim himself probably ruled over the Maba from around 1635 or so (Tubiana et 
al 1978: 5). The Maba are divided into a nimiber of tribes the largest being the Kodd, Ainlad 
Djerm, Mcdngi, Mandaba, Manthla and Koruimg). The Kajan^ Karangi, Kabgt, Ganyar^ Kashamre 
ardMarfa are Maba speaking tribes that are said to have been assimilated some time in the past 
poombos & Bender 1983: 50). 
On the early history of Ouaddai, Works writes: 
'The itrportanos (f l}x Maba ooregvup in the fomittim tradiOoTs and later court praOicE (f 
Wadai r^leOs a dnracteristic distrust cf strar^rs. Custom requires that any candidoe to the throne 
c^ierAbdalKarimbetheson(faJi£bloahiMalMandthattheJ^ 
fromihe same group', (Works 1976: 47). 
This tension between xenophobia and the need to encourage immigration and foster 
trade links has been recurrent throughout Ouaddaian history, and stiU appears to be a defining 
feature of modem Maba/Ouaddai identity.^ ^ This tension even showed itself in the selection of 
a spot for the capital of the new state. In the case of Darfur, Kobbei was chosen, since it was a 
trading post and the start of the Darb al A rbiy'en or 40 days' road to Egypt. Later the capital was 
moved to Al-Fashir, but this too was out of economic necessity. In Ouaddai the motivation was 
different; the first capital was Wara and the name said it all; in Maba it means 'inaoosssible,'. In 
1850 Sultan Muhammad Sharif moved the capital to Abeche, a small camp utilized by Arab and 
Fulani nomads (Works 1976: 57). However, the move was forced upon the Sultan, as the 
undergrovind aquifer at Wara had run dry (Interview with 'Ustadh' Saleh Solouem April 2006 
Ab^ch^). 
The Maba the largest ethnic group in Ouaddai, consists of a number of related tribes that speak the Maba 
language which is closely related to Masaalit, and they number approx 350,000. 
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Historically, Darfur was an important independent centre for both trade and religion. 
Three different dynasties were decisive in its development: 
• Daju dynasty, whose political centre lay in the south east of Jebel Mara. This ethnic group 
ruled from about the thirteenth century to the fifteenth century 
• • Tur^ur dynasty, whose centre of power lay north of Jebel Mara. They ruled over Darfur 
until the seventeenth century 
• • Kara/Fur dynasty, whose centre of power was in Turra in Jebel Marra and later in El 
Fashir. The core group in the Keira dynasty were the Fur. 
Darfur's first dynasty was the Daju, whose first ruler Gitar or Kosbur expanded the 
kingdom until they were capable of exacting tribute from the Fur and others. Their last ruler 
Ahmad al-Daj was deposed by the Tunjur in the 1400s and is said to have fled to the Dar Sila 
region of Tchad on the back of a gazelle (Nachtigal vol iv: 108-109). The most interesting fact, 
other than his means of transport, was where he fled to Tchad. He thereby set in motion a series 
of events that would reoccur throughout the region's history, with peoples crossing the border to 
seek refuge or to establish a base from which to threaten their home regions. 
Even the Tunjvu" who deposed the Daju were themselves refugees from the Nile region. 
The name of the founder of the Tunjur dynasty was Ahmed al-Makur. Usually it is given an 
Arabic translation as Ahmed the Larm. In spite of this 'Arab washing' it is far more likely that the 
name Makurwas in reference to Makurria, one of the three great Nubian kingdoms located along 
the Nile, the others being Aiwa and Soba. The rise of the Tunjur in Darfur and Ouaddai 
corresponds closely with the fall of Makurria to Arabs in the 14'*' century (Tubiana et al 1978: 7). 
By the early 1600s however, the Tunjur empire fragmented into the states of Darfur and 
Ouaddai ruled by local ethnic groups. 
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In the east Tunjur were in turn superseded by the Fur in the 1650s. Actually even the 
foundation of Darfur's IQira or Fur Sultanate is a story of cross border insurgency. The founder 
of the Keira dynasty was Sdongiur^ mtdKuro 1655-1680 also known as Sularmn Sdong, Tunjur 
on his paternal side, he was the link between the Fur and the preceding Tunjur dynasty. 
However, he was denied the right to rule by his great uncle, the reigning monarch Shau Dorshid. 
In a pattern of flight, mobiliyation, insiugency, conflict and eventual seizure of power that would 
be repeated over and over in the region, Solongdungu and his mother fled to Ouaddai (Robinson 
1928: 359). 
Local traditions tell us two similar stories as to why this occurred. In one his mother was 
either part or full blooded Masaalit, of the Surbang clan from Ouaddai (Kapteijns 1985: 19). 
"Whatever his ethnic origins, Solong spent his youth in Ouaddai. It is hard to believe that royal 
refugees from Darfvir would have escaped the attention of the authorities in the Ouaddaian 
dynasty. What is clear is that either with Ouaddaian assistance, or without their overt 
interference, Solong launched the region's first cross-border insurgency while still safe from the 
retaliation of his great uncle. 
Following the Sultanate's expansion from the Jebel Mara region into other areas of 
Darfur, the state grew exponentially through incorporation, both peaceful and coercive, of other 
territorial and ethnic groups. Hbwever in 1787, blocked by a resurgent Ouaddai to the west, the 
seventh Sultan, Mohammed Tayrab, extended the Fur Sultanate as far east as the Nile by 
conquering the province of Kordofan. This was a turning point- literally- in Darfur's history. 
The sultanate now had access to the Nile and more importandy controlled the trade routes to 
Egypt. This opened the region to greater trade and cultural links to the Arab world rather than 
with West Africa. 
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With their strategic position between the Nile and West Africa, Darfur and Ouaddai 
attracted a constant flow of migrants from both east and west. Unlike the Maba, a central 
strategy of the Fur Sultanate was to encourage immigrants. Immigrants from West Africa, the 
Nile Valley and other locations included holy men ifiiqara), scholars [ulamt) and travelling 
merchants (jallaba), as well as poorer immigrants. Many of these groups were encouraged to 
setde, with the granting of land and positions by the sultans. At the same time, a process of 
cultural assimilation was set in motion to incorporate other groups and territories. Thus, there 
was great competition and confrontation between Darfur and Ouaddai for the loyalty and tribute 
of peoples in the border regions. 
With their close proximity, similar ethnic make up and remarkably similar history, Darfur 
and Ouaddai exhibit similar trends in terms of the role and nature of the state and its various 
mechanisms for obtaining and rewarding loyalty. In Darfur this took the form of land grants 
known as Hakttra, whereas in Ouaddai estates were granted to loyal individuals and communities. 
These traditions continued right up until the early 20^ century, when in 1912 Ouaddai was 
defeated by the French forces after years of bloody resistance. Darfur was not conquered until 
1916 when the last Sultan Ali Dinar was shot by a British patrol. An offshoot of Darfur, Dar 
Masaalit was not 'incorporated' into the Sudan until 1923. Thus Ouaddai (1912), Darfur (1916) 
and Dar Masaalit (1923) were the last African states to fall under colonial rule and as a result give 
us useful examples of the projection of state power, both pre and post-colonial in the region 
which is now host to millions of displaced peoples and refugees. 
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2. T^e BeJia and t^eirplace in i/;e region 
No matter how much we may protest, the basic unit studied by the majority of 
anthropologists is the ethnic group. In its simplest sense, an ethnic group is either a collection of 
people who share a common culture, collective institutions and rites; or a community that 
inhabits the same moral geography and has a defined and ethnocentric consciousness. 
According to FredrikBardi "ahnicgvt^ are(ategjnes (fas(r^timafdickitificaticnbydx 
therrsdiES, and thus haie the djaraOeristk (f orgtrnzif^ interaction betuempecpy (Barth 1969: 10). Barth 
believed the object of study should be the '^ethnic boundaries that d^ines the ffxjup, not the cultural suff 
that it endoses" (Bardi 1969:15). He argued that there were two orders in the cultural content of 
ethnic dichotomies: 
• the first are cnatsignak and si^ that hvadaist one's edTrdc ideritity, sudiaslangM^ dress, haeetype 
etc.. 
• the second are basic vdue orientations, dnt is the standards cf morality and eKcdlenoe by iihido 
perfbnrarxe is jud^ 
Thus, two members of the same ethnic group will expect each other to share the same 
cultural norms and standards (Barth 1969). More recendy political scientist have aipied that 
ethnicity can be seen as a form of social capital that can be used to mobilize individuals and 
groups mto action (Bates 1999). 
Though created and sustained by rural village life, ethnic groups are often mobilized by 
actors and activists in urban settings. In fact, ethnic groups are more often than not mobilized 
by the elite members of disadvantaged groups that find themselves shut out of the urban circles 
79 
of power (Bates 1999:13). Thus, one can see a link emei^ing between a lack of educational or 
employment opportunities in the rural areas one the one hand and ethnic out migration and 
protest on the other. The latter is a product of competition between urbanized educated elites 
from various ethnic groups as they jostle for positions and jobs. This leads to urban ethnic 
mobilization, which is linked to rural political activism. Urban elites strive to prepare their 
'country cousins' for 'big dty lifs' by preaching the virtues of education and seek to dispel myth in 
urban centres that people from their region are lazy or backward. Convinced that they will never 
come to power in the undivided state, they seek independence, in some cases to their own 
economic detriment (Horowitz 1997: 425). Ethnic mobilization can therefore be seen as a 
matrix produced by the intersection of the skills and aspirations of educated urban elites on the 
one hand and the material and political desires of the rural masses on the other (Bates 1999: 17-
18). 
In this situation edynic gvups ewke into sonethir^ more than 'prinitiiE associations'. They become 
nhat I odl pditidzed or contestable capitaL Like all forms of capital, corOestahle capital is immensely 
attractive to political elites who can mobilize ethnic groups by co-opting their urban educated 
elite. Not only is there competition between political elites to capture this capital but there is 
competition between ethnic elites to be the legitimate representatives of the regional or ethnic 
group. In doing this they try to show their ability to redistribute resources to their ethnic 
homelands, which Gluckman labelled 'trihalisni (Gluckman 1960). The term 'tribalism' is a 
loaded and misleading one, used as it is, to conjure up images of primitive and detrimental (to 
society as a whole that is) associations. Gluckman's paper Tribalismin Modem British Central Africa. 
juxtaposed numerous terms like tribalism, modem, British and African ior maximum effect, but fails 
to highlights any of the benefits of said negttiiE associations, such as education and rural 
development that are gained from this 'trihalistic behauour'. In fact, Bates' research shows that 
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edinic mobilization m not necessarily problematic until it is used to exclude others from power 
(Bates 1999: 27-29). In such a situation, when power of specific resources are concentrated in 
the hands of a particular cultural community individuals have a choice of either entering into 
conflict or alliances with such communities. 
It is at these borders that ethnic and cultural lines of demarcation intersect, and it is here 
that people meet to co-operate or compete (Suliman 1997). According to Gunnar Haaland this 
interdependence emerges not only from people's interactions with one another, but also through 
their interactions with their environment (Haaland 1991: 10). Since adaptations to ecological 
habitats produce certain manifestations in material culture, i.e. forms of oi^anization, ritual and 
language the major markers of ethnic identification, differences are h%hlighted and heightened 
when quarrels arise over the allocation of resources. What emerges is a picture of ethnic groups 
that are identified with their subsistence patterns (Haaland 1972). As a result, conflict over trivial 
issues often mask larger hostilities. As actors endeavour to attract maximum support, ethnicity is 
the most appealing mobilization force, a fact highlighted by Fukui and Markakis (Fukui & 
Marlokis 1994). Thus batdes for resources and by extension survival, are often iterated in terms 
of ethnicity. However, it must be noted that conflict at these intersections is not the norm. 
In the past, the prevailing tendency was for people to cooperate along such boundary 
zones, exchanging goods and services and sharing the use of renewable resources. In recent 
years, competition over resources and natural services has intensified because of environmental, 
governmental, social and economic pressures. In the case of Darfur, svich competition is often 
manifested in terms of violence and conflict. However, rules for the sharing of scarce resources 
prevent these rivalries from becoming full-blown conflicts. Hutchinson points out that even 
when violence cannot be avoided the rules of engagement, disengagement and compensation act 
as checks on the level of conflict, not only between ethnic groups but also within them 
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(Hutchinson 1991: 105). This phenomenon can be seen amongst the BeRa, the subject of this 
study. 
The BeRa are an African ethnic group who straddle the northern portion of the border 
between Darfur and Tchad. They speak a Nilo-Saharan language of the Saharan super-family. 
As a member of the Eastem sub-family their language is closely related to the extinct Berd 
language and more distandy to Daza known as Gur'an of the Teda sub-family. Although they call 
themselves BeRa (pi. BeRAh)and their language BeRa Ah (BeRa Mouth/Tongue) they are more 
commonly known by the Arabic name la^va. The Daza or Gur'an know them as Am or 
A 'mm, whereas the Fur call them Mereeda. To the Erenga they are Ktiyuk, but to the Daju and 
Birgid they are known simply as 2a^im and Za^ respectively. 
The highlands occupied by the BeRa rise to about 1000 meters and lying as far north as 
they do, are exposed to the gradual but steady southward march of the Sahara. The BeRa inhabit 
a particularly harsh climate. To the north, west and to a lesser extent the east they are boxed in 
by either the Libyan or Sahara desert. To the south, any lands that are even remotely suitable for 
agriculture are held by the Mini, Mararit and Tarm of Tchad and the Gimr, Tur^ur and Fur of 
Darfur travelling west to east. To their west in Tchad, live the Maharmi A robs of the Arada 
plains, whereas to their east in Darfur live the Midob camel herders of Jebel Midob and the Berd 
of the Jibaal Tagaabo. 
The northernmost limit of the BeRa home land consists of the Ermedi range which rise 
to between 650 meters and 1400 meters and this area is the home range of TobarA or Bideyat 
nomads. This relatively well-watered region serves as a guHey, channelling water into the Mourdi 
depression. To the north of the BeRa lies the Sahara desert which is only frequented by the 
Daza on the Tchadien side of the border. On the Darfur side a host of camel nonuds travel 
82 
there in the winter to pasture their herds on the Jvzzu grasses. The rainy season which runs from 
late May to September is known to the BeRa as g)m and brings about on average 300 mm of rain 
water. 
For the BeRa, the archetypical members of their ethnie are tough desert dwelling camel 
herders. Though camel herding maybe a sustainable and even profitable mode of production in 
the deep desert home of the northern sub-sections of the BeRa, in the desert fringes, occupied by 
the majority of the BeRa, a mixed economy is more suitable. As a result, most BeRa groups 
practice a mixture of animal husbandry and agriculture, growing millet, Dukhun in Arabic, known 
locally as Eish and as Bagi in BeRa Ah. In the past most BeRa kept catde, camels, goats and 
sheep; however, due to the droughts of 1969 and 1972 most BeRa lost their catde and were 
forced to depend more than ever on their camels (Tubiana et al. 1968, Tubiana, M. & Tubiana. 
1977. And Tubiana 1985). An interesting feature of the region's geography is that the farther 
east one travels, the more arid the land becomes and thus more suitable for camek' delicate feet 
which caimot tolerate longs period of being waterlogged. As a result the BeRa who live in 
Darfur have always been more dependent on camels than their Tchadien counterparts. 
As litde as 30 years ago the BeRa of Tchad and to a lesser extent their counterparts in 
Darfur, were primarily catde rather than camel herders (M. & J. Tubiana 1977: 41). Today the 
general preference on both sides of the border is for camels, followed by sheep and goats then 
catde. Due to the mixed nature of the BeRa economy, the exact population of the Bdia is hard 
to ascertain. The fact that lar^e parts of the population of a given village or town will be out 
tending to herds makes population estimates and even census f^;ures suspect. The Tchadien 
census of 1993 counted just over 77,000 5e/?^^^ speakers while Marie-Jose Tubiana claims that 
the Darfuri BeRa numbered as many as 255,000 at the time of the 1970 Sudanese census ( M & J. 
Tubiana 1977: 99). A conservative estimate of their population today is 300,000-350,000 in both 
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countries. 
Many believe that the BeRa under the name Za^im were first mentioned in the writings 
of the Arab explorer and geographer el Mas'wudi in about 943, however this report and the 
dozen or so that follow prove contradictory. Every explorer in the region seems to produce 
another conflicting report about the Za^iia. Some claim the Za^wt are western migrants, 
while others claim a Berber origin, others state that they inhabit the deserts on the borders of 
Nubia, while others claim they were in Kanem during the earliest days of the state. However 
these accounts are reconciled by the work of Makrizi who around 1400 writes: 
"a//nations l^etween Al>yssinia on t/^e south, Nuhia on tl;e east, Barka on 
tl;e nortl? and Takruron tl>e west are ca//ed Zagl^ai" (^AsiC Michael 1922: 56). 
The first account of the Zaghawa even close to their present location and exhibiting 
similar cultural practices to the modem BeRa is a early 16^ ^ century excerpt from Leo Africanus 
(1528) who speaks of the Zaghawa and cognate Gur'an who harass travellers between Cairo and 
Bomu, he continues: 
"//^ <f h'ng o/Nuhia maintainetlr continual/ warre part/y against t/>e people 
o/Goran ("wlfo i'eing descended o/tl;epeople called Zingani, inl^alfite tire deserts 
and speake a kinde of Itnguage tl;at no otl>er nation vnderstandetl?J andpartly 
againstcertaine otlrerpeople "{Mac Michael 1922: 56-57). 
The BeRa are really composed of a number of dialectic groups, regional groupings, 
tribes, branches and clans each claiming to be descended from the tme BeRa, the Bideyat. In 
fact all groupings claim to somehow be more BeRa than all others except the archetypical 
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Bideyat. 
Perhaps the best way to classify the BeRa is with the four tiered system that they employ 
when classifying themselves. Thus they divide themselves into: 
• four mutuaUy intdli^hle dialatic gvups (Dircoig Gimf, Kobe-Kapka, Tuer- Galla, Bideyat- Borogtt) 
o 14 regcml gvi^nn^ (Dar Gun^, Dar Dimng Dar Kapka (Tdxu^ , Dar Kobe (Tchac^, Dar 
Kapha (Darfur), Dar Kobe (Dayjm), Dar Galla, Dar Tuer, Dar Unai/Dar A rtaj, Dar A vlad 
Di^n, DarSuern, DarFumur% DarArka, the desert lands (f ^  Bideyat ard^ BorogzL 
• Nmrrous tribes Be A Ah or Tribes 
• A nd a host A irrKa Beer branches 
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Table 6: BeRa Regional Groups 
Dialectic Region Capital Main Ruler Ruling Current Ruler 
Group Regional Clan - _ ^ 
and tribal 
groups 
VirsngA-
Koi'arA-
JCapkarA 
DarGurufta 
DarDirong 
DarKapka 
DarKobe 
DarKobe 
DarKapka 
DarGalla 
DarTuer 
Dar Unai/ aJt-a. 
Dar Artaj 
AwladDiggin 
DarStieni 
Boricu 
Teri-Ba 
Key-Hay 
Hiri-Ba /aJca. 
Iriba 
Tine 
Tundebay/ 
Tontoubay 
Komoi 
Um BiuroS 
UmHaraz 
Muzbat 
Dor 5 
KobaiA 
KobarA 
Kapka 
Galla 
Tuer 
Unai 
Awlad Diggin 
Sueni and 
Kaitinga 
Under the 
leadeiship 
of Dar Kobe 
Under the 
leadenhip 
of Dar Kobe 
Under die 
leaden bip 
of Dar Kobe 
Sultan 
Sulun 
Sultan 
Siartai 
Bazi 
Angajyia 
Ijyra 
Kapkare 
KaUba 
Agaba 
IlaShiaia 
Muhammad 
Abdunahman 
Haggar 
Dawsa 
Abdunahman Fiiti 
Hassan Batgo 
Adam Sabi Tijani 
Al-Tiyb 
Adam Rahman 
Muhammadin 
Abakr Hassan 
Nabi 
SalimDagal 
Adam al Tir 
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TobarA-
BoFogat 
DarFumung 
Anka 
Dar Bideyat 
Fato Bamo 
Anka 
Bahai 
Korra-Beri Matik Ahmat Mahamat 
(Fur-BeRa) Maro Janga 
Beti Ma/iJk Negere Adama Ali Kaka 
Bideyat and Sultan Deby (younger 
Borogat brother of Idriss 
Deby Itno) 
List and chart compiled with information from Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba, Tahir Hariga, Salih Haroun 
and Salih Muhammad Shumu 
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Map 7: Location of the BeRa 
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However, it should be noted that the aboie is the social orgtnization cf the BeRa aaxmUng to my 
hosts the Tuer cf Dar Galla and to a lesser extent the Twer of Dar Tuer. Another important feature 
to note are the various names applied to the different regional groupings, both by themselves 
and other such groupings.. 
Table 7: The Names of the BeR^ 
Regional/Dialectic 
Grouping 
Own Name Tuer name Kobe name Bilia name 
Bideyat B i l k TobarA TobarA 
Tuer-GaEa BeR^ Tuer Waggi 
Kobe BeRi KobarA KobarA 
Kapka BiRi KapkarA KapgarA KapkarA 
Dirong Dirongda Dirong Dirong Dirong 
Guruf Gurufta Gunif Gunif Gunxf 
Thvis, each group thinks of themselves as descendents of the original BeRa the Bilia or 
Bideyat. An important point to note about the BeRa regional and even dialectic groups is that 
most only know of their neighbours. Thus, the Umi in the far east of the BeRa home region 
know very little or nothing of the Guruf. In fact few Galla know of the Dirong or Guruf and 
most think Tchad is home only to the Bideyat and the Kobe. 
The world inhabited by the BeRa can conceived of as five interlocking zones: 
• The Western BeRa lands -vthido is the domiin cf the Gimfia, Dirongk, KapkarA and Kobe dialectic 
gxsip and lies almost totally in Tdoad, exapt for the tillages cf Tine and Timddxry/Tatouhay in 
Darfur. 
• TheEastemBeRa lands- home to the larious Ttnergvups 
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• The Northern E nnecli Gmtps- the desert home cf doe Bideyat dialectic grcxcps the Bilia and the Barest 
iiho as camel nomads frequent all odoer zones. 
• The Ditspcra- consist manly of iiILi^ created by the BeRa after doe famines cf the 1960 and 1970 and 
mil be disaissed in doe chapter on Idara A halia. 
• Tx BeRa cf doe carrps— Today doe nnjority cfBeRa ocacpy this zone as either refi^ inside Darf cr or 
displaced persons in Tchad It is nath doe latter that this thesis takes place. 
Map 8: BeRa Zones 
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The Western Lands 
The Western Lands consist of all BeRa lands in Tchad, except the desert home of the 
Bideyat. From east to west it is the home of the: 
• Gurufta who inhabit less than a dozen villages, 
• Dirongda who occupy just over a dozen villages 
• KapkarA who inhabit about 20 villages 
• Kobe just under 50 villages. 
Oral histories the of the Kobe BeRa collected by Marie-Jose Tubiana in the 1950s-1970s 
tell us an interesting tale about the origins of Kobe, Tama and Daju. These stories tell a tale of 
three brothers who accompanied their elderly father to Dar Sila around the time of the founder 
of the Ouaddai, Abd al Karim. The father, Ahmat Daikt ,died en route and was intemed in Dar 
Sila, while the sons parted company and became the progenitors of the three ethnic groups. 
Diroso, the eldest, became the leader of the Daju, while Tamai^a travelled north to found a 
village called Boru from which all Tama originated. The youngest brother AbduUahi travelled 
north from Boru to Dar Kobe where, in exchange for the Nahus or royal copper drum, he taught 
the people to cook meat and thus became the chief. His name A bduUahi Boru, combined his first 
name and his ordinal Tama village (Tubiana 1964: 28). The cxirrent Kobe royal family and by 
extension all the BeRa of Tchad, are said to be descendants oi Abdullahi Bom (Tubiana 1964: 28-
29). 
A similar tale was told to the German researcher and scholar on the Tama, Babett 
Janszky by Tama elders in 2005. In this more stylised version many more details were presented 
than in the original. In this history the original Tama came from a hither unidentified region or 
town in called Timin, in Saudi Arabia. They came to Tchad via the Sudan and setded near 
92 
mount Nyeri in Dar Tama. In another version told to Janszky the progenitors of the Tama, 
Daju and Kobe were all brothers who setded in the various areas on their way to Bomo. Hamdu 
became the first Tama Sultan followed by Dajuk while his brothers became rulers of the Daju 
and Kobe. The kinship link is used to explain why there is no Diya or blood money payment 
between the Tama and Daju to this day, and why as the Tama claim the same was tme between 
the Kobe, Tama and Daju (18-04-06 Gureada Babett Janszky. Recounting on an interview with 
Tama elder on the history of the Tama Sultanate). 
The interesting feature of both tales is what has changed over time. Stories of single 
founder events for entire ethnic groups is relatively new to Saharan culture, but the norm among 
Northern Semitic speaking groups. In cases where such histories are found in Saharan speaking 
groups they are invariably the result of cultural borrowings. Thus, rather than being actually an 
accurate historical tale of the ethno-genesis of the Tama, Kobe and Daju they are probably more 
correcdy interpreted as tales about the coming of Islam Both tales mention that the 'brothers' 
brought Islam to their respective peoples and arrived in the region around the time Abd al Karim 
started the Ouaddai Sultanate. It is not unlikely that many ethnic groups in the region use the 
coming of Islam as milestone in their history. What is presented is a narrative on the effects of 
acceptance and non acceptance of Islam on communities. Conversion to, or resistance to, Islam 
tore apart existii^ ethnic ties and and created new ethnic groups in their wake. Forging new 
alliance among Muslim communities and tearing apart links with non-Muslims. Janszky in an 
unpublished paper on the Tama writes: 
'T^e w^o/e /oundation of t^e Dar Tama is /inked i^y its in/^al'itants to t/;e 
creation o/t/^e su/tanate. AccoTiding/y, t/>e su/tan was one o/t/^ree i?rot/je7y w/?o 
came /wm Yemen or at /east t/?e Midd/e £ast region. On t^eir way /rom t/re 
A similar tale can be found in the appendix relating to the origins of the Fur and Fertit ethnic groups in Darfur. 
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centrv of C^ad to t/;e east one o/t/?em sett/ed in DarDadjo, anot/^erin Dar Tama 
and t^e t/;ird continued to Dar Zag^awa, w^ere ^e founded t^e Zag/?awa 
su/tanate. Arrized in Dar Tama one of t^e i^rot^ers ca/kd Namdou founded t/?e 
Tama su/tanate. / / e /^imse/f was appointed to i?e t/>e, Tama first su/tan t/pe 
/oca/ residents as /re was an educated man and "/^ad distributed food to t/;e 
peopk According to ora/ histo?y, Tama arriving in t/>e areafvm t/^en on sett/ed 
and intermarried wit/; t/?e /oca/popu/ation. C/nfortunate/y, further detai/s are 
unc/earand dates cannot /pe specfiedas a written /fistory does not exis-t'Qunszky 
2006). 
Interestingly none of the Darfuri Tuer BeRa refugees I interviewed claimed to have ever 
heard this stoiy. In spite of this, all readily admitted to me that the Kobe are of Daju extraction. 
The fact that the Tuer BeRa refugees disavow any knowledge of a link between the Tama and 
the BeRa is not surprising, in light of the tensions that exist between the refuges and the Tama. 
It may be that the refugees are now re-imagining their own history, albeit without the Tama. 
The Kobe Sultanate based in Hri-Ba (Iriba) which now dominates the BeRa lands of 
eastern Tchad, obtained its current borders between 1930 and 1936. Through conquest and 
absorption of other petty Tchadien BeRa sultanates and chiefdoms, it united these various 
polities into single centralized Sultanate. Prior to this the Sultan Dar Kobe was theoretically 
appointed either the Sultan of Ouaddai or Darfur. The process of appointing a Sultan depended 
not only on the relative strength of Darfur and Ouaddai, but also the strength of Dar Kobe 
itself. Thus, while the leadership of the BeRa of Darfur was installed by the Fur Sultans, the 
leadership of the Dirong and Gunf was installed by Ouaddai. Dar Kobe on the other hand was 
hody contested and as a result was able to maintain a relatively high degree of autonomy 
(Tubiana 1964: 14). 
94 
The last leader of the original and much smaller Dar Kobe, Abdul Rahman Firti, died in 
batde against his rival Muhammad Haggar in 1912. However, Abdul Rahman's line did not end 
there, as a small contingent of Kobe established a new sultanate in Tine, Darfur. At that time 
the Wadi Tire or Tine river marked the edge of French influence and the beginning the 
independent Sultanate of Darfur. This new sultanate was established just inside Darfur and was 
led by Dansa Abdul Rahrmn Firti, the son of Abdul Rahman Firti. In this way the new of 
Tcahdien Dar Kobe (Haggar) expanded the Sviltanate of Iriba while the son of the previous 
Sultan fled to Tine Darfur to create a new, gready reduced, state. The French who, like the 
British were looking for competent interlocutors, turned a blind eye to Haggar's expansionist 
agenda in Dar Kobe (Tubiana 1964: 13). The process was advanced in 1937 when SultanAbcMay 
Sabr of Dar Kapka, the westem neighbour of Dar Kobe, became destitute and Dar Kapka 
became part of rapidly expanding Dar Kobe with the sons of Sultan Haggar as Maqdums 
(Tubiana 1985: 21). As the new Sultan, Haggar did much to consolidate his position and when 
he died in 1939 his son Abdtmahrmn Ha^r coxixmu&d the process and expanded the Sultanate 
further. 
In 1957 Dar Kobe was divided into three cantons Kobe, Kapka and Dirong with 
brothers of A hdimahrmn occupying the paramount position in all three. Another change came in 
1959 when the Sultanate was made a sous-prefecture of the Biltine Prefecture. Today the 
Sultanate consists of Dar Kobe as well as the remains of Dar Kapka and its dependant Dar Ki^ 
which were conquered by Haggar, along with Dar Diror^ arid Dar Gunf. Dar Kapka is governed 
by a Maqdum usually drawn from the Sultan's immediate family, while Dar Dircfftgindi Dar Gm^ 
each have a Malik drawn from local lineages (Tubiana 1964:13). 
Though ethnically Kobe the villages of Tine and Habilah along with the Kapka villages 
of Tundebey/Tuntoubay and Gii^ira lie just across the bonder in Darfur and were or^inally 
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setded by those who had lost positions of power during Haggar's rise to prominence in Dar 
Kobe. This practice of fragmenting to form new alliances, or a sultanate in this case, is a central 
feature of the BeRa system of leadership. Disgruntled leaders, or those who have become 
disenchanted with the political leadership, have the option to break off and form new sub 
groups, a phenomenon that have continued up to the present. 
The Northem Ennendi Lands 
The Sahara desert is really only home to a few ethnic groups: the Maures of Mauritania, 
the Tuareg, the Daza tribes, a few Arab tribes in Sudan's Kordofan province, the Beja of the 
eastern Sudan's Red Sea Hills and the BeRa; or more correctly the Bideyat dialectic grouping of 
this ethnic group. Known as the Bideyat, an Arabic name meaning Nomtds, they divide 
themselves into two groups. The northernmost is called the Bomgtt and the southern group 
called the Bilia. To the other BeRa Ah speaking groups they are known as the TobarA a name 
which means Daza in BeRa A h. This may in part be due to the Bukyat's unique history. 
Nomads par excellence, the Bkkyat occupy the deep desert roaming as far north as Libya 
in search of water and markets for their camels. They also travel as far south as Abeche and Al-
Fashir in bad years. They are known to be a tough adaptable people, who are not above camel 
rustling and outright banditry during lean times. Prior to 1989 the name Bideyat was used by 
outsiders to refer only to the southern BUia, while the northem Bcovga were often grouped with 
the Daza known in Arabic as the Gur'an. The reason for this and the subsequent change is 
simple enough- AUianoes. Athough the Bilia speak a BeRa Ah dialect that is mutually intelligible 
with all other BeRa Ah speakers, the Boro^ spoke both BeRa Ah and Dagaza (the Daza 
'•^e term Bideyat is actually based on the BeRa word Bilia, which to the Arabic ear sounds similar to Bideyat 
the Arabic word for nomad. 
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language).For wider commvinication with their neighbours the Daza and the BeRa, the 
Borogat use the language of their speaking partners. This dual linguistic ability has led to an 
ambiguous dual ethnicity, with most Bilia claiming the Bomga are of mixed Bilia and Daza 
heritage, most westem BeRa claiming the Borogat are Daza and most eastern BeRa groups 
unaware even of their existence. 
The Borogat themselves marry freely with both the Daza and BeRa, showing a 
preference for the Anakaza and BUia sub-groups respectively. A key strategy, and of the one of 
the most well known characteristics of the Borogat, is that they always 'back a winner', so to 
speak. During the many rounds of Tchadien Qvil War the Borogat (and the BeRa) were the 
only two participating groups that always happen to be on the winning side. During the final 
phases of the war various Daza dialect groups and their non-Giu-'an allies fought for control of 
the Tchadien state. At the time the Borogat supported FEssene Fiabre and his Anakaza forces 
against Goukouni Oueddei and his Teda forces. The BeRa, led by the young Idriss Deby Itno, 
also threw their support behind Habre. When Fkbre and Deby began to clash in 1989 the 
Borogat withdrew their support for Flabre and threw their weight behind Deby. It was at this 
time that most Tchadiens began to reimagine the Borogat as a BeRa group. 
The Eastem Lands 
Across the border in Darfur the situation is somewhat different. Here the BeRa are 
divided into a number of Dars or domains, which correspond to tribal divisions. Darfur is home 
of the Tuer BeRa -v^ o^ are by far the largest of the dialectic groups in terms of relative numbers 
and lands occupied. Their homeland stretches from the Tchadien border in the west to the 
In a similar way, the Gurufta speak a mixture of BeRa A h and Mifri, the language of their westem neighbours. 
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north westem Darfur in the east and will be discussed in the foUowing chapters as will the BeRa 
Diaspora. 
The Za^wt (f the Carrps 
When the Darfuri refugees first entered Eastern Tchad, after the outbreak of conflict in 
westem Sudan, in 2003 the local population welcomed them with open arms. The reasons were 
obvious enough. Firsdy, when most Darfuri reftigees crossed this, one of Africa's most porous 
borders, they took up residence with ethnic Idn in Tchad. For some, like the Masaalit refugees, 
this was not the first time they had fled Darfur in the face of indiscriminate goverrmient, or at 
least govenmient sanctioned violence. The previous instance in 1996-1999 was due to violence 
uiJeashed by the Khartoum regime, after the Masaalit opposed the division of their traditional 
Stdtamte. 
Since numerous Tchadien ethnic groups spent long periods in Darfur, either as economic 
migrants or transhumant herders looking for pastures in the case of the Tchadien BeRa, also 
meant that the refugees weren't seen as intmders (at least at first). Many Tchadiens had travelled 
to Darfur as drought refugees, as was the case with the Tania. Others crossed the border fleeing 
violence and persecution in Tchad, including numerous Arab groups from the 1970s to the 
present, the BeRa from the late 1980s to early 1990s, Masaalit in the mid-1990s, and the Tama in 
the late 1990s to the present. Since in 2003 neither the refugees nor the host community 
thought the refugees would be in Tchad for an extended period, host communities were 
generous with the assistance to the refugees and worked together to overcome the host of 
problems they faced during these early days. 
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Finally, in stark contrast to the previous instances of cross-border migration, it was 
assumed that the Darfuri refugees were not going to be a burden on the host community. 
Unlike refugees of the 1990s, the Darfuri refugees were not to be supported by their own efforts 
and host community largesse, but rather by the international community. Most refugees and 
locals thought that the international community would meet all of the refugees' needs and in 
doing so minimise the disruption to the local area. Yet, in less than a year the relations between 
the refugees and the host communities in Mile camp would be in tatters, while the same had not 
take place in Am Nabak a few dozen kilometres north. 
It should be noted that though relations between the Tama and the BeRa have never 
been friendly, both groups admit that m the past, they were at least cordial. AU this changed with 
the ascendance of Idriss Deby Itno and the BeRa to power in Tchad. Since 1991, the Bideyat-
dominated Tchadien miliuiy has been the bane of the Tama's existence. The impunity with 
which not only military personnel but also the average Tchadien BeRa routinely conduct their 
affairs has led to a whole new economic opportunity for enterprising BeRa: banditry. Though 
not an exclusively BeRa occupation, the majority of the perpetrators of attacks on the Tama are 
either the BeRa, or their northern ne^hbours the Gur'an. As a result the Tama are not as 
welcoming of BeRa refugees as they would have been of others. This hostility has led to 
numerous incidents in the area around the camp and most refugees confess that they do not feel 
safe when they travel beyond the borders of the camp. 
Numerous attempts have been made by the UNHCR to repair the relationship between 
refugees and host communities in Eastem Tchad, but few have had any real success. The reason 
for their failure lies in the increasingly intractable position taken by the local Tchadien leadership 
and the inability of the refugee leadership to negotiate with the local Tchadien leaders as equals. 
The position of the Tchadien traditional leadership has hardened over the years towards the 
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refugees due to livestock thefts, competition for natural resources and more importandy 
patronage, from both the State and aid agencies. This hostility is nonetheless perplexing 
considering that a large portion of the Tama population is (or at one time was) resident across 
the border in Darfur. In many cases these Tama live in urban areas or far away from the border 
regions where most Darfuri Tama reside. Even today, most Tchadien Tama still have at least 
one male relative who is resident in Darfur. 
The hostility of the Tama to the refugees is only mitigated by two factors. Firsdy, the 
assistance they received from CARE and other NGOs; which is direcdy connected to the 
continued presence of the refugees. Secondly, lai^e amounts of villagers in the host 
communities are 'rrtxdi^jting' as refugees. Every month these mxdi^ners trek to the canqjs to 
collect 'their' rations. Many Tchadien Tama villagers claim to be Sudanese Tama. The fact that 
the Tama of Darfur are supporters of the Khartoum regime and thus have not been forced from 
their homes seems lost on UNHCR staff. The Tama moonlighters live in fear that at any point 
the refugees will inform the authorities of their scam. The refugees, for their part, keep quiet in 
the hope that allowing the practice to continue will temper the opinion of the Tama towards 
them. 
These impostors, who the UNHCR admits consume as much as 10-15% of food 
allocated for the refv^ees (the number may be as high as 40% in Konoungu refugee camp) all 
benefit from a thriving trade in UNHCR standard issue refugee supplies, such as: tents, tarpaulin, 
and CSB (an unpopular com soya blend given to the refugees). Most products are sold to the 
Tama by refugees who need Tchadien hard currency to purchase meat, which is not provided to 
them by the UNHCR. In addition to contributing to growth of local markets, the presence of 
the refi^ees and the aid agencies have also contributed to local sources of employment for the 
Tama. 
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In late 2005 Eastern Tchad and Dar Tama in particular, was the centre of a Tama-led 
rebellion against the BeRa dominated government. The heavy-handed tactics of the Tchadien 
army forced many Tama from their homes and swelled the ranks of the opposition. Those who 
did not join the rebellion were none the less radicalised by the excesses of the military and 
looked to their traditional leadership for guidance in this new struggle. Those leaders that were 
not seen as 'pro-Tama' were accused of being either in the pay of the BeRa dominated 
government or even worse the UNHCR, 
Inside the camps, the status of traditional leadership has varied. In Mile, the traditional 
refugee leadership has been sidelined by new UNHCR sanctioned leaders. These young, largely 
semi-literate men, have relegated the traditional leaders to an almost negligible role. Giam 
Kibreab, an authority on the experiences and history of the Eritrean refugees in the Sudan, 
aipaes that the breakdown of the role of traditional leaders is due to the fragmentary nature of 
refugee life (Kibreab 1996: 61). This social fragmentation has led to the weakening of the roles 
and authority of traditional leaders, who in the past govemed through their ability to get others 
to follow their lead and advice due to the social capital they had built up over the years. 
In both Mile and Am Nabak there is litde to no means for refugees to sustain themselves 
other than by rations provided by the WFP (World Food Program). The accumulation of 
material capital can only be accomplished through wage labour. However, employment 
opportunities for refugees are rare since camps are located too far from major towns to make 
err^)loyment feasible. Refugees in Gaga, as well as Tollum and Iridimi have however been able 
to find work in the towns of Abeche and Hiri-Ba/Iriba respectively, due to the proximity of the 
camps to these towns. 
UNHCR statistics show that most of the refugees now present in Tchad and the IDPs in 
Darfiu- were rural farmers or herders. Though there are opportunities for farming in the 
Assoungha and Dar Sila Camps and to a lesser extent in Konoungu and Am Nabak, there are no 
such opportunities in Mile, ToUum, Iridimi and Bahai. This lack of farming is not due to 
availability of lands, but is a result of insecurity, which is in itself a product of the breakdown in 
the relationship between refugees and the host community. The result is that refugees in the 
above camps are unable to supplement their rations with food they have grown themselves 
making their survival even more precarious. 
In the Tchadien camps many of the gender roles that regulated the relations between 
men and women in Darfur have also been altered, due to this labour migration of young males 
wishing to make money. Due to UNHCR stipulations about the employment of women over 
men many women have been breadwinners for families. In other areas, such as Tollum and 
Iridimi Darfuri BeRa women have taken jobs as servants or labourers for wealthy Tchadien 
BeRa. In the refugee camps, due either to war, or to male labour migration, there are a large 
number of female-headed households. As a result males find that opportunities for social 
advancement throt^h the accumulation of capital severely curtailed in the camp due to these 
UNHCR stipulations, many become depressed and there is a cair^ wide malaise that is almost 
palpable. 
Kibreab argues, in relation to Eritrean refugees, that after only a few years as refugees in 
the Sudan the traditional forms of social organization began to break down (Kibreab 2000). As 
with the case of Darfur refugees in Tchad, the breakdown of social cohesion and especially the 
sidelining of traditional leaders was exacerbated by the aid agencies. The preference for literate 
young, males who act as interlocutors with their communities led to the sidelining of traditional 
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leaders. As a result a dual system developed with the new young Sheikhs, called Nasara Sheikhs by 
their fellow refugees and the old. Sheikhs from Darfur. 
As the balance of power between ethnic groups vis a via the state and the state vis a via 
its rivals in the periphery of the state have ebbed and flowed, so too have the push and pull 
factors for individuals and groups to form alliances with other individuals and ethnic groups. In 
the past the nomads like the BeRa with their large herds were wealthier than their neighbours 
who were sedentary farmers. In recent years however drought has decimated these herds and 
forced many nomads to settie and take up farming. Others were forced to sell their stock at low 
prices to survive as grain prices shot up during droughts (Runger 1987: 43). In both situations 
individuals turn to alliance in their own ethnic group for assistance. 
In many parts of the Nile region of the Sudan, and along the Qiari in Tchad the forces of 
market, economic and religious integration have taken place centuries ago. However away from 
the core zones of the state these processes have really only begun relatively recendy. Dennis 
Tully in his work on market integration in Dar Masaalit labelled this process into the wider 
economic world, albeit through Sudan, Sudamzadon. He chooses this term, not A rabizatim, since 
Arabs in areas away from the Nile were now also experiencing the same changes. Tully uses the 
term Sudtrnzadon to describe a complex set of interconnected forces that manifest itself in: wage 
labour, abstinence from alcohol, segregation and seclusion of women (Tully 1988). This 
Sudamzed life style is conveyed by the Jallaba, Riverine traders who operate lucrative business in 
the peripheral areas of the Sudan and increasingly in Wadi Fira and Ouaddai in Tchad. Tully 
highlights the fact that this process of integration in what he calls Sudanese, what others have 
labelled Riverine and what I prefer to call the Statal/Cort axis is not a new process but rather the 
continuation of a long established market integration in the outer regions of the Sudanese state. 
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What is new however is the speed and penetration of this process in BeRa daily life. 
Thus, rather than being a well bounded social unit with common goals, the BeRa seem to made 
up of a number of corporate Be A Ah who compete even during times of conflict and drought 
induced uncertainty for power and prominence. This competition means however that the 
various Be A Ah and Airr Ke Be are well positioned, with each choosing the strategy that will 
ensure their own prosperity, in time of crisis. 
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C H A P T E R 6 
T R A D I T I O N A L F O R M S O F L E A D E R S H I P AND A U T H O R I T Y IN T H E G R E A T E R 
O U A D D A I - D A R F U R R E G I O N 
£zen t/d^ere are on/y/ive peop/e one can stt//he Sheik/?. The Nukuma fgozemmentj 
that is /or the peopk o/the to wn and cities, Idara Aha/ia fcivi/administrationj that is/or 
the peop/e o/the / / i / / a f '^//agesj... they need theirHukuma too. 
Omda's Secretary Adam Musa of Shau Shau near Kuttum: Mile, Tchad 02/02/2006) 
£x A/rica SemperA/i^uidNoz^- Out o/A/rica A/ways Something New. 
Pliny die Elder 
/ Land, Land Tenure and Administration in the Greater OuaddaiDar/ur 
region- from Nahus and L/akura to Dar andAmirate: 
The engine that drives much of the reliance of traditional institutions in Darfur and 
Ouaddai is the traditional system of administration. A key facet of these institutions is the land 
tenure systems of the region. The conflict over land in Darfur is hence in part a conflict over 
these systems of land tenure. This struggle is perhaps most visible in the struggle over and for 
tradidoTol form (f leadership and authority, which will be discussed in this chapter. It is here, with 
traditional rulers and post holders, that the power of the state can either be manifested or 
hemmed in by more powerful local forces. Thus, to fully understand the role of figures in 
traditional authority and the changes to this role brought about by displacement one must first 
come to grips with the relationship between the state, local regional powers and traditional 
leaders. Key to this is the system of land ownership. 
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a. Land Ownership in the Stdtamte cf Darfitr 
Land tenure systems are best thought of as the institutional frameworks that govern the 
distribution, use and inheritance of land and its resources. Several factors that will determine land 
tenure systems can be highlighted, these include: 
Climate 
Quality of land 
Water resources 
Mode of Production 
Descent patterns 
Population density 
Level of political cohesion 
The above factors need no explanation except for the last, which is connected to the 
resilience and adaptability of traditional forms of land ownerships. Throughout this chapter it 
will become clear that, though the names of particular institutions may change, their form and 
underlying ftmction will remains largely the same. One such institution the Hakura 'estate or 
grant', is key to understanding the region's history and complex land tenure system. The region's 
land tenure system is best described as an adaptive institution, intrinsically connected to the 
cultural, economic, political and social conditions of the society. Flence, traditional communal 
land tenure cannot be seen as static, but rather constandy adapting itself to the changing social 
and technical situations and advances along with the economic realities of the region. 
Not only do terms like 'customary law* and 'customary tenure' refer to systems present in 
pre-colonial oral cultures, but they also encompass modem systems, 'produced out of colonial 
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?7usw%hstarda^ and politically expedient apprqmatijons and allocations <f lard' (Peters 2004: 272). In 
many cases, it is clear that colonial authorities neither fully understood the symbiotic 
relationships between African rulers and their subjects, nor the relationships between these two 
groups and land. They often interpreted tenitaridity in terms of sowreigTty, in other cases they 
misinterpreted ritual roles. In other cases where the colonial rulers could not identify a 'chief, 
they simply created one. As a result, land tenure and ownership systems in Africa are a 
fascinating and complex topic, with the Sudan and Tchad being no exceptions. Due to their 
unique history and their late encounters with the colonial enterprise, the regions of Wadi Fira 
and CXiaddai in Tchad bear many similarities, in regards to land tenure, to Darfur. Having said 
this one carmot overlook the fact that in the region land tenure systems may vary between ethnic 
groups and show significant regional variances. 
Though many classify rights in the wider region as 'communal' (Manger 2006), this does 
not mean that every member of a particular ethnic group will have the same rights to land. 
One's right to any tract of land in the region varies according not only to one's ethnic group, but 
also one's clan, lineage, and residence status. Thus, certain clans may have stronger claims to 
land than others, and one may have to be resident in a community for a period of time before on 
can be considered an insider and granted land rights. However, many of these rules and norms 
governing land rights have always been contested, particularly by those who lose out under the 
current assemblages. 
IdaraAhalia, usually translated in English as Natke Administration ]s perhaps best rendered 
CiiM Adrrimstration, However it is interesting to note that the term was originally coined in the 
1920s by British officials as Natifw Adnimtration and Idara Ahalia was used as the Arabic 
equivalent. The fact that Ahalia or more precisely Ahalian is not an exact match for the word 
NatizE does have repercussions that reverberate to the present day. Most Darfuri see IdaraAhalia 
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as a legitimate branch of authority whose relationship with and to central state structures varies 
depending on whom one speaks to and who is in office. IdaraAhdia is perhaps best described 
as a system of administration that in some cases exists just below the state or goverrmient 
administration, and in other cases parallel to it. Integral to the understanding of the IdaraAhalia 
is the traditional system of land allocation and ownership which operated almost uninterrupted 
from the 1600s to the late 1970s. 
The land tenure systems in Darfur are the result of long historical evolution and changing 
political, economic and social organizations. The cornerstone of this system was the concept of 
the Dar ("home", "homeland", or "abode"). An ethnic group's Dar is its inviolable homeland, 
from which it cannot be removed. By the same token, large numbers of outsiders from other 
Dar cannot setde there without the expressed consent of the Dar's leaders. Small groups of 
pastoralists like the (Came^ A khalla Rizdga, Terjim, Hotiyya, Otriyya, Mahadi or Dorok who did 
not possess their own Dar and indeed some larger pastoral groups that do, may have been 
granted rights allowing them access to water and pastures at certain times of the year. These 
rights are enjoyed on the basis of purely local agreements. 
Another key feature of land tenure in Darfur is what is known as Hakura an estate or g^ant. 
The Hakura was a grant of land given by the Fur Sultans to an individual, clan or lineage group 
over a tract of land. Though some grants more closely resembled the European feudal estates, 
most were part of a complex system of administrative structures that governed the Sultanate. 
Records of Hawtkir (xhe. plural of Hakura) being granted appear very early in the Sultanate's 
history, in fact during the reign of the tiiird Sultan Ahmed Bakr (1700-1720) (OTahey 1980: 50). 
Thus, from the time the Sultanate spread from the Jebel Marra, home region of the Fur, the 
Hakura system was already well established. 
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The Hakura system, consisted of two kinds of Hamkir. The first granted limited rights 
to either a community or a lai^e area of land, -wHiile the latter Harkurat al-Jah or estate (fpriiile^ 
granted more extensive rights to a smaller area of land (OTahey 1980: 51). The former was 
des^ned to give administrative rights to individuals who woiJd govern outlying areas in the 
name of the Sultan, whereas the latter was a means of incorporating influential newcomers and 
providing income for the nobility (OTahey 1980: 51). 
Whether it was inherited from the Tunjur or even the Daju for that matter, Darfur had a 
complex three-tiered system of administration. The highest level of organisation were the four 
provinces DarDaali in the east, Dar Takamid in the north, Dar Aha Dima in the southwest; and 
DarAbbo Umnv in the southeast. Each was further subdivided into a number of Shartiyya, each 
headed by a Shartai^. The Shartai was the Sultan's represenutive in the area and as a result had 
the power to exact taxes, administer justice and raise levies when requested by the Sultan. The 
position of Shartai was hereditary, in the Sudanic sense that is, with the Shartaiship being passed 
to one of the brothers of a deceased Shartai or the eldest son of his eldest sister. Each Shartiyya, 
was further divided into a number of Dirriijiyya headed hyzDirriy (Young et al 2005: 15). 
The term Dar is now used to describe the cluster of rights in a particular area of land that 
is held by a community with an ethnic base. Formerly the term was used as a broader 
geographical category, such as the four provinces of the Darfvir SToltanate {Dar Takarmd, Dar 
Umrrv, DarDaali, DarDiirra). It was also further used to describe tributary regions such as Dar 
Fia and Dar Kerne in Western Darfur. At the same time it was xised, under the Sultanate, 
presaging its meaning today, to describe areas in which the Sultan had granted rights to an 
ethnically-based elite to administer justice and collect taxes, e.g. Dar Gimr, Dar Masaalit and Dar 
Shartai is a corruption of the Daju term Oxirte which has the double meaning of drumAnd dnrf(OTahey 1980: 71) 
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Rizeigat. In the early days of the Siiltanate administrative units were headed by elders who were 
granted the tile A bbo Nairn (hther or lord of the drum) (La Rue 1989: 172)^\ 
Map 9: Sultanic Darfiir and the various Dar 
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(O'Fahey&Abu Saliml983: 15) 
^ D u r i n g the early Fur Sultanate leaders were 'drummed' in the same way that European rulers were 'crowned' (La Rue 
1989: A). 
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The Hakura system played an important part in the creation of ethnic groups in Darfur. 
In the south the system meant that many of the smaller ethnic groups were led by chiefs 
appointed by the Sultan. However in most parts of the Sultanate the Hakura system was not an 
explicitly ethnic one. Hakura holders were appointed by the Sultan to collect tax and were able 
to become so influential that in many ethnic groups patronage networks were built around 
Hakura holdere (Flint & De Waal 2005: 8). 
The first Fur Siiltanate was destroyed when Sudanese slaver and adventurer Zubeir 
Rahama Pasha defeated the Fur Sultan during the battle of Menaweshi in 1874. However, 
Zubeir was cheated out of rule in Darfur by the Turkish Khedive of Egypt and in this way 
Darfur became an unwilling part of the Ottoman Empire, while Zubeir was detained in Cairo. 
His lieutenant Rabih Fadlallah nonetheless saw the writing on the wall and escaped with a 
section of their Zande and Nuba slave soldiers to begin a reign of terror in Africa that saw him 
conquer Dar Runga, and many of the Fertit ethnic groups, before being defeated by Ouaddai. 
Rabih then conquered Bagirmi and finally became the Mai in Kanem-Bomu. His adventures 
were only ended when he was killed in batde by the French at Kousseri near lake Tchad in 1900. 
In 1883 Darfur began to convulse under rebellions of Fur Shadow Sultans. Later that very year 
the Turks were driven out by the Mahdist forces and Darfur became a part of the Mahdist state 
until 1889. After the fall of the Mahdist state to the British a Fur nobleman named Ali Dinar 
returned to Darfur from Khartoum to establish the Neo-Keira dynasty, which was conquered by 
the British in 1916. 
Throughout this period in Darfur's history land and access to its resources was controlled 
by lineages (La Rue 1989: 4). Barth also explored this lineage based system in his 1967 work 
Eoononk Spheres in Darjur. Though Earth's work focused on Fur lineage groups, similarities exist 
between many groups in the region including the BeRa. For instance in both the Fur and BeRa 
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descent groups arc generally non-linear, that is they arc composed of groups of kinsmen who are 
usually endogamous (Barth 1967: 152). Though members of these groups may claim that 
membership is patrilineal, matrilineal descent and inheritance throi^h one's grandmother hint 
towards a history of matrilineal association in the Pre-Islamic era (Barth 1997: 152). Barth argues 
that such a group is possible since communal rights rather than being corporate are vested in a 
title holder, a Shdkh, Omk, or Dwiy. Thus rights to land can be transferred from the tide holder 
to individuals (Barth 1967: 152). 
Remnants of the system still survive. Ahmed Diraige, Govemor of Darfur in the 1970s 
and more recendy a protagonist in one of the attempts to bring peace to the region, was 
hereditary ruler of a large Fur subsection located in Zalenji and was entided as such to collect 
taxes and allocate land in that region. In the nineteenth century, as the Sultanate took on a more 
Islamic character, elites (either local ethnic chiefs or court loyalist placed in positions of authority 
by the Sviltan) were granted Hakura. All these terms were used concurrendy. Today the idea of 
a Dar, borrowing from the historic notion of Nahus ('possession of royil drum as a symbol of 
zuxhonty) and Hakura, combines the idea of an administrative unit, estate and ethnic homeland. 
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b. The A j^Egpdan Cadorrinmn in the Sudan and the Creation (f Natize A dmmtratim 
The policy of the British colonial regime and the often contradictory policy steps of their 
successor regime in the early post-independence era have also had a far reaching effect on the 
land ownership system of the region. The expansion of extractive commercial ventimes, in both 
Tchad and Darfur has also led to changes and conflicts as traditional and modem systems of land 
tenurc have clashed. The colonial powers, by and large, did rccognize the Usufructury system or 
Mancfa'a in Arabic, that allowed the use and possession of land that actually belonged to another. 
Thus, even today the right to graze, to water animals, to cultivate and cut wood arc not 
necessarily evidence of land ownership. 
The long and complex history of the allocation of land in Darfur did not end when the 
British killed Sultan Ali Dinar in 1916 and attached his state to the Sudan, as punishment for his 
supposed answering of the Ottoman caU for an Islamic uprising against the British during WWI. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that the British had eyes on Darfur long beforc they invaded 
the Sultanate in 1916. Africa's last independent state, Dar Masaalit, which had thrown off the 
yoke of both Darfur and Ouaddai during the Mahdist uprising was incorporated in 1923. In 
both of these states the British found an established and rcspected system of tribal govemance. 
The British used this system as the blueprint for their own Idara Ahalia, starting in 1923. The 
concept of Dar fit easily into the doctrine of indircct rule developed by the British elsewherc in 
Africa. The possession of a Dar allowed its inhabitants to monopolize the use and allocation of 
natural resources iri that Dar. The rights of minorities in the Dar varied but by and large they 
were denied the right to claim ownership of land in another Dar and were thus left without the 
means to play an active political role (UNICEF 2003a: 27). 
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In the pre-condominium era (the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium lasted from 1899-1955), 
leaders of various sections of a tribe had prestige but relatively little authority, in part because 
those who did not like them had ample opportunity to vote with their feet and leave. The 
colonial authorities stabilized the floating power positions in the traditional system For 
purposes of taxation, justice and public order, the new government needed the co-operation of 
representative authorities over identifiable groups. Locality could not serve as a basis of 
authority in a nomadic society, so the government settled on the leaders of patrilineal descent 
groups and gave them a formal power they had previously lacked, in this way creating dynastic 
traditions in many places where they had never existed and restructuring those that did exist. 
For the British like so many other Saharan state builders and conquerors the question 
was, as ever, how to govern effectively in this often hostile zone. The actual policy on Darfur 
was drawn up long before the invasion of the Sultanate. In 1915 Captain Harold MacMichael 
was sent to El-Obeid in Kordofan, the Sudanese province neighbouring Darfur to formulate the 
policy for Darfur after the overthrow of Ali Dinar (Pettersen 1986: 33). Initially the British 
played around with two ideas: firstly replacing Ali Dinar with a British colonial official and 
secondly replacing Ali Dinar with another member of the Kara dynasty who could be controlled 
via a British Resident. The former represented direct rule, in the manner that the way the rest of 
the Sudan was ruled and the latter represented indirect rule. In the end British opted for a 
compromise, which looked somewhat more like direct, rather than indirect rule. While the 
colonial government abolished the Fur sultanate, they retained many of the insdtutions from the 
old sultanate in the period between 1916 and the Nyala Uprising and Milner report of 1921. 
The British relied upon a form of indirect rule based on a model developed by Frederick 
Lugard, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria. The Li^rdian model was basically a form of 
cokmd adrrmstradm on a shoe string. This was accomplished by leaving the local population free to 
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manage their own affairs through their own rulers; under the guidance of the British officials. 
Hence, on July 16 1916, the British proclaimed that all established heads of tribes who declared 
obedience to the colonial regime would be allowed to keep their positions, however they would 
"rsrrviE these leho prow therrsdus unsuitahle" (Pettersen 1986: 36). Above these tribal heads were 
British District Commissioners and other colonial officials. 
The early period of Condominium British policy in Darfur was mainly focused on 
security and stopping the spread of Mahdist-inspired uprisings in the region. However once the 
British had consolidated their position in the region a series of reforms were implemented 
between 1921-1931. This series of ordinances, sparked by the 1921 Milner report which 
recommended leaving administration invested in 'nameauthorities', 'Nati.ieAdministration'W3S bom 
(Morton 1992). The system was gradually developed and finally legalized after a series of 
ordinances in 1922, 1925, 1927 and 1928 and eventually consolidated in the Nati^ Courts 
Ordinanae of 1932, which regulated the administrative and police powers of tribal Sheikhs and 
established a hierarchy of local coiuts in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Judicial powers were 
granted to the Sheikhs, although their jurisdiction was restricted to the individual tribe including 
the power to fine and imprison. These steps were taken pardy because of a need for stricter 
economizing during the Depression and by the need to fi l l the gap left by the expulsion of 
Egyptian administrators for political reasons in 1924 (Pettersen 1986: 36). 
During the colonial period, the Hakura system was altered and Haimkir combined to 
form a new administrative unit, the Omodzyyz, headed by an Omda. M2Jiy Hakura holders became 
Sheikhs and their powers were reduced or usurped by the new rank of Onzk (Runger 1987 52). 
The British hoped that by the creation of an intermediary position between the now 
strengthened paramount rvder and the comparatively weak Shakhs a new power balance would 
be struck (Morton 1992). The British introduced the Onk as a sub-district administrator who 
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combined the roles of tax collector and judge (Flint & De Waal 2005: 12). The term actually 
entered the Sudan via Egypt and ultimately the Ottoman Turks. The British used it in Darfur for 
the position previously held by the Diniq under the Keira-dominated Sultanate of Darfur. 
The British system of Natiw Admrdstratkn was in no way a unified, overarching set of 
policy goals, but rather a series of ad hoc decrees and conflicting policy, governed more by needs 
on the ground rather than a desired outcome. Therefore, even as the British upheld and 
legalized established land allotments, with some exceptions they made numerous changes to the 
native system of administration. Most of the changes made were justified in terms of 
administrative convenience. So, while even the four-fold division of Darfur dating to the Tunjur 
period was upheld, the numerous clans of the A hhdla Rizeigtt were at first made subordinate to 
the Madibu lineage, the Nazir of the historically-related but geographically distant Southern 
Rizeigzt. Later they were granted their own independent Shdkhdcm ^ e Waal 2004a). 
As the ruling family of the Rizdga from the early nineteenth century, the Nazir Madibu 
and his kin have become skilled in sensing coming changes in the political winds of Darfur. 
They allied the Rizdgtt with Darfur's enemies and helped overthrow the Fur Sultaiute on two 
separate occasions, first by siding with the slave trader Zubeir Pasha in 1874 then by siding with 
the British against the last Fur Sultan, Ali Dinar, in 1916. Durir^ the interim period they were 
allies of the Mahdist, however when the tide turned against the Mahdist A nsar forces they sided 
with the British. After independence they became prominent members of the Urma Party, 
which was headed by the great-grandson of the very Mahdi they had foi^ht against. Today a 
younger brother of the current Nazir serves as an elected member of parliament in Khartoum, 
while another brother is SLA commander for south Darfur. The allegiance of the Senussi ruling 
family of the Ta'aisha Arabs of southeast Darfur is also another barometer of the power of the 
various actors in the region. Nazir Ali Senussi was originally a Malik under his brother-in-law Ali 
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Dinar, but this however did not stop him from betraying his hideout to the British when the 
chance arose (Morton 2004: 6). 
The British also moved the two subgroups of the Beni Hussein to their present Dar 
north of Kepkabia and united the two sections of the Beni Halba, though these had been 
diverging both geographically and politically for some time (De Waal 2004a). Many of the Ba^ra 
groups ruled by varioxis Maliks subordinate to the Sultan saw their Maliks renamed Nazirs and 
their powers gready increased (Morton 1992). The term Nazir was given to the paramount 
chiefs of the Arab tribe. Six were given to the Arabs with Haimkir, namely the Ta'aisha, 
Habbanyi, Bern Halha, RizdgO, Bern Hussein and leyidzya (Flint & De Waal 2005: 13). 
Colonial administrators also changed the traditional leadership of the Bir^ who had no 
paramount ruler (De Waal 2004a). They also united the various groups north of the Masaalit, in 
what is now Dar Eren^ (Flint and de Waal 2005: 192-193) and die Harmr in El Nahud, 
Kordofan (Davies 1957). To the south the Fertit were also united and an attempt was even made 
to move those who lived in Kifa Kinga and En-Nahus in southern Darfur across the river to 
Bahrd Ghazal province (De Waal 2004a). 
Such also was the case in Kordofan among the nomadic Kababish camel and sheep 
herders, who were a loose confederation of tribes fluctuating in size, composition, and location. 
The acceptance of the tribe as a single unit by the colonial authorities and the appointment of an 
ambitious and more importandy an extremely intelligent and capable Nazir, led to a major 
change in the social and political structure of north Kordofan. Another factor that played into 
the hands of the Kababish was that they were staunch opponents of the Muhammad Ahmad Ibn 
as-Sayyid Abdullah dx Mahdi who had driven the British out of the Sudan. As a result the 
Kababish of Kordofan and the Shukria of the Blue Nile became favovirites of the British and had 
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numerous smaller groups attached to them for administrative purposes during the Condominium 
period (Morton 1992). 
Under the British the Hakura system was reorganized. Hakura holders were reduced to 
village Sheikhs and Hamkir amalgamated into Orvdiy^. This led to the disappearance of the 
Hakura from the le^ but not comnnrkd lexicon. The system of Idara Ahalia provided security 
with minimal staff and finances. However even as early as 1930s the shortcomings of NatiiE 
Ackmnstrationwere apparent to those British officials working in urban areas and along the Nile. 
With the realization that the Sudan was changing and that NaOiE Adrrmstradon was becoming 
outdated in many areas the British set about trying to make Natii£ Adnirnstratian more 
representative. Thus in the late 1930s elected councils were introduced, and in a few areas 
Sheikhs and Omdas were elected by village councils (Morton 1992). The model was modified 
over time, the local government frame work was introduced in 1932, and municipalities, 
townships and rural areas and councils created in 1937. However, traditional tribal leaders with 
their executive, financial and legislative power remained an integral part. A further development 
took place in 1951 with the establishment of a new Local Government Ordinance (Mohamed 
and Badri 2005). The purpose of Idara NaU'ie/Nadie Adnirnstration in this new framework was 
according to Mohamed and Badri (2005) to: 
1. Assure good management of tribal local community affairs. 
2. Allocate land for agriculture and grazing {theHokum). 
3. Look after security 
4. Communicate with local council, the province and state level. 
5. Collect taxes and other levies. 
6. Setde conflicts of local tenure. 
7. Mobilize communities 
8. Chair tribal/sub-tribal local courts (Judzyya). 
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c Past-Iruiependenoe Goiemments and Ooan^ to Lard Tenure 
The period immediately after independence was a period of great change and uncertainty 
with regards to traditional lands throughout the colonized world. In Africa, in particular, there 
were numerous land acts and even more reforms and amendments to these acts. Some states 
such as Kenya, Gate D'lvoire and Zambia opted for private land ownership patterns, while 
others including Tanzania and Ethiopia took the road of collectivization and state ownership of 
lands. Tchad occupied a middle ground; while there was private ownership of land, it was 
controlled by large multinational or para-statal firms, such as Qjim-Tchad and QVSTthe state 
sugar company, in the south. 
The Sudan followed yet another path. Initially communal land rights were more or less 
upheld, then after the 1964 October Revduticn, Native courts were placed under the central 
government judiciary and many posts in Idara Ahalia were abolished. The system of communal 
Dar and Hakura was recognized by post-independence governments up until 1970. After the 
1969 May Revolution traditional systems of land ownership were once again altered when in 1970, 
the Numeiri regime issued The Unre^tered Lands Act This Act, placed all land under state 
control and ownership. According to the new law, all Sudanese citizens were entided to equal 
access to government lands (Mohamed and Badri 2005). This de jure access to land clashed with 
the defaOo communal ownership of land in Darfur. Issues surrounding ownership in Darfur has 
festered for decades, with successive governments neither irr^lementing nor repealing the Land 
Regstration Ordinance. In some areas the state was able to expropriate land and use it for 
mechanized farming, as it did in the Nuba Mountains and Shilluk areas around the town of 
Malakal (Suliman 1997). However, traditional forms of land ownership and tenure continued 
without much state interference in Darfur. In these regions, as in the Nuba mountains, the 
presence of the Sudanese state is limited to the bare necessities of surplus extraction. 
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The establishment of the Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFQ in 1968 is perhaps 
the best-known example of state appropriation of traditional lands. The Corporation was 
initially set up as a Para-Statal to allow the Sudanese government to implement a market oriented 
agricultural drive. Mohamed Suliman argues that this drive was in part stimulated by the IMF 
and World Bank loan repayments, which forced the Sudanese regime to become even more 
predatory in its extraction of surplus from the zones away from the Statal/Core. In this way, 
unregistered lands which were in fact being utilized by nomads in their various seasonal 
migrations was put under intensive and unstistainable cash crop production. The nomads, 
forced of their lands and trying to find pastures for their herds, encroached on the lands of 
setded farmers and as a result conflict between the two groups became the norm (Suliman 1997). 
Ferguson argues that such spatially structured ineqvialities are key to the creation and 
perpetuation of local identities and thus are key to mobilization (Ferguson 2003). Pottier's work 
on Rwanda shows that even conflicts that were perceived as solely 'tribal' or 'ethnic' in character 
had much deeper roots. The collapse of external patronage networks and the shrinkage of the 
economy in the late 1980s and 1990s, the concentration of power in the hands of the northem 
Hutu elite cormected to president Habyarimana and the alienation and persecution of Rwandan 
refugees in Zaire and Uganda, all played a role in the subsequent genocide (Pottier 2002). 
Gallagher's work shows that the same is true of the Yugoslavia, where economic collapse of the 
late 1980s lead to a shrinkage of patronage and forced elites to seek new means of legitimizing 
there rule (Gallagher 1997: 47-75). 
Duffield highlights this as the pattern of conflict between Httmr and Dinka in the BahrAl 
Ghazal region south of Darfur, when the former were forced off their lands to make way for 
mechanized farming (Duffield 1994: 53). Sulinun shows the exacdy the same trend of escalating 
conflict in the Nuba mountains, between the Nuba and their Arab, neighbours with the former 
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losing their land to mechanised farming and being forced to farm marginal lands previously 
utilized by herders (Suliman 1997). Both cases highlight a process of marginalization and land 
appropriation Duffield labels local asset trarsjer (DMiiield 1994: 53). This has the effect of creating 
the landless underclass, who would work for low wages, which was necessary for mechanized 
farming to be successful in the first place. 
The Numeiri government finally abolished Idara Ahalia in 1971. In its place a complex 
administrative system was introduced, with all organs being controlled by the S.S.U. (Sudan 
Socialist Unior^. Village, Rural, Town and Provincial Councils were introduced, though with few 
staffers to replace the myriad of posts created by Idara Ahalia, the Act was only lightiy 
implemented in Darfiu". In practice, tribal leaders continued to be acknowledged heads of their 
group, and the ethnic group became a political base to promote its members to senior positions 
in local councils, as well as members of the regional and national assemblies as a result. 
In spite of the reforms in 1971, land in Darfur is still considered to be communally 
owned by one ethnic group or another and the possession of individual tides or deeds is rare, 
except that is, in the Kuttum area where tides and deed to lands are common (Tanner 2005: 9 
and De Waal 2004). Pressure for changes to land r^hts comes from groups that are outside the 
Dar system. The Sahelian droughts of the 1970s produced an increase in migration from one 
region of Darfur to another. According to customary law, leadership and political power in a 
Dar or Sba7tiy)a should be restricted to descendants of the original inhabitants of that Dar, 
incomers can be settied and absorbed relatively easily as long as they submit themselves to the 
established leadership (UMCEF 2003a: 27). But incomers, as opposed to ordinal setders, have 
increasingly come to frame demands for access to resources and political position under the 
terms of a more recent political dispensation, one that is potentially at odds with the Dar system, 
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i.e. their rights as Sudanese citizens. Similar disputes are found elsewhere in Northem Sudan 
(Suliman 1997, Morton 1992, Mohamed undated, Babiker 2002). 
In the late 1970s and 1980s hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of northem Darfur 
sought refuge and a new life in the more fertile central and southem regions. At first the 
traditional leadership and populace of the central and southem Dars were welcoming and 
allocated vacant land to the newcomers. The migrants were expected to attach themselves 
politically to the owners of the Dar, the advantage to the latter being that newcomers increased 
the numbers and political clout of the Day's ordinal inhabitants. However the sheer numbers of 
drought refugees and the political aspirations of some meant that traditional systems could not 
always cope with the competing demands from the two groups. The fact that the new 
generations of migrants setded on vacant lands and lived in separate villages meant that their 
absorption was relatively slow. In some areas, incomers came to oumumber the Dai's original 
inhabitants. They sought to gain control of their own rural councils and representation in the 
central government based on these demographic realities. 
The situation in Sudan and Darfur, in particular, should have improved in 1986 when 
Idara Ahalia was reinstated by the new Urrvm Party government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, but it did not 
(Egiemi et al: 2003). The reasons for this failure lay in Darfuri political changes that started in 
the 1960s. In the early 1960s, intellectuals and activists from across Darfur's ethnic and political 
divide formed the Jabhat Nahdat Darfur 'The Darfur Development Front' {DDF). Its main 
objective was to protect and lobby for the interests of the indigenous Darfuri in the political 
scramble for power at the centre (Ali-Dinar 2003). This can be seen as a milestone in the 
relationship between Khartoum and Darfur. In 1981 the Darfur Development Front was able to 
stage a popular and largely peaceful uprising, that forced the Khartoum government to appoint 
its leader Ahmed Diraige as the governor of Darfur and which reunited the province, which had 
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been divided into North and South Darfur in 1974. This was the first time since the death of Ali 
Dinar in 1916 that a native Darfuri had held the reins of power in the region. This signalled a 
distinct change in policy towards the region. What one notices, unfortunately, is a clear attempt 
by Khartoum to bypass this newly established regional authority. 
Some Darfuri Arab intellectuals saw the DDF as a movement dominated by leaders from 
African ethnic groups, ^ c h had been able to gain influence because Darfur's Arab constituency 
was divided. The DDF however, did include a number of prominent intellectuals of Arab, 
mainly Ba^ra and Ze)ad^, origin. Many of these Arabs had high ranking positions in the 
organization and the subsequent regional government. The Abhalla Arabs however, were not 
well represented, but this may have had more to do with the fact that as nomads they did not 
have the same access to educational opportunities as the setded Furor Bag^ra who had Dars and 
a capital where schools could be built, rather than a policy to overlook them. Whatever the 
reality, an altemative political strategy was embraced by another group of Arab intellectuals, who 
believed that they should form an alliance with the Fellata^* and BeRa and thus take political 
control of the province. To this end the " Gathering cf the Arabs" or "A rah Gathering, was created. 
This underground group began by distributing leaflets that called for the name of Darfur to be 
changed and other programs that would discriminate against the region's non-Arabs. 
The rise of the A rah Gathering can be seen as a second milestone in the relationship 
between Khartoum and Darfur. Emboldened by the absence of government intervention 
following a series of small scale robberies and attacks in their name, the Arab Gathering 
members wrote an open letter to Present Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1987. The letter, which was 
published in a prominent newspaper and signed by some 27 Arab leaders from Darfur, nude 
various claims and demands, the most interestir^ being that Darfur was more than 70 % Arab 
Specifically the Fulfulde speakers of TuUus 
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and that as a result Arabs should control the region politically, economically and socially (Flint & 
de Waal 2005: 51). The Sudanese president's response was unsympathetic and he appointed 
Tijani Sese, a Fur, as the new Regional Govemor. 
The Arab Gathering then began to take matters into their own hands. Directives know 
as Qpreshi 1 ard Qoreshi 2, released in 1988 and 1998 respectively, called for a covert war against 
the Z«7g3. The Arab Gathering called for cells to infiltrate the Congress Party, an organization it 
claimed was dominated by hybrid NubiarkA robs from the Nile region. The true Arabs, according 
to the directives, were the nomadic peoples of the West, the Juhayna nomads, whose homeland 
stretched from Kordofan to Lake Tchad (Flint & de Waal 2005: 52-53). Despite diis divisive 
rhetoric, it is clear that the Arab Gathering had support even among the hybrid Arabs of the Nile 
region that dominated the Sudanese state apparatus. 
The arming of Rizeigat and Misseriya tribal militias to fight the SPLA (Sudan People's 
Liberation Araiy) began in 1986, under the government of president Sadiq al-Mahdi (Ibrahim 
2004: 3) and was continued by the NIF regime when it came to power in the 1989. However, 
under the NIF the various militias were consolidated into the PDF.'' The subsequent 
ascendancy of the military security cabal under the NIF led to the establishment of parallel 
institutions whose purpose was to execute central government directives without the interference 
of the regional government in al-Fashir, or Juba for that matter. The logic behind the creation of 
the militias however had changed. This change was manifested in the two recruitment drives 
that took place in Darfur, both of which had the effect of preferentially arming fighters from 
Arab tribes perceived by national military authorities as loyal to the central government. Many of 
the new Murhleen militiamen were Darfuri, mainly Rize^at fighters loyal to the Umma party and 
the al-Mahdi family. Many had served with the party in Gaddafi's Islarrsc Le^m in Tchad (de 
" Popular Defence Force, essentially the militia-like reserve for of the Sudanese army 
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Waal 2004). Now they used their weapons during inter-communal conflict such as that between 
the Rizeigat and Ma'ali in 1999 and 2002. In 1992 the Government commissioned another 
militia force al-Fursari°, made up mainly of Beni Halba fighters (Ali-Dinar 2003). 
After the NIF came to power, the Khartoum Government pursued two policies in 
Darfur. One was a conventional divide-and-rule strategy, designed to shore up the authority of 
the centre. The other involved an attempt to construct a new, wider alliance for the Islamist 
project. In its early years in power the was to remould the Sudan into a state in which political 
Islam was the route to enfranchisement and citizenship (Flint and de Waal 2005: 191). Efforts 
were made to bring more Darfuri people into the political fold (Tanner 2005: 17). The particular 
target was the Fellata inhabitants of the region who, prior to the 1989 coup, were not citizens 
and could not vote and as a result had no political representation. In the final analysis this 
Islamisation program turned out not to be whole-hearted, it was a rallying call, rather than a 
serious political project. Nevertheless, the NIF, under the guidance of Hassan al-Turabi, did 
form links with influential elites from some ethnic groups in Darfur, mainly the Kobe BeKi and 
Berti from the north-west, who were already active in the Islank Brotherhood and radical Islamic 
circles in Khartoum University. They formed part of the NIF's "oUiarKE cf the failhfii', intended 
to unite Darfuri Africans, Fellata and Arab Nile Valley Islamists. 
When the ruling group split in 1999 and Hassan al-Turabi was driven from power, one of 
the casualties was this alliance. From the original Car^ress Party General Omar Basher formed d-
Mutamtral-Wattard (the National Congress), while the Turabists formed al-MtOarmral- Sha'bi (the 
Popular Congress). Most of the members of the formerly mai^inal groups in the new elite — 
those from drawn from the Fellata and other Darfuri groups — sided with Turabi, the architect 
Horsemen. The term was used to designate the Beni Halba horse mounted mihtia men who fought against the 
SPLA incursion into Darfur. 
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of their inclusion in the power structures of the centre and joined his Popular Congress. Some 
later formed the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the two main rebel groups in the 
present conflict in Darfur (de Waal 2004: 6-7). 
After Turabi's fall from power, central government strategy reverted to the previous 
divide-and-rule pattern in Darfur. Militias drawn from Arab tribes were armed and given tacit 
license to raid non-Arab setdements. Impartiality was progressively abandoned. Militias were 
also formed for self-defence among non-Arab groups, some of whom had military experience or 
martial traditons. Many BeRa militia men, for example, had fought alongside - and then against -
the Libyans in Tchad, or as mercenaries in Mauritania and Burkina Faso or against the SPLA, in 
the Nuba mountains and against the Ugandan Army in Equatoria. It was these militias that later 
formed the core of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), the main rebel group in the current civil 
war. 
The radical miliurization of the non-Arabs in Darfur, however, can be traced back to a 
local conflict that occurred before the polarization of interests in the central government. In 
1987, 27 Arab tribes, from Kordofan and Tchad, as well as Darfur, formed an alliance against 
the Fur, declaring war on 'the Zurgz'. The objective of raids on Fur villages was to seize fertile 
Fur land permanendy and warnings were to be given in advance in the hope that the Fur would 
abandon their ancestral land without a fight (Intemational Crisis Group 2004: 6). This was the 
time that the term Jar^aimi entered common usage to describe the hordes that attacked villages 
and massacred inhabitants. In defence the Fur organized their own militias composed of retired 
army and police officers. 
A Government-sponsored peace conference, oig;anized in 1989 to resolve the conflict, 
provided only a brief respite as neither party disarmed or demobilized their militia forces. 
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claiming that the central government was not in a position to guarantee their security. The 
agreement became one of a number that were never implemented (de Waal 2004: 195). This lack 
of follow-up from the Govemnoent became part of the wider slide towards impunity for Arab 
militias in Darfur and led to a growing perception among non-Arab groups that the Government 
itself was part of the problem. 
Of the factors in the conflict cited by the members of the reconciliation committee, one 
of the most striking is their stress on the bui^eoning of weaponry in the region. In the 1980s 
and 1990s the proliferation of firearms in the region gave rise to a level of lawlessness and 
banditry to which there was no comparison in Darfur's history. This, in turn, produced an 
amplification effect as the population of the region formed militias to protect their property and 
lives. The power of established tribal authorities over such militias became problematic. Many 
of their recruits were young men who had lived away from the reach of traditional leadership, 
either in urban centres or as famine migrants. Confronted with this, traditional methods of 
conflict mediation struggled to maintain their effectiveness. Increasingly, it was a militia leader, 
not the Omk or Nazir, who took the decision as to when to take action in a conflict (Mohamed 
and Badri 2005: 23). In some cases, though, the forms of traditional authority were transformed 
in the new era: a new kind of Omk began to emerge, one whose influence came primarily from 
leadership of an armed group. Musa Hlal, the pro-Government Abballa leader of the Untjulul 
section of the Northern Rizeigat, who has come to prominence during the current war in Darfur, 
is the best-known example of this. 
In February 1994, the Khartoum regime embarked on a radical transformation of 
govenunent structures. In what must have seemed like a nod and a wink to the Arab Gathering 
the Sudan was divided into 26 federal states. Darfur was divided into three. North, West and 
South Darfur, with El Fashir, Genneina and Nyala as the respective capitals of the three new 
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states. The redivision of the states was a thinly veiled attempt to do exactly what the Arab 
Gathering had been asking for since the 1980s. All over the Sudan people were waking up to 
find a raft of new civil service and NadwAchirdstratim agencies had been created and filled with 
Arab cronies of the NIF. However, the re-division may have prompted by a failed revolt in 
Darfur by ex-NIF security cabal member Yahiya Daoud Bolad. Bolad, a Fur, had become 
disenfranchised within the NIF and joined the southem rebel movement SPLA and tried but 
failed to start a revolt in the Darfur region. 
At this time, the N.A.C Natke Acbrmstratim Council was created in Darfur as a 
overarching agency to deal with and coordinate Khartoum's policy on Ickra Ahalia (de Waal 
2004a). The Government also created a new office called Y4 ;7 i r and an administrative division, 
smaller than a Dar, called an A rrirate. The A mrate was a term that was new to Darfur. The A mr 
was, typically, interpolated between the highest tribal authority and the Onk, this previously the 
second-highest, was now relegated to third position (Young and others 2005a: 121). 
In an episode of national ethnic Gerrymandering, the likes of which have rarely been 
seen, ethnic groups that had carved up entires and dominated regions for centuries found 
themselves in rump regions or disenfranchised. In Darfiu-, the Fur, the region's largest single 
ethnic group and the region's leading political force since the 1650, found their homeland 
divided into three states, worse yet, they were a minority in all three states. The new states were 
thus created at the expense of groups such as the Fur, while others who were deemed worthy 
received states, or A nirates of their own. The administrative divisions were manipulated to 
reward or punish particular groups. On the one hand, the reorganization of local government 
can be seen as giving recognition to unrepresented communities. On the other, it can be seen as 
a divide-and-rule tactic, one that recurs in Sudanese history as the power at the centre struggles 
to control the periphery. 
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The above historical narrative h^hlights a process by which ethnic or communal groups 
become contestable capital that can be manipulate by political elites, a process I have labelled the 
creation of contestable ethnic capital. However, this process is by no means unique to Darfur. 
Feipjson in his 2003 work on mobilization warfare called these conflicts in which mobilization is 
along perceived lines of identification, identerist oorfiict, and argues that they have four phases 
(Ferguson 2003: 30): 
1. the creation of a core identerist group 
2. the creation of mutual foes or a security dilemma 
3. polarization and projection of negative attributes 
4. calculated violence 
Remarkably, the above sequence specifies the exact process that took place in Darfur 
1. the creation of ethnic capital; 
2. followed by the perceived political dominance of the province by Ahmed Diraige and the 
African ethnic groups. This was countered by the creation of parallel security institutions 
to curtail regional power and led to even more alienation and finally the Bolad rebellion. 
The central government then armed the Arab groups in the region and the African 
groups began to do the same; 
3. the rise of the Arab Gathering, Qureshi I and I I and the smaller conflicts that merged 
into the cvurent crisis 
4. calculated violence 
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Bette Denich in her work on the collapse of the Yugoslav state, highlights a similar trend 
in which regional conflicts are used as lightening rods by notables in the political centres of 
power as means to either advance their own careers or entrench their own powers and vice versa 
(Denich 2003: 186). This can be seen in Darfur with the amalgamation of the local and national 
-and the global, with the mvolvement of Libya, France the United States and Tchad-. In Darfur 
this lightening rod was in many instances IdaraAhalia. 
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2 Traditiona/Leaden^ip in £<tster?2 Tciad: Dar Tama 
Most of Eastern Tchad was under the control of the Sultanate of Ouaddai prior to the 
latter's conquest by the French in 1905. As a result of historical and cultural similarities with 
Darfur, the system traditional administration in the Greater Ouaddai-Darfur region bears striking 
similarities to each other. In Tchad this leadership is known as Ndhim al-HiUa or the village 
system, while in Darfur it is known as Idara Ahalia or native administration. In Dar Tama the 
system of Ndhim cd-HiUa is headed by a paramount Sultan. The current post holder Sultan 
Haroun Mahamat has been in office since 1987. 
Comprising about 10,000 km2 and rising to about 1000 meters, Dar Tama occupies the 
tract of land north of Ouaddai and south of Dar Kobe (Tchad). To the east, across the Sudanese 
border lies Dar Gimr, to the west the Mararit and Abu Charib and to the south the Maba and 
Masaalit. Tama is actually a Nilo-Saharan language of the eastern Sudanic family, as part of the 
Western Branch of this language family Tama is closely related to 11 other languages 
(Ethnologue 4): 
• Daju 7 languages 
• Nyming 2 languages 
• Temien 2 language 
Tama itself is divided into 3 languages 
• Mararit of Am Zoer, Tchad which includes Abu Qiarib close to 50,0000 speakers 
• Asungur-Erenga of Darfur close to 40,000 speakers 
• Tama proper close to 70,000 speakers 
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Dar Tama was hody contested by both Darfur and Ouaddai for most of its history. At 
some points in time, the unfortunate Tama, were forced to pay tribute to both of their 
neighbours. Le Rouvreur confirms that at least as far back as the 1960s, there was an oral 
tradition of a dynastic link between the Daju, Tama and BeRa going back to the 15^ century 
when the Daju were the dominant ethnic group in Ouaddai and Darfur. Like Darfur and 
Ouaddai and Kanem, Dar Tama was divided into four provinces, with the names of the 
provinces and much of the court functionaries taken from Ouaddai to the south (Le Rouvreur 
1962: 155-156). 
Map 10: Location of the Tama 
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The Tama are agriculturalists, who rely on farming and breeding catde for their 
livelihood. Though in past many of the northern Tama clans owned camels, raids and thefts, 
which increased with the la-wdessness of the Tchadien civil war, means that today most Tama 
have been relieved of such livestock. In the rest of Dar Tama the inhabitants farm millet known 
in Arabic as Dukkim and locally as Eish. Most Tama aspire to own a few head of catde since 
manure, which acts as a fertilizer, increases annual crop yield higher. However such 
advancement is not without cost, as raids by Daza/Gur'an bandits, who can take stolen catde to 
markets in volatile Darfur, are a constant threat. Due to the poor nattiral resources and 
economic conditions of the region, miration from Dar Tama across the border to Darfur is a 
enticing prospect for many Tama. 
Map 11: Cantons of Dar Tama 
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The Department of Dar Tama is divided into 19 Cantons: {Gureada-Ckiest, Gureada-Est, 
Fare, Koursi^ Mcudourre, Djimke, Troa I, Tvoa II, Odtkoure, Birak, Morossabize, Lino, Bali, Kdaym, 
Naraungt, Niere, Kassine, Kourkcure). Each Canton is head by a Ch^de Canton known in Dar Tama 
the Arabic XtrmA^M. In the past the A^ad, a member of the dominant clan in the canton, was 
selected by the Sultan. Today however, they are chosen by the Prefod, after consulting the Sultan 
and local political officials Qanszky 2006). According to Tama expert Babett Janszky the role of 
A^dd is to act as an intermediary, not only between the Tama people and Tchadien state 
officials, but also between the village Shakh and the Sultan (Janszky 2006). Like Ordas in 
Darfur he is also responsible for the collection of taxes and also plays a prominent role in the 
dispensing of traditional justice. 
Below the level of AgM are the do^de uUa^ or Shdkh al-Hilla,, village Sheikhs. As in 
Darfur, the term Hilla or village, actually refers to the main village, as well as any nearby hamlets 
occupied by villagers. As with the appointment of the Agidd, the Tchadien state plays a much 
larger role than its Sudanese counterpart in appointing Shdkhs. Generally Sheikhs are supposed 
to be appointed by the Sub-prefect, however in practice the inaccessible location of many 
villages means the most the Tchadien state can do is confirm the appointment of Sheikhs. This is 
especially the case in Ouaddai and Dar Tama, where the Sheikh is a hereditary position, passing 
from father to son or younger brother (Interview with Zelil Ibrahim Sheikh al Hlla MUe, Tchad 
16-03-06 & Janszky 2006). 
Though members of the traditional administrative system in the region have faced 
numerous problems in the past, it is the new ones thrown up by the presence of refugees in their 
midst that have caused them the most aggravation recendy. In addition to cases of theft of 
Tama property or fights with refugees the Tama leadership have now found themselves 
challenged by their own people to stand up to the U N and the NGOs and stop the influx of 
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BeRa into their lands. Many Tama are deeply concerned about the number of BeRa refi^ees 
who have been placed in camps on the outskirts of some of their villages. Many in the Tama 
leadership complain that although during the ioitial stages of the refugee influx, when sites were 
being selected and refv^ee numbers were low, they were consulted extensively, this participation 
was superficial: 
Vou know w/?en t^e camp was hut/t.. / was ca/led into ezery meeting wit/; 
CARE and NCR. / was in t/;e midd^ and my peop/e t/;oug/;t / ate mi//ions to iet 
t/;e re/ugees come /;ere... / /;ave not receized one CFA not one franc.... my 
peop/e even went to see t/;e Su/tan and />e said it is not tme /;e /;as not eat any 
money. Zelil Ibrahim Shakh de village Mile, Tchad 16-03-06. 
In a push for 'host ajmmnity partidpatim' UNHCR held numerous meetings with villages 
in Dar Tama and their traditional leadership. Though the meetings gave the appearance of 
community participation, they were litde more than window dressing, since all the meaningful 
decisions were taken by represenutives of the Tchadien state and the UNHCR. What the 
meetings did manage to achieve was the appearance that the do^de uUa^ were complicit, if not 
actively involved, in the inundation of Tama lands with Darfuri refugees. 
Many Tama used the presence of the refugees to take their complaints to the Tama 
Sultan. By Tama tradition, if the majority of males in a community agree, they can petition the 
Sultan to have their Shakh removed. However this has rarely taken place with the position of do^ 
de zilla^ passing from father to son or brother, in line with the Islamic traditions of succession. 
Recendy however, there have been a few cases of villagers taking petitions to their Sultan to have 
Sheikhs, whom they suspected of being too close to the NGOs or refxigees, removed. Though 
none of the petitions have been successful, the threat of being removed has had of the effect of 
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hardening the opinions of many Tama traditional leaders and has given them more reasons to 
oppose the presence of the BeRa refugees in their midst. 
In addition to the refugees the Tama have also had to cope with the presence of 
significant number of well-armed nomads. Daza, Bideyat BeRa and to a lesser extent Arabs have 
always traversed Dar Tama on their way to camel markets in Abeche or the Sudan, or during 
their annual migrations. However, many Tama claim that during the 1970s and particiilarly 
during the Hssene Habre government (1978-1992), the number of Daza/Gur'an and BeRa 
nomads who began to setde more or less permanentiy in Dar Tama increased dramatically 
(Interview with Zelil Ibrahim Shdkh de village Mile, Tchad 16-03-06). 
These well-armed nomads, with very good links to the Daza/Gur'an and BeRa miliury 
officials, presented problems to the traditional system of administration, not only because their 
control of the means of violence meant they did not have to abide by traditional practices 
regarding use of communal lands. More importantly, many of the nomads had left their home 
areas in small groups of 10-15 men and their families. Upon arriving in Dar Tama many selected 
their bravest or most ambitious member as their Shdkh, and as a result Tama local authorities 
found it difficult to negotiate with the representatives of the nomads as violence between 
nomads and farmers became increasingly commonplace. 
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J TraditionalLeaders If ip in Darfur: Dar Zag/rawa : Idara Alra/ia in Dar Ga/la 
The origin of the various dynasties in Dar Zaghawa is somewhat murky. What is known 
is that by the late seventeenth century the FurSultamte, based in the Jebel Marra region of central 
Darfur, was already entrenched in the BeRa areas of northern Darfur, while the Maba of Ouaddai 
were already present in northern Tchad around the same time (OTahey 1980: 34-35). This initial 
incorporation of Dar Zaghawa into the Fur Sultanate was not as violent as one would imagine. 
The Fur utilized another, more subde, tool of statecraft- marriage. Marriage alliances proved a 
useful tool to integrate disparate BeRa 'big men' and other local elites (OTaheyl980: 36-37). 
In this way Ahmed Bakr (1700-1720) the third Fur Sultan, married the daughter of the 
ruling Kobe family named Kaltoum (OTahey 1980: 36-37). A generation later his half Kobe 
BeRa son Muhamad Darwa would become Sultan. Next Muhamad's son Umar Lei would hold 
the position, before another son of Ahmed Bakr and Kaltoum- and brother of Muhamad 
Dawra- Abdul Qasim (1739-1752) became Stiltan. The half BeRa Abdul Qasim appointed a 
BeRa named Bahr as his Wazir when he became Sultan. This appointment caused so much 
resentment among the Fur nobility that during an invasion of Ouaddai they abandoned their 
Sultan, Abdul Qasim, on die batdefield (OTahey 1980: 36-37). 
With the Sultan's untimely demise, his position passed to his brother Muhammad Tayrab 
(1752/1753 1785/1786). Thus, for the third time in less than two generations the position of 
Sultan was occupied by a son of Kaltoum. The new Sultan immediately made his maternal uncle 
Kharut Ibn Hlan, Sultan of the Kobe BeRa, granting him a Nahus. Numerous other Kobe were 
given high position in the Sultanate. When Mtihammad Tayrb's son Issaq (1785/1786-
1787/1788) became Sultan the Fur nobility expressed their discontent, complaining that they had 
had enov^h of rulers who were more BeRa than they were Fur. Issaq's position was rather 
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precarious, as his father was half BeRa and his mother a full blooded BeRa. His appointment of 
numerous BeRa to positions of power did not help him win over the Fur nobility. In the end 
Abdel Rahman, the brother of Muhammad Tayrab (and son Ahmed Bakr to a Fur wife) and 
imcle of Issaq, rallied the Fur nobles to his side an civil war ensued. The south became the 
domain of the Fur under Abdel Rahman and the north became a hold out for Issaq and his 
BeRa. The civil war was brief and Issaq was killed. He made his final stand not far from the 
modem BeRa setdement of Girgo west of Kepkabia (OTahey 1980: 38). 
Not only were the BeRa traditional leaders susceptible to influences from the centralized 
states to the south, so too were the endogenous leadership stmctures in which they operated. 
Dar Galla, with its capital in Komoi north Darfur, is bordered to the west and south west by the 
Sultanates founded by those who fled the advance of Sultan Haggar, namely Dar Kobe (Tine) 
and Dar Kapka (Tundebey). To the east it is border by Dar Tuer. Like all of the Darfuri 
regional grouping Dar Galla was initially part of a much larger Dar Tuer which fragmented into 
smaller and smaller territories, a process that began under the Fur Sultans and continued during 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan. 
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Map 12:DarGalla 
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(Arrows show the winter migration routes of BeRa nomads) 
Dar GaUa itself is a region made up of numerous Be A Ah/tribes and Air Ke 
Be/Branches. The region is also composed of numerous Haimkir, one for each tribe BeRa of 
the BeRa who live there (Interview with Qnk secretary of Salih Muhammad Shumu of Adar 
close to Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 04/02/2006). Presented here is the first full list of those Be A 
Ah/tiihes, along with their Air Ks 5e/Branches, origin stories and camel sign. The list was 
compiled with information from Omda Tahir Hariga Boyo of Komoi, Yousuff Nour Terayo 
member for the Mahkama of Komoi and Sheikh Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba of Saref Omra, 
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Kepkabia. The information was gathered in Mile refugee camp in Tchad in 2006. My interpreter 
and friend Salih Haroon Soleyman also proved to be very knowledgeable of the tribal histories of 
Dar Galla and became a key source in this area. These men, though interviewed separately 
agreed on almost all information they provided me with. In fact only in three cases did Yousuff 
Nour suggest a different name for the same camel sign. 
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T A B L E 9 
S O C I A L ORGANIZATION O F D A R G A L L A 
BE A AH 
bedeyara 
AiRR KE BE CAPITAL 
Kalibai 
Etdnga 
Kotiyara 
Boronga 
Orora 
Iridi 
Adar 
Indete 
Tedebe, 
Humr 
Zuruk 
Mustetaya 
Kamo 
Miski 
HISTORY 
Of Tunjat origin 
desceadants of 
Hadji Kato Suliman 
Terteba 
Of TobarA/Bideyat 
and Midob (called 
Degede giey in 
BetA Ah) origin. 
After a murder a 
group of Midob 
known as the Baga 
refused to pay the 
Diya or blood 
money and moved 
to Kamo in Dar 
Galla. Those that 
paid remain in Dar 
Midob in the far east 
of Datfiir to this day 
Bedeyara Origin 
CAMEL SIGN 
Herti abo -the horse 
T \ 
Dtandoi- horse 
Bedi- horse 
I t I 
Okurra 
Dava 
Gelegara 
Sinna 
Hap 
Jidu 
Nimeiti 
Murguni 
Datma 
Jawa 
Ima 
Mani 
Darong 
Da Be 
Datma 
Uigui 
Of Maba origin 
Of D a z a / G u r ' a n 
origin form Borku in 
northern Tchad 
Of Arab Awlad Zeit 
origin fonn Hilaliya 
O f K o b a r A / K b 
origin 
Guydey- ctow foot 
Thamint-asar wa mai 
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) 
Mamur- ring (the ring of 
Abu Zeit Hilaliya) 
Bado targoi- gazelle hoof 
Sbegara Migera Togoi O f D a z a / G u r ' a n Hede Shuei- 2 horses 
Dekom origin 
Boyo u w 
Jardaberi 
<• 
Tabara Jitbokiy Of D a z a / G u r ' a n Berrr Sherou- a cross 
origin 
\ 
Gola Awkd Diggin Gelabe Of Gelegata origin 
4-
Mamur- ring 
Baage Dar Sueni Hilaliya Of Misseriya origin Bado targoi- gazelle hoof 
brought to Dar Galla 
form Am Timan in 
Salamat Tchad as 
captives during a 
war between the 
BerA/Zaghawa ad 
the Misseriya (more 
Taming Taman bede 
Mira Hilaliya 
Kanagara Darma 
likety a wax between 
Bet A/ Zaghawa 
forces of the Sultan 
of Darfut and the 
M i s s e f i y a or 
Misseriya forces of 
the Sultan of 
Ouaddai. 
Of Arab Awlad 
K e m e d i f r o m 
Salamat T c h a d . 
Their ancestor came 
to Dar Galla as a 
Faki. 
Of TobarA/Bideyat 
origin 
Of KobarA/Kobe 
origin 
Guydey- crow foot 
/ V I 
Kunjara-a sickle 
1 
Meri Wutit (throwing 
stick) or Deri Dera (not 
s t r a i g h t ) . L a t t e r 
suggested by Yousuff 
Nour. 
Ik Dabo 
Awlad Diggin 
Burrra 
Eli Birra 
Komoi 
Dildia 
Hilaliya 
Hadjet 
Koburta 
Of Gelegara origin Mamur- ring 
Of Kanuri-Kanembu 
origin 
Of KobarA/Kobe 
origin 
Maba attacked the 
BerA/Zaghawa took 
a large group of 
women with them 
back to Ouaddai. 
Some time later the 
women escaped and 
returned to Dar 
Guydey- crow foot 
Timsa - crocodile 
Sayif-sword 
Bey Bera Gasimaba 
Kotora Bow Ba 
Mamia Datma 
Zaghawa pregnant. 
Their offspring were 
not accepted and 
formed their own Be 
A Ah. 
Of D a z a / G u r ' a n 
origin 
Of TobarA/Bediyat 
origin 
Of TobarA/Bediyat 
origin 
Bur sham- a cross 
Meri wutit- throwing 
stick 
1 
Bore- sticks 
\\\ 
Orrodio 
Agabi 
Oboral 
Nuera 
Jaba Kurra 
Gatak 
Umm Bora 
Manyi 
Of KobarA/Kobe 
origin 
Mamur- ring 
Of Tuer origin 
Of TobarA/Bediyat 
origin 
Guydey- crow foot 
Kimiara-sickle 
Of TobarA/Bediyat 
origin 
Meri wutit- throwing 
stick 
Kurrra Furawiya 
Kobora Idit 
Odebey Guskari 
Hodera Motio 
Of TobarA/Bediyat 
origin 
Of Arab Misseriya 
ongin 
Mamtir -ring 
Berhsan or salib - cross 
-4-
O f Arab Taliba 
origin 
Of KobarA/Kobe 
origin 
Sabali sunduk- cowering 
rabbit 
Mamur kafo -blind ring 
(closed ring) 
Toginye Katiya and Bedi- Horse 
Miski 
E 
Mifia Abdel Of KobarA/Kobe Sajff- sword 
Khatowey origin 
Shea Futawiya Of Arab Awlad Zeit Mamur- ring 
origin 
Erdibara Eridi close to 
Kamo 
Of TobarA/Bediyat 
origin 
Timsah- crocodlie 
-4^  
To many of the peoples of the Sahara and Sahel camel signs are more than just brands or 
intricate scarification bestowed upon camels to show ownership. They constitute a symbol the 
ethnic group or, in the case of the BeRa, the Be A Ah. For instance, the various Be A Ah Are not 
territorial groups, in that they are not found in specific areas only. I n fact, rather like the Rendilk 
and Sarrimu rrrdetks and phratries (translated as sections) in Spencer's work on East African 
nomads of the Kenya, Somali, Ethiopia border (Spencer 1973: 29), Airr Ke Be and on occasion 
entire BeA Ahzio. found in numerous pockets throughout Dar Zaghawa and farther afield. This 
segTBiTtary cksaent system is held together by a belief of common origin of people in the same A in 
Ke Be and Be A Ah. The various camel signs are a testament to this common or^ in . The Ba^, 
for instance whose largest pocket is found in Dar Galla also have pockets in Dar Kobe, among 
the Midob and even among the Bideyat. The same Be A Ah\s found among numerous regional 
groupings and ethnic groups in the region. Thus, in addition to being segmentary, the BeRa 
descent groups are also dispersed and multi-locational groups. 
John Davis in his 1987 work on Libyan politics argues that the key feattire of segmentary 
societies is, that the liill to oppose akmys rest mth others. As Davis put it " They wish to dominate, and 
so £?«ycall forth our solidarity to oppose them", (Davis 1987: 104). What therefore develops is a 
system of f luid ever changing alliances and allegiances. Gimther Schlee in discussing the Elemo 
sub-clan of the Rendille mentions a similar process. The Elemo were descendants of Oromo who 
were captured by R&zlille warriors. I n 1992 the Gabra Oramo raided the Rendille and the Elenv 
bore the brunt of the attack losing most of their camels. The Elenv were forced to seek refuge 
among their original Gahra clan brothers \\dio gave them a grant of camels. Thereby crossing the 
fluid Gabra-Rendille &hmc boundary twice (Schlee 2004: 145). 
The BeRa o r^ in stories are confirmed, in part, by Tubiana. Her work claims an eastern 
origin for the Kobe, a Bomu origin for the Tuer, Bideyat for the Galla, and a Fur origin for the 
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Kaitinga (Tubiana 1985: 23). De Waal in his work on famine in the region also examines this 
fo rm of ethnic adoption briefly. He notes that in some Darfuri tales Ahmed al Makur is not 
Tunjur, but an Arab who marries a Tunjur princess named Keiia, thereby starting the Fur 
dynasty known as the Keira dynasty. De Waal also recounts the story of an abandoned Arab 
baby, found in a ziacU, who grows up to become the leader of the Fur of Dar Enga (De Waal 
1989: 48). Even today there are the Tunjur-Fur of Dar Fumung, the BeRa-Fur known as the 
Kaitinga, the Turra-Fvir of Turra and the Arab-Fur of Jebel Si who attest to these mixed 
heriuges. 
The various AirKeBe and Be A Ahoi Dar Galla have, f rom time immemorial, been ruled 
by local big men known by a host of names, the oldest of these terms is Ilu. Currendy the ruler 
of Dar Galla is known as a Shartai, a term bestowed up the ruler of the region by the British, in 
1914. The line of the Shartai of Dar Galla in Dar Zaghawa goes back nine generations according 
to both Omk Tahir Hariga Boyo of K o m o i and Yousuff Nour Terayo. 
Abdel Karim 
SalihNur 
Abdel Shafi 
Bush 
Al-Zaain 
I ^ s a n 
Salih Al-Tiyyb 
Tijani 
Adam Sabi Tijani Al-Tiyyb 
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The first five rulers of Dar Galk were in fact little more than petty chiefs known in Dar 
Galla as Hor (Interview with Sheikh Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba of Saref Omra, Kepkabia: Mile, 
Tchad 02/02/06). Though not the laigest or the most powerful Be A Ah in Dar Galla, the 
Kaliht had used their close links with the Fur Sultans to see off any contenders to the position 
and distribute largess to those who could be co-opted (Interview with Chiia Tahir Hariga Boyo 
of Komoi : Mile, Tchad 08/02/06). The Hor of Dar Galla like many other BeRa chieftainships 
was subject to the Malik in Um Burro in Dar Tuer to the east. In this way the Hor had litde more 
responsibility than a modem Sheikh (Interview with Yousuff Nour Terayo member traditional 
court at Komoi : Mile, Tchad 26-04-06). 
This all changed with the coming of coloni2ation. After the defeat and subsequent 
murder of the last Fur Sultan A l i Dinar in 1916, the British District Commissioner appointed a 
new Hor and moved the capital of Dar Galla f r o m Morshey, with its poor wells, to Komd 
(Interview with Yousuff Nour Terayo member of the traditional court at Komoi : M l e , Tchad 
26-04-06). At this time they also gave the Hor the title of Shartai (Interview with Shdkh Idriss 
Abdul Rahman Harba of Saref Omra, Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 02/02/06). The British had 
decided that Dar Tuer was too large a unit to be administered effectively and that smaller units 
would be easier to deal with in terms of taxation and political control (Interview with Yousuff 
Nour Terayo: Mile, Tchad 26-04-06). I n this way Dar Galla was created with Al-Hyyb as Shartai 
equal to the Malik of a now smaller Dar Tuer. I n doing so they entrenched the Kaliha leadership 
and gready increased the power of the ruler of this, a hitherto litde known backwater province of 
the Darfur. 
The actual process of fragmenution of Dar Tuer may have begun during the reign of AU 
Dinar who elevated the Hor and other petty rulers as a means to counteract the power of the 
Malik in U m Burro (Interview with Yousuff Nour Terayo: Ivffle, Tchad 26-04-06). I f this was the 
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case the British may have only finished a process started by the last rviler of independent Darfur. 
Prior to these changes, Dar Zaghawa had only two seats of power 
A t the time of the death of his protege Al-Tiyyb, Moore appointed his son Tijani A l -
Tiyyb as the new Shartai (Interview with Yousnff Nour Terayo member of the Mahkama at 
Komoi : Mile, Tchad 26-04-06). Moore also appointed numerous Omdas and Shdkhs throughout 
Dar Zaghawa, replacing those he thought were loyal to A l i Dinar, with their sons. One such 
Qmk appointed by D C Moore was TahirHarigt Bop. Bom in Iridi, in Kanv district, he had been 
a Onzk in K o m o i for more than fifty-five years by the time of the conflict. As a youth like most 
BeRa of his time, he was a herder and trader, taking catde, sheep and camels to Malha in Dar 
Midob (where the Baga claim to have originated) to trade for salt block which he sold in A l -
Fashir, Nahud and El-Obeid. He also travelled regularly to the salt-flat in the north of Borkou-
Ennedi-Tibesti Region in what is now Tchad. Around 1948 he was appointed Qntk of the Bagt 
Be A Ah and made their representative in Komoi . The four AirrKe Beh of the Ba^ - the Iridi, 
Adar, Ivckre, Teddx- each have a term appomting an Omda to represent the Bagt. The Tedebe, 
Inderu, Adra must have had no idea in 1947 that the representative of the Iridi, Tahir Hariga 
Boyo would still be occupying the post of Onk until his death in 2006 almost 60 years later. 
Salih translates f rom BeRa- sayfsj t/;at l?e/ore in Dar Ga/la t/;ey elid not /?ave a 
S^artai / t was made t/je Bntish, hy Moore. Be/ore t^is t^e Kalil?a rukd 
Komoi and Mors/jey. Moore made A/-Tiyy^ t^e S/rartai But once w^en A/-
Tiyy^ was visiting Um Borro t^e people /augl>ed at Irim and said "Irow can you 
ire Sirartai ifyou do not /ra^e a Nai^us/drumf So wiren ire came iack to Dar 
Ga/ia ire ca//ed a meeting and to/d eacir/ami/y tirey must give tireirirest iei/erso 
tirey cou/d get a Nai>us fdrumj o/ tireir own. Tairir's uncle, Bag id, wi)o was 
Baga iry iris mo tier's side and Kaliia on iis ^tier's side was selected to go to 
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Nya/a to huy a c^ru/n. Ta^tr Nanga Boyo went wit^ /;im and t^at is ^ow Dar 
Ga//agot its drum and t^e S^artai i^ecame rvspected. 
Interviewer- Ne sawa//o/t/?is/ TAis is astOTj/rom w/;en/?e was young i 
Tahir Hariga Boyo Yes 
Interviewer- Now old was l?e attl;e time 
Salih- Ne t/?inks l>e was J2 orso 
(Interview with Omk Tahir Hariga Boyo of Komoi : Mile, Tchad 08/02/06). 
I f we accept the above narrative, and there is no reason not to, Orrda Tahir Hariga Boyo 
who was 96 at the time of this interview in 2006 would have been bom around 1910 and the 
British would have killed the Fur Sultan A l i Dinar in 1916 when he was about 6 years old. Salih 
Al-Tiyyb was appoint as Shartai before 1934 and it is possible that a few years later once the 
Shartai had begun to collect taxes he decided to purchase a Nahus- the vJtimate symbol of power 
in Darfur. 
Below the level of Shartai in Dar Galla, the next post is the relatively new position of 
Mandub. The term MarM> makes its first appearance diuing the reign of A l i Dinar who had 
borrowed the term f r o m the Mahdists who had ruled prior to his arrival. The term, which is best 
translated as an a^nt, was used extensively by A l i Dinar who appointed slaves, eunuchs and 
generals to the position to monitor other officials (OTahey 1980: 90). 
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The next level is that of the Onxk, who is the head oi Be A Ah. The word Be A Ah 
which actual means rwudo (doomty) cf the ^mse-meaning those who speak the same dialect-
corresponds with the term tribe. Each tribe is headed by an Onda, the AirrKe Be 'is however not 
headed by a particular leader since they may be present in more than one area. Rather villages or 
groups of villages are headed by Sheikhs. 
I n Darfur the appointment of Sheikhs runs the entire gamut of selection processes. I n 
the majority of cases Sheikhs are selected by some kind of popular vote. I n many instances this 
vote singly serves to confirm an already esublished Une of succession, in which a son wiU take 
over f rom his father. Even in these cases there must be some kind of popular vote. In other 
cases however, there are heated contests between two or more candidates fo r the post of Sheikh. 
I n yet other instances someone may have the position of Sheikh thrust upon them by village 
without their consent. In some extraordinary cases Sheikhs may be selected by more unusual 
means. 
J/e.'' W^en / was made an Omda a meeting was /?e/danc/ two names weTV 
put in a hag, the name they pu/I out was mine and / he came Omda... to he 
honest/ did not want to he Omda as / was a/ready a we a/thy man hut my/ami/y 
to/d me / cou/d not re/use. Omda Haroun Suleiman Gani of Abu Gamra: Mile, Tchad 
23/12/2005) 
Regardless of the process when a Sheikh is selected Omdas and Shdkhs f r om the local area 
usually attend a simply ceremony, in which the name of the new Sheikh is annoimced and he is 
told of his role and responsibilities. A t these ceremonies the Om:ias are just observers and have 
no power to interfere with the selection or appointment of sheikhs. 
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Table 9: Idara Ahalia in Dar Zaghawa 
Position 
Shartai 
Manduh 
Omda 
Sheikh/Hor/lW 
Iru/Ina 
Though most Darfuri will not make a distinction, Sheikhs frequendy divide themselves into 
two groups Sheikh al Idara (adrrimstratiw Sheikhs) and Sheikh al Eh^/Darih (tax Sheikhs). In 
smaller villages the Sheikh al Idara will fulfil both roles but in large villages, or in areas 'w^ere one 
Sheikh has jurisdiction over a lai^e number of villages, there may be two or more Sheikhs, one 
being the Sheikh d Ekfia/Darih. 
In relation to taxation, all Sheikhs follow similar rules. A Sheikh keeps a register of taxable 
persons in his village and once or twice a year he collects taxes, in the form of currency or 
produce. Sheikhs are entitled to keep 20% of that revenue as their own and the rest must be 
given to his superior, the Onia in Dar Zaghawa. The Orda will receive taxes from all his 
subordinate Sheikhs. Before passing this up to his own superior he wiU be allowed to keep 10% 
for himself. The rest is then passed on the Shartai, in the case of Dar Galla, or the Sultan in the 
case of Dar Kobe etc. At this, the last level of Idara Ahalia the paramount rulers can take 5% of 
the tax revenue as their own and the rest is passed on to a government official, usually the 
Mahafis Provincial head or Wali state govemor in Darfur or the Prefect in Tchad. 
It should be noted that due to a long history of civil strife, the system of tax collection by 
sheikhs has been almost nonexistent in Tchad. In some areas there has been no real taxation via 
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Ndhim al-Hilla for at least forty years. Another key role of the sheikh is in dealing with land 
claims and divorce proceedings. They are in a sense the first port of call in the village when 
there is a dispute of any kind and the custodians of customary law. 
Idara Ahalia and Taxation in Dar Galla 
Shartai keeps 5% of taxes and gives 
tlie rest to the Wali/Govenor 
Mandubs keep 10% of taxes they 
collect 
Mandub Mandub. Mandub 
Omdas keep 10% of taxes they collect 
Omda 
Sheikhs keep 15% of taxes the collect 
Sheikh 
Omda 
Sheikh Sheikh 
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At each administrative level the official is only supposed to get his 'solar/ if all the 
designated taxes have been collect and accounted for. This, however, is rarely the case, as many 
tax rolls are deliberately keep out of date, so that the difference can be pocketed in some areas. 
Recendy the government of Sudan has stipulated that Sheikhs should only be allowed to keep 
15% of the taxes they collect not the 20% they had in the past. However the war in Darfur 
postponed the implementation of this decree (Interview with Omk secretary of Salih 
Muhammad Shumu of Adar close to Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 04/02/2006) 
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4. /dara A^a/ia in t^e BeHa Diaspora: 
IDARA AHALIA FAOLITATES THE GOVERNMENTS WORK 
{A s artiadated by Onk's secretary Salih Muhmmtd Sham) 
Drought, famine and conflict-induced migrations were already common in Darfur and 
Ouaddai prior to the cvirrent conflicts, however the patterns of miration varied according to 
how different groups were affected by famine and the options open to them. The major 
famines to affect the region include the Karo Tindd-Fm for eati)^ bones (from carcasses) in the 
middle of the 18'*' century and the Buz- Fur for eueryishere or mdespmid in 1828/29. The period 
between 1874 and 1909 bears special attention. This period, sandwiched between the 
destruction of the Keira dynasty under Sultan Ibrahim Garad by the forces of the Sudanese 
slaver and adventures Zubeir Rahman Pasha and the point when Ali Dinar was able to defeat the 
ruler of Kepkabia and finally bring all of Darfur under his control, saw a number of severe 
famines, during which as much as half of Darfur's population may have perished (De Waal 1989: 
62). The first famine of this period, the Karo Fata or white bone famine, was caused not only by 
poor rainfall, but was also due to constant clashes between the forces of Zubeir Pasha and the 
Fur shadow Sultans, which devastated the countryside. "When the Mahdist forces wnesded 
Darfiu" away from the Turldyya in 1882, they initiated a new period of suffering due to the 
Khalifa Abdullahi al-Ta'aisha's policy of forced migration to Omdurman. ^ This migration 
coupled with their constant fighting with shadow Sultans causing untold suffering. 
'^ For fascinating discussion on the concept of famine in the Sahel see De Waal 1989. 
Abdullahi was actually a Fulani who, in a process common in the region, had lived among, and become a 
Ta'aisha Arab of South western Darfur. It may have been Abdullahi, continuing a well established messianic 
tradition among the Fulani, who influenced the Mahdi and not the other way around. What is clear it that with 
the Mahdi's death in 1895 Abdullai became the new leader and it was he who instigated the policy of eastward 
migration to Omdurman. Many Fulani in Darfiir believe that rather than being a political or economic move it 
may have been the Khalifa's inteipretation of the Fulani's own eastward migration. 
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Famines continued under the restored neo-Keira dynasty of Ali Dinar with the 
1913/1914 Jtdu meaning mraJbz?^ famine (De Waal 1989), followed by the 1969-1974 Sahelian 
Drought and the 1984/1985 drought. Each of these famines caused lai^e numbers of deaths 
and led to large scale miration. The BeRa and north Darfur as a whole, seem to have been 
affected by most of the region's drought and famines. Fouad Ibrahim (1998) compared the 
migration behaviour of two groups from north Darfur, the Midob and the BeRa, pay particular 
attention to the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. During this time more than half of the BeRa 
and Midob migrated southwards to the towns. Despite the similarity of their livelihoods based 
on agro-pastoralism in both cases, the BeRa migrants were considered more economically 
successful than the Midob. The reasons for this are in part due to BeRa social organisation. 
Fouad Ibrahim argues that: 
The Za^mt started their out-rrigration earlier than the Midob. Thus, they could establish 
ethrdcaUy based networks in Lihyn ard the Gulf countries, to vhido la^im rrngrants can resort to 
mtke a gxxl start in their destination areas. BythetinietheMidobstartedtheirrri^aaon in the 1980s, 
the conditions (f enployment in the Arab dl countries had norsened The Za^im show a strong dan 
solidarity They readily lend money to young menixrs cf door dan to cauer the hi^ costs cf traidling to 
the A rob oil countries for imk, inhere rmny cf them haze already established thensdies. The Midob, 
both in the Sudan and abroad, haie mudi less resources awilahk. The ody country q?en fir them 
outside the Sudan is Libya. Ladsir^ capital, the Midob gj there on camds, mosdy ille^y (Ibrahim 
1998). 
This, once again illustrates the varying fortunes of people in Darfur, as influenced by 
their tribal affiliation and alliance networks and resilience of traditional institutions. The BeRa 
who migrated southward setded not only in rural areas, but also in the major towns. Today the 
BeRa living in these areas outnumber those living in Dar Zaghawa itself. 
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Once such area with large of amounts of BeRa migrants is Kepkabia Province in North 
Darfur state. The BeRa village of Girgo lies to the west of the provincial capital Kepkabia. The 
BeRa first began to settle in the Kepkabia area in the early 1960s due to a prolonged drought in 
their home area (Interview with Onk Naib Adam Abdul Rahman of Girgo near Kepkabia: Mile, 
Tchad 07/02/06). These early waves of drought induced migration were largely peaceful and 
happened without national or international assistance (Ali Dinar 2004b: 4). The BeRa simply left 
the far north of Darfur, travelling to areas they had visited during their annual migration or to 
locations where they knew local residents. In the majority of cases they settled on vacant land on 
the outskirts of established villages. 
Map D: Key sites in the BeRa Diaspora 
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a. Thecase(f A ckr, Kepkabia ardjebd Si Regan, Kepkab^ 
Onrk Naih (Onk's assistant) Adam Abdul Rahman and his family first came to the village 
of Girgo in Kepkabia province in 1973 to escape the drought that was plaguing his home town 
of Umm Burro in Dar Tuer." The location of Gii^o was chosen because Adam's maternal uncle 
had been a trader, bringing sheep, cattie and camels from Umm Burro to Kepkabia for sale. 
During his regular trips to Kepkabia he became friends with many Fur from the village of Gii^o 
and when the famine struck he was invited to stay in the region (Interview with Onk Naib 
Adam Abdul Rahman of Gir^o near Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 07/02/06). In fact, 'invited' maybe 
too strong a term. The truth may have been that there were no objections to him settling on the 
vacant land on the edge of the village. This willingness of drought and environmental refugees 
to migrate to other areas according to JoAim McGregor, is tied to the ability of migrants to find 
members of their social network in that region (McGregor 1993: 159). Thus, as in the case of 
Adam Abdtil Rahman, people will be more willir^ to abandon one site for another if they know 
they have connections or kin in that region. Also, migration to more fertile areas has long been a 
coping strategy of pastoral and agro-pastoral groups in the Sahel. Black writing on African 
refugees in general takes this ai^ument further when he states that 
The picture is one cfnigraam as an essential part cf ^ eoononic and social structure cf the 
regm, rather than a response to endrwrnental dedine - a picture that is reirforoed by numerous ether 
studies that haw ocsfimed the critical role cf rrigrant renittanoe in households and regonal eocmnaes 
(Black 1998: 28). 
De Waal argues that this famine was known as Samt Krud. The years of Kruul, the latter being the sound made 
when luggage grates j^ainst the ribs of emaciated camels as people migrate to escape drought De Waal 1989: 93) 
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This out migration was part of a wider phenomenon affecting Dar Zaghawa. De Waal 
estimates that in 1970 there were 250,00 BeRa, 150,000 of whom lived in Darfur, by 1983 only 
82,000 people lived in Dar Zaghawa (de Waal 1983: 93). As highlighted by the Gii^o example 
Dar Zaghawa's links with this ever growing diaspora are extremely strong, reinforced by 
migrants returning to their villages, or the villages of their parents, to find spouses and new 
migrants constandy arriving in villages like Girgo. Whether for purely environmental or 
economic reasons, in 1973 Adam Abdul Rahman and many of his relatives moved with his 
maternal uncle to Girgo, where they were each given a grant of land by the local Fur Omda in 
exchange for which they would give him 10% of all their produce (Interview with Onda Naib 
Adam Abdul Rahman of Giigo near Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 07/02/06). 
Interviewer- And did they haie to pay for the land 
Adam Abdul Rahman- /^o we didn't 
Interviewer • and how mudo lard did you ^ 
Adam Abdul Rahman- / / zariedsome got 6others f/eddans; i^ut t/it was c/ose to 
t/;e lVadit^ent/;eygot2orJ. 
(Interview with Onda Naib Adam Abdul Rahman of Giigo near Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 
07/02/06). 
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Map 14: Giigo and surrounding villages 
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Initially, they stayed in Giigo for about a year and a half, before returning to Umm Burro 
when the drought had abated. However, m 1983, many of them, including Adam Abdul 
Rahman made the decision to move permanentiy to Giigo. This entailed many changes for the 
BeRa migrants. Most had spent most of their lives in Umm Burro as catde and to a lesser extent 
camel herders. However the land in Girgo, with its loose wet soil, was unsuitable for camels; and 
catde could not be kept in large numbers lest they ate the crops of Adam and his relatives' Fur 
neighbours. As a result the BeRa of Kepkabia province turned to farming (Interview with Orda 
Naib Adam Abdul Rahman of Girgo near Kepkabia: MQe, Tchad 07/02/06). 
Interviewer- ard ims it easy to rruiEfromcatde herding tofaming 
Adam Abdul Rahman- yes I^ecause in C/m Borro we/armec^i in t/;e summer months 
and^eTziin t^e spring and winter. We were a/ways doing 
some /arming in Umm Burro i^ut when we moved to Girgo 
/arming become our/izes. 
Interviewer- •uhatdidyougfoisi 
Adam Abdul Rahman- onions, tomatoes, grig a, foul, hay and other crops. 
Interviewer - and these were for selling? 
Adam Abdul Rahman- Ves. Traders wou/d come to Girgo market, they have a hig 
market there to huy the sup/us and se// it in otherp/aces 
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The switch from herding to farming, as alluded to by Adam Abdul Rahman is ahnost the 
mirror opposite of process of social change highlighted by Haaland (Haaland 1972). In his work 
on the Fur-Ba^ra ethnic boundary, Haaland highlights a process by which sedentary Fur 
farmers, constrained by a lack of altematives for the accumulation of wealth, turn to catde 
herding. This requires them to become attached to an already established herding 'Arab camp' 
(Haaland 1972). 
Since land in Darfur is communally held, the accumulation of catde is the most attractive 
way to amass wealth. Catde however, do not thrive in agricultural areas during the rainy season. 
Therefore, those with over 8 to 10 head of cattie wiU be pressured to leave the village and 
become nomadic herders (Haaland 1978: 191). Haaland ai^es that though many Baggara 
become Fvir, by adopting a settled lifestyle, more Fur take up nomadism. As a testament to the 
attractiveness of this altemative, Haaland estimates about 1% of the population of the western 
lo^ i^ands leave the village every year to become nomad herders (Haaland 1972: 152). However, 
there is no nomadic Fur subgroup, since nomadic Fur are considered Baggara by both ethnic 
groups (Haaland 1978: 191). 
The same can be seen in the Dor area, where the inhabitants claim to be genealogically 
Fur but culturally BeRa. In Darfur, individuals, families and indeed entire ethnic groups can 
move across the ethnic boxindaries and assume a new identity even though their new ethnic Idn 
recognize them as coming from a different group (Haaland 1978: 192). 
These systems of integration however vary from group to group and over time. Takana's 
work in 1986 shows the Flabbaniya of Buram south Darfur assimilate smaller units as sub 
sections of the wider Habbaniya ethnic group, with all the rights and responsibilities of 
Habbaniya. While their neighbours the Rize^at rarely assimilate other groups, though others 
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may use their land, such rights are not considered permanent and the land is seen as always being 
in the domain of the Rize^at (Runger 1987: 37). 
The difference in the two systems lies in the nature of their modes of production. As 
cattie nomads the Rizeigat are keenly aware of the carrying capacity of the land. To catde 
nomads an area's value is connected to pastures and watering holes, both finite resources. Thus, 
allowing non-ethnies access to these resources is not in the best interest of the individual or the 
tribe. The Habbaniya on the other hand, though a Baggara group, have at least since the last 
century, perhaps longer, been primarily farmers (MacMichael 1922: 279). As a result the best 
farming lands are already claimed by Habbaniya farmers, thus allowing new comers to settle and 
have access to unwanted land woiJd not necessarily upset the local balance of power. One can 
see a similar process in the case study from Dar Hotiyya which will be explored later in this 
chapter, where a newcomer, as with every other member of the tribe, has the right to cultivate a 
plot for himself as an individual holding despite the land being tribally held. This however is not 
a permanent right, but depends on continuous possession and use. 
The fact that land claims are framed in terms of continuous possession has implications 
for the close to 2.5 million Darfuri internally displaced peoples and the 250,000 or so refugees in 
Tchad. Many are incredibly nervous about the fact that Sudanese land law grants the right to 
land ownership to inhabitants after only one year of use. After a further nine years the land 
becomes the permanent property of the inhabitants (Wax: Washington Post 2004). Thus land, 
which was at the centre of the current crisis in likely to prove problematic in the future, 
especially in the arid regions of north Darfur, the home of the BeRa, where good land is at a 
premium. In many ways adaptive processes to drought and the encroachment of the desert, 
have led to a system in which modes of production and by extension ethnicities, have created 
fluid boundaries. 
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like most BeRa migrants, Adam and his relatives were compelled to switch from herding 
to farming as their primary mode of subsistence. However due to the comparatively good soils 
in the Kepkabia area many of the migrants were able to raise a surplus which could be sold in 
local markets and enabled them to meet their commitment to pay their Fur Omda, 10% of their 
produce and still have enough to sell in the local market, either in Girgo or in Kepkabia. They 
did all this with the help and expertise provided to them by their Fur neighbours (Interview with 
Omda Naib Adam Abdul Rahman of Giigo near Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 07/02/06). 
Initially the BeRa of Kepkabia were still subject to the Shartai of Dar Galla in Komoi 
where the majority of the migrants had come from. The SAartoi was not, for numerous reasons^ '*, 
a popular man. FEs policies on taxation and his selection of people from only hisAirrKe Beh as 
Mandubs had long made him unpopular with the people of Dar Galla. Now that they had moved 
away from his domain many felt that it was time to break free from his overlordship. This 
however was not to be, since a decade after the first BeRa arrived in the area, the Jafaar Numeiri 
regime abolished Idara Ahalia in the now infamous 1971 proclamation. Though Idara Ahalia 
continued largely as normal during the Numeiri period no new Onxizyya was created for the 
BeRa of Kepkabia and as a result they were considered subjects of the Shartai of Dar Galla, who 
was represented by a Mandnb. 
Since the migrants paid taxes to the Shartai, through his Mandub, rather than try to block 
migration away from Dar Zaghawa, the Shartai and many of his Mandubs encouraged it. Since if 
these migrants did well in the diaspora they could contribute more revenue in the form of taxes 
to the Mardub and his Sultan. In this way, a conflict emerged between the Shartai and his 
Mandubs who worked in the south and the Mandubs, Omdas, and Sheikhs of Dar Zaghawa. The 
*^ Today he is accused of being a close associate of General Omar Basher. With some suspecting that he passes 
information to the Sudanese regime about certain key individuals. As a result he was been kidnapped twice by 
the SLA during the early stages of the conflict, only to be released later. 
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former encouraging and in many cases facilitating migration and the latter desperately trying to 
stop the flow of wealth and youth out of the region. Matters were only made worse by the fact 
that taxes from the diaspora did not reach the home villages of the m^rants, but rather went 
from the Mandub to the Shartai and to the government. 
This sute of affairs lasted until 1995, when the BeRa of Kepkabia began to agitate for 
their own Idara (adrrinistratja^ independent of Komoi. Finally, after three years of negotiations, 
Abakr Bashar was made Orda cfAdar, a new Owdiyya which included most of the BeRa villages 
of Kepkabia. In 1999 Adam Abdul Rahman was appointed his Naih (vice/deputy). The former 
was based in Adar and the latter in Girgo. At the same time a school teacher named Salih 
Muhammad Shumu was made Orda's Secretary (Interview with Qrda secretary of Salih 
Muhammad Shumu of Adar close to Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 07/02/2006). 
The creation of an Onxkyya, for the BeRa of Kepkabia was part of a wider NIF strategy 
to create more local government and Idara Ahalia posts for NIF cadres to fil l . Kepkabia was not 
the only area in which this took place. In the south of Darfur the Ma'ali were given their own 
Nazirate which meant that they were no longer subject to the Rizeigat Nazir, a position they 
despised. The Ma'ali were initially given their Nazir by the British in the 1920s but he was 
deposed by the British, who viewed him as incompetent (and a drunk) and subordinated the 
Ma'ali to their larger neighbours the Rizeigat, a situation which lead to numerous clashes and 
conflict (Morton 2004: 7). In the East of Darfur the number of Berti OnxByya jumped from 
three to twenty-three. 
The experiences of the Berti of North Darfur are a particularly good example of these 
processes of alliance and fragmentation. In the mid 1990s they developed 'a oorrpr^xnsiiE plan for 
taking pasession (f the local gyvenvrent adrrinistraaiE cffioes in Darfur ie, those (f the gjiemors, mimters, 
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executize admrnstrators, etc, at the state andpradnce kids. The first practical step done by the Berti zias that 
they increased their Berti Omodiyyz firm three to tuenty-three ones. This meant increasitig the number cf 
constituencies in dections for pditical and le^latiw cffices in the interest cf the Berti ffvup. Gxndded wth this 
•were publications undertaken by Berti dite: "Berti and Lard", "Berti and Geography", and "Berti and 
Histay", nhido leere intended to prcne Berti's ngte in the ounership cf land and the participation in authority' 
(El Tom 1998). 
Darfuri scholar Abdullahi Osman El Tom, himself a Berti, writes, that the present Berti 
identity is a conscious reflection of their subordinate position vis-a-vis the kingdoms and states 
which have dominated Sudan over the past few centuries. It would appear that Berti, one of 
Darfur's larger ethnic groups, have been successful in their endeavour of redressing this 
historical imbalance. The past two govemors of north Darfur have both been Berti and the 
Berti are the majority group of MPs in the National Assembly representing north Darfur, 
occupying 6 out of the 16 MP seats for North Darfur. Also Berti areas appear to have suffered 
fewer GoS and /lar^ i^eaai attacks than other areas, during the current conflict. 
Prior to the changes of 1997, the Omda cfAdar reported to the Shartai in Komoi, but this 
all changed around 1997. From the time the BeRa arrived in Kepkabia they had been subject to 
the Shartai in Komoi, Dar Galk. He was represented locally by a Sheikh and a Mardub both of 
whom travelled to the area periodically to collect taxes and setde any disputes the BeRa were 
having (Interview with Omda secretary of Salih Muhammad Shumu of Adar close to Kepkabia: 
MUe, Tchad 07/02/2006). 
Due to the peculiar nature of the Omodzyya cf A dar, in that they refused allegiance to the 
paramount Shartai in Komoi and did not want to be an Omodtyya, subject to the Fur Denung, of 
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Kepkabia, it was decided that the Ortia of Adar should report direcdy to the Majlis al-Mahafis al-
B^kabia/'Provmc'tal Gjuncil of Kepkabia. 
Chart 3 
Idara Ahalia in Adar 
Majlis al-mahafisal-
Kepksbia 
OmdaofAdar 
The new Omodr^, which was established in 1998, consisted of about 20 BeRa villages in 
the Kepkabia area with a BeRa population of about 12,000 before the war (Interview with Omda 
secretary Salih Muhammad Shumu of Adar close to Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 07/02/2006). Abakr 
Bashar was selected as Omk because of his good relations with the Mahafis, Khartoum and the 
local BeRa (Interview with Ovda Naib Adam Abdul Rahman of Girgo near Kepkabia: Mile, 
Tchad 07/02/06). 
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This case study highlights some of the key features of the BeRa diaspora, namely that 
the diaspora and Dar Zaghawa remained linked through the figures in IdaraAhalia. The disputes 
regarding where taxes should be paid is not unique to Girgo. De Waal in his work Fanine That 
KiUs, highlighted similar disputes in Legediba in southern Darfur where the BeRa setded among 
the Habbaniya. Baggara. There, the BeRa wanted to continue to pay taxes to their leaders in Dar 
Zaghawa but the Habbaniya believe that the BeRa Sheikh should be incorporated into the Idara 
Ahalia of Dar Habbaniya. 
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b Idzra A halia in the BeRa Diaspora: the case cf Dar Hotiyya, Sireaf and Sar^Omra regm, Kepkabia 
Proiince/Dar Masaalit 
Map 15: Dar Masaalit 
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Dar Hotiyya lies to the far west of Kepkahia proiinos, in the Sirmf and Savf Qnra region; the 
latter being the capital of Dar Hotiyya. The Hotiyya are a small Arabic-speaking ethnic group that 
are primarily cattle herders. Along with the Terjiwy Otriyya, Mahadi and Darok they occupy a tract 
of land to the south of the Beni Hussein, to the east of the Masaalit and the various Tarra groups 
and to the west of the Fur. Little is known about these five related Arabic speaking ethnicities. 
The Haiyya. themselves claim a common ancestry with the Ginr, Sa'ada, Terjim, and Korohat, in 
that they are all supposedly either, descendants or followers of Gim- HassabaUah, a Ja'ali Arab 
who came to western Darfur area from Metama along the Nile over one hundred years ago, who 
established a state based in Nckat in Dar Tama (OTahey 1980: 84). 
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Map 16: Ethnic groups in DarMasaalit 
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Map 17: Historical Extent of Sultanate of DarMasaalit 
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Though now part of North Darfur state, Dar Hotiyyn lies on the border of North and 
West Darfur states. In fact, Dar Hcdyya, and its capital, Saref Omra, are both bisected by the 
Wadi Kepkabia, which divides North and "West Darfur States. The Hadyya, Terjim, Otriy^ Mahadi 
and Dorck are still considered subjects of the Sultan of the Masaalit who conquered the area in 
the late 19^ century. 
Map 18: Sireaf and Saref Omra region 
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DarMasaalit, to which DarHotryyz is often attached, lies to the south-west of Dar Horiyya 
proper in West Darfur State. It is perhaps the most populous of the border sultanates. The 
history of the Sultanate goes back to 1874 when the Masaalit threw off the yoke of both Ouaddai 
and Darfur and established what would be the last Sudanic state under their Fwsha Hajjam 
Hassaballah (Kapteijns 1985: 18). In 1883 as the Mahdist forces closed in on Darfur Hajjam 
Hassaballah was deposed by Ismail Adb al-Nabi, a religious scholar and leading Masaalit follower 
of die Mahdi (Tully 1988: 21). 
The current line of Sultans claims descent from Ismail Abd Al-Nabi, whose son, Abakr 
broke free from the Mahdists and established the region as a Sultanate in 1888, and went on to 
conquer the Jabaal, Erenga and several Arab groups. However in 1912 the fourth Masaalit ruler 
was forced, after years of warfare with the Fur, French and remnants of the Mahdists, to cede 
the western region of his kingdom to the French who had conquered Ouaddai (Kapteijns 1985: 
18). The remaining region of the Sultanate was occupied by the British in 1923. 
Prior to incorporation into the Sudan Dar Masaalit's system of administration was as 
follows 
Sultan paramount ruler 
Fursha appointed by the Sultan as heads of groups of clans 
Malik relatives of the Sultan or heads of clans or lineage groups 
Sheikhs litde more than village head men 
The distinctions between each position were very vague (Tully 1988: 26). Soon after the 
British conquest the reignii^ Sultan Andoka had become the protege of D.O. Reginald Davies. 
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A firm believer in Indirect Rule, Davies immediately set about recreating Dar Masaalit's native 
institutions throi^h which the British would rule indirectly. In this endeavour he had a most 
unlikely ally, the Sultan himself. Andoka, being no fool, could see that what Davies was 
attempting was to create a centralized system, with the Sultan as the intennediary between the 
British and the Masaalit. For this to succeed the position of Sultan would have to be 
strengthened at the expensive of his rivals, mainly his relatives and other members of the Sultan's 
clan. In this way the powers of taxation and justice were brought under the remit of the Sultan 
(TuUy 1988: 25), in a similar tax pyramid scheme as the rest of Darfur. However by 1936 the 
administration was in disarray as the number of Furshas expanded to more than 30. After a joint 
pui^e of the 'more useless' Fursha by Davies and the Sultan, the niunber dropped to 26 in 1938 
of which 17 were Masaalit (Tully 1988: 25). 
These reforms meant that most of the administrative roles were now being carried out by 
the Furshas and Sheikhs as the position of Mcdiks became redundant. The imm^ration of large 
numbers of Tchadien Masaalit also reduced the importance of clan heads like Maliks as clan and 
lineage lines became blurred. So much so that by 1988, when Tully carried out his research in 
Dar Masaalit, most of the region's inhabitants had no idea about the borders of their clan's 
territory or even the identity of their Malik (Tully 1988: 27). 
Today there are 20 Masaalit Fursha and e^ht non-Masaalit Fwsha (Tully 1988: 27). 
However, in 1994 the non-Masaalit Fursha were elevated to the position of Amir along with 4 
Masaalit. There is a Masaalit Qnk of Germeina, and 24 Arab Ovdas. Together they govem over 
1500 Sheikh. 
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Table 10: Idara Ahalia in DarMasaalit 
Position Role Current Post 
Holder 
Sultan HaiDun 
Amit^ 8 to 12 Arab 4 Masaalit Babi Deen 
Fursha 20 to 28Masaalit 8 others, 1 Sultan of 
the Gimr 
IP 
Omda Diah Abdullah 
One of 24 Arab 
Omdas in Dar 
Masaalit 
Sheikh 1500 + Idriss Abdul 
36 under the Omda of the Hotiyya Rahman Haiba 
Note: The position of Amir imknown in Darfur. Actually tried and discarded by the British in Zalenji west 
Darfur in the late 1928-1932 (Pettersen 1986:128). It was reintroduced by the M F regime in the late 1990s 
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The BeRa began to arrive in this area alittle later than they did in the Kepkabia and Girgo 
areas, only really arriving in substantial numbers in the 1970s. Though there is a well established 
BeRa community in Germeina, the capital of Dar Masaalit, Dar Hotiyya with its small market and 
distance from the main roads was not initially setded by large amounts of BeRa migrants. 
However, since the Hotiyyi were-semi nomadic catde herders and the Dar had a relatively low 
population density, there was an abundance of land available for the BeRa farmers, like Idriss 
Abdul Rahman Harba. 
Sheikh Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba was seventy-five y;ars old at the time of my interview 
and was bom in Abu Gamra in Dar Zaghawa. He moved to Saref Otiua when he was about 
fif ty years old. 
Interviewer- iiihy did you leave Abu Gamra 
Shdkh Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba My c^i/drefj ^ad/tnis/;edsc^oo/anii/didnot 
^aze to stay in A^u Gamra anymore. Vou 
^aze seen Dar Zag/;awa, t/;e land was not 
good inAl>u Qtmra. 
Interviewer- you had been dxreb^ore 
Sheikh Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba- yes /^adgone to se//anima/t^ere many time 
Interviewer Do you rerrErrixr ishen the first arm you vent to the area 
Has? 
180 
Shakh Idriss Abdul Rahn^an Harba- Sorry, no. 
Interviewer- so (fall the places you traidled to ishy did you dxse Sarf Omra. 
Shdkh Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba i^ecause t^e /and was good t/;a[ was t/>e reason and 
even my c/^ddren /i^edit. 
Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba had been Shdkh in Saref Omra for some twenty=-four years 
before the conflict. He took up his position less than a year after he arrived in the area. When 
he was appointed Shakh of the BeRa in Dar Hotiyya he was give a grant of 30 Jeddans of land by 
the paramount Omk of the Hotiyya, Muhammad Hussein. This huge grant of land was a mark 
of his position. After his death, Muhammad Hussein was succeeded by Diah Abdullah 
(Interview with Sheikh Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba of Saref Omra, Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 
02/02/06). 
In the past twenty-five years Dar Hotiyya has become a magnet for drought and 
economic m^rants. The Omk of the Hotiyya has an unusually high number of subordinate 
Sheikhs for such a small ethnic group, some 36 in 2002. This was an unusual situation that meant 
that in Dar Hotiyya there were not only more non-Hotiyya than Hotiyya, but also that the 
immigrants came from almost every ethnic group in north and west Darfur. Many, like Sheikh 
Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba, represented communities of migrants that have taken up residence 
in the Hoityya's communal Dar, while others represent sections or tribes of the Horiyya ethnic 
group. Sheikh Idriss Abdul Rahman Fkrba admitted he knew of Sheikhs from the following: 
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BeRa 
Gimr 
Tama 
Otriyya 
Awara 
Marasa 
Dorok 
Beni Hussein 
Fur 
Masaalit 
In addition there may have been others he was not familiar with (Interview with Sheikh 
Idriss Abdul Rahman Harba of Saref Omni, Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 02/02/06). 
The large number of immigrants in Dar Hotiyya may be unusual, but the accommodation 
of immigrants by host communities is not unheard of. In the far east of the Sudan, along the 
Red Sea coast, a similar situation exist between the Hadendom tribe of the Beja ethnic group, the 
original Cushitic speaking inhabitants of the region, and the Rashaida, nineteenth centiuy 
immigrants from the Hejaz in Saudi Arabia. Peaceful coexistence between the Rashaida and 
Hadendowa was confirmed by an agreement between the two tribes signed in 1933, during the 
period of British rule. The agreement, which was negotiated and signed by both the Hadendowa 
and Rashaida leaders and notables, safe guarded the interests of the two ethnic groups and 
maintained peace and security between them (El Amin 2004: 10). 
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In some cases migration is not always this peaceful, and its seems that government 
intervention can have a negative effect. Thus, when Arab groups from other parts of Darfur and 
even Tchad and Niger setded in Dar Masaalit they had been given a Sheikh or Omk subordinate 
to the Masaalit Sultan, as was the custom. In 1995, however, Dar Masaalit was divided into 
thirteen Anirates; five went to Arab groups and only eight to the Masaalit themselves 
(Intemational Crisis Group 2004: 7). The Masaalit opposed the division of their traditional 
sultanate, first peacefully, then by violent means. The Government then claimed that Masaalit 
insui^ents were in league with SPLA rebels in the South. There followed a coordinated attack 
on the Masaalit by the army and militiamen drawn from Arab groups in Darfur. The conflict, 
which ran from 1996-1999, forced a large number of Masaalit to flee to Tchad. In the ensuing 
violence close to two thousand Masaalit were reported killed and many villages destroyed 
(Mohamed and others 1998). This was one of the contributory causes of the current war in 
Darfur. 
The Government established special courts to try those accused of instigating the 
violence in Dar Masaalit, and fourteen were sentenced to death. A Government-sponsored 
tribal reconciliation conference was also convened at which it was reported that 292 Masaalit and 
seven Arabs had been killed, 2,673 houses burnt, large amounts of livestock had been looted, 
and that the Masaalit had borne the brunt of the violence and losses. Compensation was agreed, 
but the Arab tribes refused to pay and were not forced to do so by the central Government 
(Intemational Crisis Group 2005). This pattem of unenforced agreements was to recur in 
Darfur in subsequent years. 
In Adar, the BeRa immigrants were happy enough to have their own shakh subordinated 
to the Hotiyya Idara. Like all the other immigrant communities in Dar Hotiyya they were obliged 
to give 10% of their produce, either in the form of crops, livestock or cash to their Shdkh, who 
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in turn passes it on to the Orzk, who in turn takes a portion (Interview with Sheikh Idriss Abdul 
Rahman Harba of Saref Omra, Kepkabia: MOe, Tchad 02/02/06). Dar Hotiyya became a 
hotbed for Jaryawed activity during the Darfur war mainly because many HDtiyya had become 
concerned about the numbers of immigrants living in their Dar. The Hotiyya not only attacked 
the BeRa and other non-Arab immigrants, but also asked many of the region's Arab immigrants 
to leave the Dar. 
These four case studies - Dar Tama, Dar Zaghawa, Girgo and Adar- each give us a bit 
more insight into the structure, history and change of forms of govemance in the peripheral 
zones of the state. They all also show us the resilience of these systems, even during times of 
turmoil and conflict. An interesting feature of traditioml admmtradm in the region is the 
similariries in Darfur and Tchad. As a result of this more hands on approach to traditional 
leadership, albeit inherited from the British, endogenous systems of leadership have been far 
more politicized in Darfur than they have been across the border in Tchad. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the struggle over traditional leadership and traditional administration has become 
deeply intertwined with the current Darfur conflict. 
Though I have only examined one Sultanate in Tchad (Dar Tama) and three areas in 
Darfur (Dar Galla, Giigo and Dar Hotiyya) it is clear that there are numerous similarities in 
terms of taxation, organisation, history and development. In fact the main difference between 
the two areas seems to be the appointment of Ch^de Cantons by the Tchadien state while Ondas 
are appointed or elected by the local populace. This, in itself, may be more a facet of the similar 
intrusion of the central government to the region, rather than a difference between the two 
systems- insomuch as there is no evidence of the election of IdaraAhalia post holders before the 
reforms introduced by the military regimes in the Sudan. Thus, this difference in the 
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appointment and selection of post holders tells one more about the role of the state in regions, 
than it does about the differences between IdaraAhalia and Ndhtmal-HiUa in the region. This is 
just one of many superficial differences imposed by the various colonial rulers in the region. 
The three case studies from Darfur highlight the role of traditional leaders in facilitating 
migration from Dar Zaghawa. An interesting aspect of the Dar Hotiyya and Girgo cases are 
that, even though in Girgo the BeRa settied among Fur farmers and in Dar Hotiyya they settied 
among nomads the general practice and structure of IdaraAhalia was generally the same. 
One of the main effects colonial policy had on BeRa society was to 'freeze frame' many 
of the lucid and often contradictory posts and tides that existed in the pre-colonial era. Many of 
these posts were in themselves a reflection of Dar Zaghawa's connection to regional and global 
currencies of power. In this way Ilu Mama {petit doi^) and Ilu Bt^ati {bigdn^hecame Shartai and 
Maliks (Tubiana 1976: 57) under the influence of the Keira Sultans whose own currencies of 
power had been moulded by both Islam and the Tunjur. 
Today the following is the system of Administration in Dar Tama 
Sukan 
Mandub 
Aguid 
Sheikh 
While in Ouaddai it is as follows: 
Sultan 
Maqdum 
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Malik 
Agdd 
Across the border in Darfur the system is as follows: 
Pararrvunt Sultan (mcart sirxE 1917) 
Stdtan, Shartai, Dermr^ or Malik 
Maqdum or Mandub 
Omk 
Sheikh 
Over the years the Sudanese state has passed numerous laws and made numerous 
pronouncements on the issue of land ownership and in particular the abolition of customary law 
and land ownership. What is apparent however, is that customary law applies to any area of land 
that the state has not claimed as its own for development purposes (Runger 1987: 25). The May 
Revolution of 1969 opened the way for greater land seizvires. In 1970 the Unregistered Land Act 
was passed stating that all unregistered land belonged to the state. This was followed by the 
Local Government Act in 1971. This new act was an attempt to abolish Idara Ahalia (Runger 
1987: 30). The act created rural, village and nomad councils that in most cases had the same 
boundaries as the former Dars (Runger 1987: 36). The Act though often seen as a milestone in 
Sudanese history was not a complete success as it did not do away with Idara A halia since there 
were no civil servants to take the place of the Omda and Nazirships that had been abolished. 
Prior to the Darfur conflict, four tiers of land ownership existed in Darfur 
1. AttheoornrrumdsQzle,ead7trihehasaQ!umlardasaDar. 
2. Within the tribal Dar, there is the dan oisnership mdo a knoim boundary 
3. At tillage lend, there is dx tillage land uhere eado zilla^practices his prizate ounership, ishid) is 
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respected by all 
4. Undairmi land, teed as rar^ lander allocated to 'strar^'(rdff-ants) by the lilla^ head (Mohamed 
2004: 61). 
Land allocated to an individual cannot be withdrawn unless he/she leaves the village for 
an extended period. When this happens, the abandoned land reverts to the village community to 
be allotted to someone else. In all cases, the owner of the land is free to hire out part of his land 
or dispose of it in the way he likes and after death, the land is inherited by his children or 
relatives (Mohamed 2004: 61). Thus an individual's right to any give piece of land is conditional 
on the prolonged and continued use. However, individuals can establish control over land 
through the opening up of a new areas by clearing and preparing it for agriculture. 
The terminology of the Natiie Admirnstration in Darfur is complex, as a result of having 
accommodated a number of variants of tribal authority. In the case of the Fur, each section had 
a Shartai, or more commonly a Derran^ however in urban areas like Kuttum, Al Fashir and 
Nyala, the Fur had a Maqdum The Masaalit were ruled by a paramount leader known as a Sultan, 
who ruled over a number of Furshas, who in turn commanded a number of Omdas who govern 
even more Sheikhs. The Arabs of Darfur had their own three tiers of authority. At the apex of 
which were the Nazirs as the heads of tribes, below them Ontixs who were the heads of a tribal 
subsections and at the bottom the Shakhs, village or camp heads. All had specific rights and 
duties towards the Government. Many of these offices survive while some have fallen into 
desuetude. 
What emerges is a picture in which: 
Marr^ cf the si^)paed central tenOs (f A frican lard temae, such as the idea cf comrnnd 
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temre, the hierarchy cf reoogvzed interests in lard (ounership, Ust^ructury ngte and so a^, or the 
plaae (f dm^ and dders, haw been shoim to haw been kr^ created ard spstained by ohrM pdic^ 
ardpassed on to pat-colonial states... In addition, the soazUed custonary rules r^leOed only some cf 
the 10KB (f irdi^nous society., vhat cane to be the content and procedures cf astamary law zeere 
^nerated out cf a oonpronise and vmeasy alliance betvueen the pcnier holders cf A frican irdigenous 
sodeties and coloraal pouers (Whitehead & Tsikata 2003: 75). 
Thus, like later post-independence concepts such 2is African Socialismoi Mboya and Ujarraa 
of Nyerere, many of the key concepts of traditicml adninistratkn were either invented or 
reinterpreted to suit the purposes of those in power (GriUo 1993). The pvupose of these 
initiatives, in many instances, was to allow central governments to effectively project state power 
into the peripheral areas, without having to compete with already established actors and local 
forces. In this way positions of power or influence, as with the Sheikh in Darfur or indeed chief 
in Tanzania, were recast and reinvented in a way that makes their power seem not only necessary 
but timeless. 
Perhaps the most important feature of this shallow or short-term tenporal historicity is that 
once such alternative forms of power, such as traditional paramount rulers, have been destroyed, 
new leadership quickly fills the power vacuum. Thus, in Darfur once Ali Dinar was killed the 
various Demtn^ Shartai, Marduh, Ornda and Sheikh became exponentially more powerful, without 
the Sultan imposing his authority on them. It has to be remembered that many of the figures in 
Idara Ahalia in the Fur Sultanate were descendants of local rulers who had created their own 
petty states. One such state was Dar Masaalit, which became a full-fledged sute -wdien its 
overlord (Darfur) was weakened by the forces of Zubeir Pasha. 
This ability to reinvent and reinterpret history also extends to land tenure and 
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administrative systems in the region, which is seen as coherent, static and overly legalistic. The 
problem lies in the fact that customary law, as it emerged as a concept, was thoi^ht to be ''a 
diffemt kird (f primtrily legd system carryir^ out mtny <f the same JunOians as fcmal [Westerr^ laud 
(Whitehead & Tsikata 2003: 75). It is that kind of perception that some influential policymakers, 
policy-making bodies and more importandy local scholars and lay people are today rediscovering. 
This is in stark contrast with what anthropologist and historians have been trying to tell 
policy makers, with very litde success, for over fif ty years. Both sets of academics ackno\\dedge 
that: 
Ajrimnsystems cf land acoess were... created by use and negxiated, ani that to save extent 
they rermvn so today ... Qmrnrnty-teid patterns cf lard access mre not ri§d, but flexikk and 
negtiahle... Within kinsh^ ffxx^ and households, cUim to 
Urd ir^xrited mdjin these social ffvups, iMebetwenlhem, dairns codd also be rrude on a nmher cf 
bases. Pawmg pledgr^ and Icanir^ pruuded access to land for use wthout undemmng the flow cf 
lard throu^ inheritance ard rnost comnmdties abo had wi)s in TjJ^ could rruke daim to 
land that wzs not already assi^2ed (Whitehead & Tsikata 2003: 76-77) 
Rather than seeing these systems as set in stone one must ackno-wdedge that they are 
culturally relative and fluid, as well as socially embedded. 
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C H A P T E R ? 
J U D I Y Y A A S T H E M I D D L E G R O U N D : 
C O M P E N S A T I O N B A S E D J U S T I C E A N D C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O N IN T H E G R E A T E R 
D A R F U R O U A D D A I R E G I O N 
/uc/tyya is not /ike a court 0/itw and it is not exactly S/raria or re/igious /zw. / t is 
a means o/so/ving con/Iicts /py t/>e midd/e ground. It is t/re midd/e road system. 
Omdds Secretary Salih Muhammad Shumu of Adar, Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 07/02/2006 
/ Pre- andPost-/sJamic Traditions 0/Con/IictResolution 
As previous chapters have shown, there are numerous possible causes of conflict 
between and among ethnic groups, which coexist in the same area or interact frequently. 
However, even in the face of such conflict, various ethnic and communal groups, the world over, 
have developed mechanisms to mitigate conflict. Some are even specifically designed to ensure 
peaceful coexistence in spite of resource competition and fragmentary alliances that characterize 
the Sahel and Sahara. These traditional mechanisms rely not only on common cultural heritage, 
regarding the areas in question, but are also on subscription to a particular set of norms, for 
them to work. Subscription to these norms will vary over time and from place to place and 
though some aspects may be contested, it is the adherence to the core principles that makes 
mediation and conflict resolution possible. 
Though the role that competition plays in violent conflict needs to be stressed, it seems it 
can easily be over stressed. A number of non-violent forms of competition and an even larger 
number of non-violent forms of conflict resolution exist. The fact that such setdements i.e. 
relocation, exchange and territoriality, may not be as effective as violence in obtaining and 
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securing resoxirces, is offset by the fact that they are less costly in terms of enei^ and indeed 
lives. 
There is a considerable body of literature on conflict resolution and peace accords 
between states, or states and their constituent regions, or even states and their subjects (de Silva 
and Samarasinghe 1993, Woodhouse & Ramsbotham (eds) 2000, Burton 1990, Becker & 
Mitchell 1991 etc). However, there is comparatively little written on communal conflict 
resolution. This chapter will help to bridge that gap, by focusing on communal conflict 
resolution, while drawing on inter- and intra- state examples. 
When a conflict exists between two parties there are a surprisingly limited amount of 
options available to those parties to bring about a peaceful solution. Namely 
Domination- where one group forces its will on the other 
Capitulation- where one side allows itself to be dominated by another 
"VWthdrawal- where one party refuses to be part of the conflict any longer 
Negotiation- direct talks between parties to the conflict 
Mediation/ Arbitration- third party negotiation 
(Rubin 1997: 6). 
This chapter will focus on the practice of third party negotiation known in Northern 
Sudan as Judiyya. It must be noted however, that third party negotiation only becomes necessary, 
and indeed possible, when the conflict has either reached a point of deadlock, or when one of 
the parties feels secure enough to seek external mediation. More importantly, direct negotiations 
must either have run their course unsuccessfully, or be ineffective or impossible for some other 
reason. 
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It is clear that many aspects of conflict resolution during the pre-Islamic period or A I-
JahiliyyaJ^^ were continued later during the Islamic period and transferred to Darfur during the 
regions earliest encounters with Islam. The Bayimh or deliverance of proof by the plaintiff and 
Yarrsn, the oath given by the defendant, are both still widely used to open conflict resolution 
processes. Even today among Darfuri refugees in Tchad, a plaintiff is asked to submit Bayimh, if 
none is forthcoming the defendant will then be asked to swear Yarrm on the Qur'an. Declining 
to do the latter is the same as an admission of guilt. However if the defendant does swear then 
proceedings will begin to determine the validity of the claims put forward by the conflicting 
parties. It should be noted, however, that all forms of Islamic conflict resolution are considered 
IlzamMamm, morally binding, rather than Iham Qimni, legally binding. 
Another important, perhaps central, feature of Islamic conflict resolution is the payment 
of Diyx or Hood nmey. Interestingly enough, the most often cited reason for the failure of 
contemporary mediation revolves around the payment of Dr)tt. The term Diysi, often translated 
as blood rruney is actually a colloquial contraction of the word Fadiyyz, which means the sacrifiaecf. 
In murder cases Diyn is always set at a price that the defendant can feasibly pay and the 
circumstance of the crime, and the social status of the victim are also taken into account (Khuri: 
1997: 123). According to the Malakia school of Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence, the relatives of the 
murderer must pay one-third of the entire Diya sum regardless of the contribution of other 
relatives and allies. 
DiyA is paid to the blood relatives of a murdered person, or the wronged party if they 
were injured or suffered loss of property, usually as part of a setdement relating to the 
The word Jahiliyyah actually means ignorant, and Al-Jahilian the (time) of ^norance Le. the pre Islamic period 
27 Fadiyyen the plural of Fidiyya was the name a corps of soldiers used by Saladin during the Gusades and also the 
crack troops of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army 
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normalization of relations between conflicting parties. In cases of homicide, it is the relatives of 
the murderer who are bound to pay Diya to the relatives of the victim (Khun 1997: 132). 
However, they are expected to receive help from their relatives and in some cases co-ethnies or 
even non-ethnies, with whom they have an alliance. Thus, tracing descent through the 
generations, even fictitiously, implies historical importance, as well as a wider range of potential 
relatives and supporters. 
In cases of homicide the murderer is usually given sanctuary in another area, in order to 
faciliute the diminishing of tensions. In more recent times murderers are remanded in police 
custody, not as a punishment, but for their own protection v ^ e tempers are hot and relatives 
prone to violent retributions. Later, after Judiyya proceedings have begun, the murderer will be 
released into the custody of his local Sheikh, whose task it will be to ensure that he does not flee 
from justice. The murderer however, is free to carry on with his life as normal, while the Ajaisid 
try to come up with a suitable Diya amount. 
The economic situation of the parties involved is reflected in the going rate of Diyx 
compensation, which varies from region to region and from ethnic group to ethnic group. 
Prison sentences were rare even during the Condominium Period (Pettersen 1986: 86). Among 
the BeRa of Darfur the Diya allocated for specific offences is fixed and widely known -especially 
for cases of homicide. 
In cases where there is lai^e scale conflict, or when the killer has escaped to the safety of 
his tribe or for some other reason cannot be brought to justice, then the tribe will be forced to 
pay the Dr^. In the latter cases the paramount head of the region, or of the tribe, will organise 
the Dry*, dividing it up between his Qniis and Sheikhs so the burden does not fall on one 
particular section (Interview with Chziz's secretary Salih Muhammad Shumu of Adar close to 
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Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 09/04/2006). In Darfur the standard Di)a price for the loss of one male 
IS 100 Taniya, where: 
Table 11: Taniya System in Dar Galla 
Animal Taniya Value 
1 Adult Camel 3 Taniya 
1 Young Gimel WtS^ 2 Taniya 
Hfe|f^  1 Cow 1 Taniya 
7 Sheep 1 Taniya 
4 goats/3 sheep 1 Taniya 
66 1/2% of the Diya is paid to the paternal family of the victim 
33 1/2% of the Diya is paid to the victim's maternal relatives 
(Interview with Omdds secretary Salih Muhammad Shumu of Adar close to Kepkabia: 
MUe, Tchad 09/04/2006). 
Though Diya is measured in terms of Tamya, which itself is based on the value of specific 
animals, recently, more and more Diya. is being paid in cash, reflecting a general trend of market 
integration taking place throughout the Greater Ouaddai Darfur Region^*. The animals, or cash, 
once collected are brought to the Ajamdiov inspection before being distributed. However, not 
all of the Diyx goes to the immediate relatives of the victim. Of a typical Diyn of 100 Taniya, the 
father of the victim will get 12 Taniya and the rest will to other relatives and figmies in Idzra 
Ahalia (Interview with Oitk Haroun Suliman Gani of Abu Gamra: Mile, Tchad 21/12/2005). 
In this way all the relatives who would have been involved in hostilities or wlio would have 
' For more on Market integration in the region see (Tully 1998). 
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benefited from the labour, marriage and children of the victim, are compensated. I f the victim's 
family agree to the Diyz the problem is considered solved and after payment no further action is 
needed. Otherwise the matter will be transferred to the state run coiut system. 
Much of Islamic conflict resolution has its origins in the Sulh, smknm/resdutim 
techniques of Al Jahiliyyah or pre-Islamic period (Moussalli 1997: 44). A I- Jahiliyyah was 
characterized by periods of intense inter- and intra-tribal warfare and feuding. As a result 
complex systems of Svdh developed including W^ast mediation; T<j/;^»7Z arbitration and Judiyyz. 
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2 T^e Plszce qf/udiyya andA/'awidin Pre- warDajfur 
Judzyyn is an established mediation tradition in northern Sudan, conducted by a Faki wise 
man, or a Natiw Adrrhnstratim leader known as Ajaisid. The JucJiyya system is based on third-
party mediation, with the mediators known as Ajawd (sing. Ajimdi). The root verb Jwi means 
gxd, but the same word also forms the roost of such words as rrag'manae and §p7erous. For 
Judiyyz to take place the Aja-rnd must be accepted by all conflicting parries, this acceptance is 
based on their reputation as wise and knowledge of the traditions. Traditionally, ]udiyya ends 
when a setdement of some sort is reached; this setdement need not be all encompassing, but 
should re-establish some sort of harmony through the payment of compensation. To achieve 
this, the rhetorical skills of the Ajavdd are important, appealing to the wisdom of the parries and 
to their honour, but the process is also political because pressure is put on the parties to agree. 
In Darfur the Ajamd are, by traditional practice, elderly people who are versed in 
communal customs and customary laws. They are however, not neutral in the Western sense of 
the term. Their practice is to exert pressure on the party resisting a settlement until they accept 
the recommendations \hs. Ajamdhacwe setded on (Mohamed and Badri 2005). In this wayAjawd 
act as facilitators, mediators and arbitrators depending on -w^t is needed. According to Ali Ali-
Dinar (Ali-Dinar 2004: 4), a scholar who is himself from the lineage of the sultans of the Fur, the 
Ajauiid form part of a system for the regulation of group land rights and ethnic boundaries that 
was unquestioned until very recent times: 
Disputes leere Tesdued in traditional recandliatim oor^rerxes Mutarrarat al Sulh lehcse riding 
isere ahmys respected and honored Eim at times ishen the gyiBmrmnt wis imolwd, it serued as a 
facilitator and not as an erfoner. GowTiment naOrality oontairsd edmic ocwflias not only in Dar^ 
also in Kordcfan and in doe soudo (Ali-Dinar 2004: 4). 
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a. GovrnTnent-Sponsared Judzyya 
A distinction needs to be made between comrmnalfy and gJiEmrmit-sponsared Judiyya. The 
latter has its origins in the Condominium period. The colonial government (1898-1956) 
authorities recognized the system of NaOw Adnimtratim and made some rriodifications to it, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, so that they could more easily control the Sudan's often-unruly 
natives. Communities and community members were forced to live within the limits of their 
NaUw Adzmnstratim area and could not go beyond them, except in the case of drought and war. 
Even then they were expected to return to their Dor once the cause for leaving it was resolved. 
Key to this system of colonial control was the creation of Natiw and District Courts. 
In the colonial period, law enforcement institutions such as courts, police stations and 
prisons were established, but also traditional, NaUiE (Adrmostratiori^ Courts. In a situation 
reminiscent of the colonial government's creation of Idara Ahalia, Nadte Courts were created, 
below government courts. When the Sudan gained its independence in 1956, post-colonial 
governments also continued the tradition of organizing Mutarmrat al- Sulh or reconciliation 
conferences, to settle persistent or reocctirring conflicts. 
In this way, the colonial government (1898-1956 Sudan as a whole, 1916-1956 Darfur 
and 1923-1956 Dar Masaalit) adopted two policies that gready lessened inter-group violent 
conflicts (Mohamed 2002b): 
• a heavy-handed pacification policy and 
• the standardization of the system of tribal administration, which would become known as 
Idara A halia/NatiieA dnmstratioru 
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By definition, colonization implied pacification, so that extraction of economic resources 
would be possible. Disturbing law and order was made punishable and in most cases individual 
responsibility replaced the traditional communal responsibility for dealing with crimes 
(Mohamed 2002b). Thus, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government in the Sudan 
established a system of urban and rural courts that also covered Darfur (Pettersen 1986). 
The first government-sponsored Jtidiyya in Darfur was organized by the colonial 
government in 1932, under the name "The Protocol", and sat outside of the jurisdiction of the 
government courts (UNICEF 2003a: 48). During the Condominium period such tribal meetings 
were usually sponsored by the Government. It was the responsibility of the Government, as the 
convener, to arrange the location and time of the conference, as well as using the security 
apparatus at their disposal to prepare a list of deaths, injuries and other losses. The colonial 
goverrmient also selected and notified the A jawd, and determined the number of representatives 
each party in the dispute would put forward. A fairly senior public official would chair the entire 
proceeding (Egiemi and Pantuiiano 2003), thereby ensuring that the interests of the colonial 
government were served. The fact that government officials organized the conferences meant 
that they could select only those whom they felt they could trust or who they could manipulate 
into representing their interests, or at least not opposing them. This partial assimilation into the 
apparatus of government has endured, with variations, to the present. Thus, in government-
sponsored Judiyya today, Ajazdd are selected by Khartoum or State governors in an attempt to 
in^ose their authority — and in some cases their wiU — on the conference. 
Before a government-sponsored peacemaking conference is convened, preparatory 
measures will be taken by the government authorities, including: deciding the time and place for 
the conference, directing security forces to prepare lists of deaths, injuries and material losses; 
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selecting and notifying the Ajamd, asking the parties in conflict to select their representatives; 
and arranging how the conference is to be managed. A fairly senior public officer, believed to be 
capable and acceptable to the parties in conflict, will be designated as chairperson for the 
conference and will be assisted by a working group. Of course, it is the government that meets 
the financial obligations for the conference. 
When the conference is convened, the procedure runs as follows: 
A moderator will ask one of the saints to recite verses from Qur'an and the Hadido. 
Qtations will normally concentrate on verses and Hadzth that commend living in peace for 
individuals and commtmities. Listeners are also reminded of the mischievous consequences for 
engaging in feuds and homicide. Then the chairperson addresses the conference acknowledgmg 
the difficulty of the task at hand, but indicating his confidence in the Ajawd, whom he is sure 
have the ability to solve the problem and restore brotherly relationships between parties in 
conflict (Mohamed 2002b). 
The next step is the 'story telling' by representatives of the conflicting groups. Each 
party will try to demonstrate how the other party was the one responsible for starting and 
worsening events leading to violence. As a way out, each party will lay down extreme conditions 
for the other party so that the conflict might be resolved (Mohamed 2002b). A written 
statement will be read out by a representative of each party and will be submitted to the A jaisid 
and government authorities as a conference document. The floor will then be open for more 
'story telling' by representatives of each group, confirming in most cases what the group had 
decided to focus on in its written document. The meeting will then be adjourned so that the 
Ajauid might sit alone by themselves and deliberate on how they may proceed with the 
mediation. 
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The government authorities will have already decided who should be the Ajavid 
chairperson. The A jawd will then meet with each party, in caucuses, for deliberations on the 
issues they raised and solutions they suggested (Mohamed 2002b). Ajamd-fnH^ be careful not 
to indicate sympathy for either side. Rather, they will express their understanding of the points 
parties made, and would advise them to be lenient on certain issues that might block the 
reconciliation process. Again, the will sit alone and agree on what they perceive to be the 
solution for the problem. They go back and forth between the parties, after having assigned 
roles for the "doves" and "hawks" (Mohamed 2002b). Their tentative judgments wiU by now be 
clear and their most difficult task is convincing parties to accept their judgments. 
This process of convincing might take hours and sometimes days in which not only the 
Ajamd, but also the government authorities, will put pressure on the party refusing settlement 
conditions. Certainly, no side will want to be labelled as the obstacle to making peace or the one 
refusing the wisdom of the A jawd (Mohamed 2002b). The representatives of parries in conflict 
will normally find themselves in the difficult situation of having to accept y4;i2zai^ judgment while 
fearing grassroots reaction to what may be perceived as unjust problem solving. This is one of 
the reasons why increasingly government-sponsored peacemaking conferences have failed to put 
an end to inter-group conflicts. Judiyya judgments m^ht not always be properly and honesdy 
conveyed to people at the grassroots level. 
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b. Comrmnally Sponsored Judiyya 
By communally sponsored Judiyya I mean conflict resolution meetings that are organised 
and implemented with little or no-direct state involvement (we will define what constitutes state 
involvement later). Secondly this section -as with the entire thesis- mainly deals with Judiyya and 
Idara A halia among the BeRa unless otherwise stated. 
In its traditional form, once a mediation conference has been convened, it follows a fairly 
standard course. The moderator asks a ranking religious figure to recite a suitable verse from the 
Qur'an or Hadith, stressing the need for the nations of man to live in harmony. After the 
chairman has spoken, the parties lay out their cases, each usually accusing the other of starting 
hostilities. Each party then submits a list of complaints and demands, the satisfaction of which 
would, in their view, resolve the conflict. The Ajamd then retire for discussion. Their role is to 
try to convince both parties to stand down from demands that would block a setdement. Once 
they have agreed on a solution, they return to the meeting and try to cajole the two sides towards 
an agreement. The A jamd may also ask the government to apply pressure on the party that is 
not willing to accept the setdement put before them (Egiemi and Pantuliano 2003). In this way 
the role of the state in communally sponsored Judiyya, is to facilitate the smooth running of 
Judiyya, by acting as a fall back when mediation fails, or with the threat of sanction for those who 
break agreements. 
Communally^sponsored Judiyyz are similar in form to the government-sponsored 
mediations, but with some critical differences. In the case of communal Judiyyx, the Ajamdrnxy 
be religious leaders or others of high social standing within their respective communities. In this 
form of Judzyyn, the A jaisid decide on a place and time of meeting. Mediation usually takes place 
in the house of the one of the A jamd who comes from a group that is not party to the conflict. 
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Like government sponsored Judiyyst the proceedings begin with a prayer (Egiemi and Pantuliano 
2003: 20). 
The key difference between the two is who are selected as Ajamd In communally 
sponsored Judiyyz only elderly, respectable, wise and experienced people are chosen to be 
members of the council. In Darfur there is a preference for figures in Idara Ahalia to act as 
Ajamd when a Judiyyz council is convened. However, the exact nature and make up of each 
council will vary depending on the nature of the conflict. The various council members will have 
different tasks depending on what needs to be done, thus some will perform the funcrions of 
arbitration, mediation and reconciliation between conflicting parties. 
Another key difference between government and communally sponsored Judiyyz is the 
types of conflict they are used to address. The former is used exclusively for large-scale inter-
ethnic or communal conflicts, which have turned violent. Communally sponsored Judiyya. 
however, can be used to address all levels of conflict, at the family level: between members of the 
same household or family, at the clan level: between two clans belonging to the same ethnic 
group; at the tribal level: between two tribes from the same ethnic group, or two clans from 
different tribes in the same ethnic group; or at its highest level between two ethnic groups or two 
clans belonging to different ethnic groups. 
At each level and indeed between them, there is a system of escalation and referrals that 
allows minor cases to be dealt with by minor figures in Idara Ahalia while more serious cases can 
be dealt with by higher ranking officials. At the family level a local Ajamd council would first 
tackle a case. This council, usually headed by the village Sheikh, endeavours to bring the 
conflicting parties together and tries to reach a fair setdement, just compensation and 
reconciliation. In cases where the council fails to reach a setdement, the matter would be 
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referred to the Onk, who as a higher ranking official in IdaraAhalia would try to find a solution 
to the problem. 
When the conflicting parties come from different Airr Ke Beh, or branches, then the 
responsibly of dealing with the conflict will fall on the Omk of the Be A Ah. In the case of a 
conflict between members of different Be A Ah, or tribes, then the paramount ruler of the 
region- the Shartai in the case of Dar Galla- would take responsibility for organising a Judiyya. 
The members will likely include the Onks of the opposing Be A Ah or tribes. 
The role of the A jawd is to act as go betweens once both parries have agreed to 
mediation. Once trust has been restored and tempers cooled a Judiyya council is to be convened. 
This council will include the A jawd as well as the conflicting parties, each of whom would be 
given an equal chance to present their cases. In many cases several meetings and mediation 
sessions can take place. However, if a peaceful settiement cannot be reached, the case will be 
transferred to a state court of law. 
In Darfur two types of courts existed before the current conflict, state courts and 
local/native. State courts were headed by qualified judges, versed in the Sudanese criminal and 
civil code. Local courts have undergone numerous and significant changes over the years. 
Generally they are connected to Idara Ahalia and are based in the capital of regional entities- for 
example the Komoi court serves the whole of Dar Galla, as the court in Tine serves Darfuri Dar 
Kobe. These courts are usually made up a number of Qtdi, or judges, trained in Fiqh or Islamic 
Jurisprudence. In previous years the paramount head of the region appointed these scholars due 
to their training, with a special eye to having one representative from each Be A Ah in his realm. 
Recendy however, the Sudanese state has began limiting the number of judges and even going as 
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far as vetoing certain appointments (Interview with Yousuff Nour Terayo member for the 
Mahkama and Head of the Mahkama at Komoi: Mile, Tchad 21-04-06). 
Both kinds of mediation continue to take place in contemporary Darfur, and recorded 
instances have mcreased strikingly in number. However, it is interesting to note that only one 
major government-sponsored mediation conference was held in Darfur under the Condominium 
(i.e. between 1916 and 1956), whereas between 1957 and 1997 twenty-nine such conferences 
were held in Darfur, with six taking place in 1991 alone (Mukhtar 1998). This does not mean 
that Judiyya is becoming more effective, rather the opposite, since many of the peace meetings 
had to be repeated in subsequent years. Out of these conferences, five were between the same 
groups (the Kababish and camel-herding Berti, Midob and Zeyadiya of North Darfvir). Conflict 
in Darfur is repetitive, occurring on the same social fault-lines, as a result peace conferences 
seldom bring lasting peace. But Judiyya is still the institution that is turned to in a crisis. 
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J. Con/IictResolution in ot^er/sizmic Societies 
cL Hezbdlah as L dxmese arbitrator and erforaer 
Today Islamic jurisprudence and conflict resolution techniques are practised in societies 
from the mountain retreats of Morocco to the islands of Mindanao and Moro. Two such 
examples will be discussed in this section, the first from Lebanon and the second from the Red 
Sea region of Sudan. These two examples have been chosen for a variety of reasons. Firstly the 
Lebanese case of Hezbollah sponsored mediation shows us two things: 
• What conflict resolution looks like when supported by a impartial 
mediator/ arbitrator. 
• How conflict resolution can be accomplished between non-sute 
actors with no state intervention. 
Both of these are important in the context of Darfur. The latter since, as discxissed 
before, communally sponsored Judiyya takes place with litde state intervention; the former 
because it hints to the role which the Sudanese state should be playing in Darfur. The brief 
outline of Hezbollah st)de mediation and arbitration in Lebanon, which follows, is taken from 
Nazir Hameh's 1997 work. It shows Hezbollah actii^ as impartial mediator, a role the Sudanese 
state has not played in some time. The Beja case study shows how conflict resolution is achieved 
among members of the same ethnic group without the need for state or extemal intervention. 
In Hezbollah-controlled areas of Lebanon, Hezbollah is frequendy called upon to setde 
disputes between families, clans and even lai^e tribes. When conflicts emerge and Hezbollah is 
involved there are two forms of conflict resolution that can be employed, arbitration and 
mediation. 
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By definition, arbitration, involves parties to a conflict deferring to a neutral third party 
for a setdement. The main difference between arbitration and other forms of conflict resolution 
lies in the fact that the ruling of the arbitrator is binding and in most cases there is no recourse to 
appeal. Though parties may be allowed to take part in the selection of arbitrators, there is very 
litde direct communication. In a sense, arbitration is seen as a more legalistic form of conflict 
resolution. In Lebanon, Hezbollah uses arbitration for everyday conflicts: such as those between 
members of the same family, disputes of goods or the price of services. In these instance 
Hezbollah Shdkhs, whether judges or I?mrrs, act as arbitrators. 
Mediation, on the other hand, is used by Hezbollah for lai^e intra-Shia conflicts, either 
between families, clans, or tribes. The difference between the two is that a mediator tries to 
come to a setdement not by imposing his views of Islamic Jurisprudence on conflicting parries 
but rather by cajoling them away from violence and hostilities and towards reconciliation. In 
cases of mediation, Hezbollah Sheikhs foUow a well-known procedure: 
1. Once Hezbollah is asked to mediate in a conflict, the mediator will visit 
the home and family of the victim. The purpose of this visit is for the mediator, usually a 
prominent Hezbollah affiliated Sheikh, to get a list of demands from the victim's father 
and uncles. This group of relatives, collectively known as the Walt d-dam, are of the 
utmost importance since they would be the ones responsible for either avenging the 
death or allowing the conciliation process to continue. After hearing the demands, the 
mediator will usually give the Wdi al-damtwo options. The matter can be solved through 
negotiation and a setdement, or it can be taken to the Sharia court. In his work with 
Hezbollah Sheikhs Nizar Hamzeh states that most Walt d-dam choose the former 
(Hamzeh 1997: 111). 
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2. The next step would be for the Sheikh to prevent Tha'r or vendettas. In 
this stage the moral might of the Sheikh and the real threat of (violent) sanction by 
Hezbollah, which he represents, go hand in hand. Though Hezbollah mediators claimed 
they tried not to use force to prevent vendettas, they did admit that on occasion force 
was necessary to put an end to retaliatory killings (Hamzeh 1997: 111). If the mediators 
do use force to bring parties to the table or to stop revenge killings, it puts them in a 
difficult position. Since the pursuit of vendettas is not prohibited, but rather an integral 
part of the shared moral code of the region, preventing a wronged party from carryii^ 
out such actions compromises Hezbollah. However, as the only thing even closely 
resembling a functioning 'government' in large parts of Lebanon, Hezbollah's interest lies 
in peace and more importandy stability. Intra-Shia violence is a threat to such stability 
and as a result in such cases where Hezbollah is compelled to use force to bring about 
stability, the third party can no longer be seen as a mediator but rather as arbitrator. 
3. Once both parties have agreed to Hezbollah involvement as a mediatory 
or arbitratory agent, the next step pursued by the Hezbollah Sheikh is to hold the accused 
(Hamzeh 1997: 112). The purpose being not to punish the culprit, but rather to protect 
him (invariably him) from retaliation. It is here that Darfur and Lebanese tribal custom 
vary. Whereas it is the role of the clan or tribe to protect members, even those who have 
committed murder in Lebanon (Hamzeh 1997:112), it would be immoral for the same to 
take place in Darfur. One's tribe can give sanctuary but only until conflict resolution 
begins, then one must be turned over to face judgment. The role of the state in both 
cases is minimal, since both parties in conflict could end formal legal proceeding once 
reconciliation had been achieved and Diya agreed upon. 
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4. When the level of conflict and distrust has been lowered, the Hezbollah 
mediator then starts a process of extensive consiiltations with both parties. Usually the 
Sheikh will consult the parties separately and listen to their version of events. Two main 
issues are discussed at such consultations the fate of the accused and the Dry*. The most 
common call from the family of the victims in Lebanon is for Ni^ exile of the accused 
and a lai^e Diyx payment. In some instances if the accused's family cannot afford the 
entire Diyn, it is not unheard of for Hezbollah to pay a portion of the amount demanded 
(Hamzeh 1997: 113). The same often happens in Darfur, with the government either 
paying a portion of the Di)a, or more frequently lowering the amovint. The difference 
between the two cases is, whereas Hezbollah applies this extemal assistance even handily, 
the same cannot be said of the Sudanese government. 
5. "When the fate of the accused and the amount of the Diya have both been 
decided, Hezbollah mediators aimounce that the conflict is at an end. Interestingly, this 
is not done by a general proclamation but rather by visiting all the members of the two 
parties as well as the clan and tribal leaders personally, to notify them as to the end of the 
conflict and the particulars of the setdement (Hamzeh 1997: 114). 
6. Finally, the mediators bring together tribal, clan and Hezbollah leaders 
for a Mptscdaha. Where, through speeches, the need for Shia unity, Hezbollah's leadership 
and distrust of Israel and the West are reaffirmed. In some cases, the Musalaha is also the 
time for the parties that were previously in conflict, to show their largess and piety by 
returning all that which they demanded as a condition for the Musalaha. Thus, Dr^a may 
be returned as a gesture of tme reconciliation. 
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Through the above process, Hezbollah mediated over 200 clan conflicts in a ten-year 
period. Most were due to homicide and surprisingly over two thirds were claimed to be 
resolved, that is the conflict did not reoccur (Hamzeh 1997: 111). Hezbollah mediation and 
arbitration share many similarities and even Nizar Hamzeh admits the difference between the 
two can often times be litde more than the interpretation of the Sheikh. 
Al-Krenawi in his 1999 work on Bedouin conflict resolution argues that mediation 
among the Bedotiin, much like among Lebanese clans occurs in two ways. The first is a method 
to instil a sense of mutually agreed upon justice and the second is a method to restore stability 
and harmony to social relations (Al-Krenawi 1999 160-164). In the case of Lebanon the 
Musaiaha fulfils the role of the latter, while the role of the Hezbollah Sheikhs is to achieve the 
former. 
b. The Bqa corflia resolution nethods 
As previous stated, the use of Jtidzyya, as a means of conflict resolution is common 
throughout northem Sudan. The Bqa of the Red Sea region of eastem Sudan provide a second 
example of conflict resolution in Islamic societies. The Bqa have been chosen since we are 
somewhat familiar with them having discussed their system of Idara Ahalia in the previous 
chapter. Unlike multiethnic Darftir, the Red Sea region is compose of four primary ethnic 
groups: the Beja, the area's indigenous inhabitants; Riverine Sudanese Arabs, mainly migrants 
from the Nile region; other Non-Arab Sudanese migrants, mainly Sudanese Fellata and Hausa 
and finally the Rashauk Arabs, who migrated to the region from the Ptjaz region of Saudi Arabia 
in the 1800s. The Beja people, though a single ethnic group sharing a common language, are 
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composed of a number of frequendy conflicting tribes. This sub-section will focus on 
peacemaking between Beja tribes. 
When news of a homicide spreads, it is the duty of the Shakh and Omk of the killer's 
tribe to cahn the situation and prevent further escalation. This is typically done by apologizii^ to 
the Shdkh and Omda of the deceased tribesman's community and getting their GuUador word of 
honour, that they will abide by a Wagzb a truce (El Amin 2004: 16). According to Beja tradition, 
the rejection of a conflict resolution solution put forward by tribal leaders, representing both 
parties is considered highly unacceptable. In fact, the very act of involvement of mediation 
teams from the other Beja tribes is tantamount to the recognition of the right of the injured tribe 
to an apology and a demonstration of respect, to which the injured tribe normally responds 
positively (El Amin 2004: 16). 
If Gtdlad is given and a Wagzb accepted, any revenge attacks or killings are reported to 
Shdkhs who will submit the names of the murderers to the regular state-run legal system for 
punishment (El Amin 2004: 16). A council composed of Sheikhs, Omdas and wise men is 
convened to deal with the matter and suggest appropriate compensation. As with the previous 
case study from Lebanon, the issue is considered resolved once the wronged party has agreed to 
Inter-tribal conflicts among the Beja rarely escalate into violence, unlike the situation in 
Darfur. There are a few key reasons for this. Firstly, the fact that the vast majority of the 
region's inhabitants are pastoralist, coupled with the region's low population density, means that 
groups of would-be competitors for resources rarely come into prolonged contact. When 
conflict does occur the Beja have well respected forms of conflict resolution. As E l Amin states 
it is not that the Beja mechanism are better than other conflict resolution techniques, 
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Ifut rather t/?at t^ey are ejfectize l^ecause popu/ar cu/tu?v, noTms and 
za/ues support t^em t/}rvug/j gu//ad fword o/^onour^, wagal> ftruce and waiting 
untdt^e situation ca/ms down and su/ftcient consultations and negotiations are 
conductedj and taiweg fcommitmentj a// ^e/p to keep con/lict at manageai>/e 
proportions andprevent escalation (El Amin 204: 20). 
These are two very different case studies from very different parts of the word. 
However, both are located in regions in which the role of conflict resolution and peace building, 
usually reserved for the state, is not carried out by another actor. In the case of Lebanon this 
actor is a political party and in the case of the Beja it is the tribe. In both cases, however, 
motivation for the creation of such complex systems is the same, stability. 
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4. DaTfuri Case Studies 
A. . The Rizdszt-BeRa Conftias cf 1986 and 1996 
An attempt to understand conflict and conflict mitigation in Darfur must also include an 
analysis of the impact of ecological change. Recent works (Bromwich 2007, Tear Fund 2007, 
Abdalla 2004, Suliman 1997, B B C 2007) have frequentiy argued diat the violence that has 
wracked the region since the mid 1980s can be interpreted as t^ncd eoologcd oorfiict dcaig 
distinOifiE ecdo^ad borders — in this case — the borders (f the seni-aridplains waned by 'A rah'pastordist 
norruds and those cf the 'iM oasis' (f Jebd Marra cf the settled Fw farrrErs" (Suliman 1997). Though I 
would argue against the tendency to place resource degradation and competition at the centre of 
the current conflict, these factors cannot be overlooked. In Darfur successive demographic and 
political responses to ecological change and resource scarcity, along with Government 
intervention have produced a complex layering of the causes of conflict. 
Though the paramount importance of competition over natural resources may have 
seemed obvious to a writer in the early 1990s, since that time the complicating effect of central 
government interference has become clearer. James Morton a researcher and development 
worker who has been involved in Darfur for decades, put forward a similar aipiment in a 1992 
paper on the collapse of Idara Ahdia in Darfur. He exaxnines a few of the more well-known 
conflicts in Darfur and explores the factors that led to violence (Morton 1992). The Ta'aisha-
Salamat conflict bears some menrion. For decades the Salamat Arabs of the Salamat River 
region of Tchad had been migrating to Ta'aisha lands in Darfur to escape poor harvest, conflict 
and in search of a better life. In a situarion reminiscent of the Dar Horiyya example m the last 
chapter, the Ta'aisha catde nomads initially had little objecrion to the Salamat farmers settling on 
vacant land in their Dar. Then in 1982, laige-scale violence broke out between farmers and 
nomads. Many contemporary researchers may have been happy to interpret this as a simple 
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nomad-agriculturalist clashes over land and water and in that way provided only a one 
dimensional analysis of the conflict. Morton however looked deeper and as a result got to the 
root of the problem. Narrdy, dx introduction cf conpetime dectiais and the vestnuHmng (f sub-ruoional 
boundaries. 
The new democratic regime intended the number of local councils and seats available, 
which was a chance for the long established Salamat to get their own Orndiyyas and free them of 
their status as clients of the Ta'aisha. This was a prospect that the Ta'aisha were not all together 
too happy with. In this way a single killing, most likely unrelated to the upcoming election, 
became the spark that ignited large-scale communal violence (Morton 1992). Thus, a conflict 
which was largely interpreted as a simple clash between nomads and farmers, was revealed to be 
the result of more deep-seeded social frustrations exacerbated by political events in the region. 
Giving envirormiental change a paramount role in the current climate of violence in 
Darfur runs the risk of absolving the Khartoum regime of its responsibility. Patterns of 
increased frequency of years of bad rainfalls, the basement rock complex, which causes leeching 
of nutrients, leading to soil erosion and soil exhaustion are high%hted by Bromwich's work 
(Bromwich 2007) and are common features throughout the Sahara and Sahel; as is the 
concentration of agriculture around fertile wadis located in alluvial plains. What is interesting is 
that in spite of the general Sahelian pattern of diminishing agricultural yields in relation to input, 
with the exception of two reoccurring Tuareg insurrections in Mali and lS%er -which are better 
classed as political rather than envirormiental conflicts- large scale conflict, either communally or 
against the state is not the norm In fact four of the most intense and most protracted, of the six 
cases of violence between the state and its inhabitants in the Sahel occur in the Sudan (Nuba 
Mountains, South Sudan, Darfur and the Beja/Red Sea area), and involve the Arab dominated 
regime against non -Arab ethnic groups. A superficial glance at the data relating to inter-ethnic 
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violence in the Sahel shows a similar pattem, with a disproportionate number of cases falling 
within the Sudan. Thus, those who would classify the current Darfur conflict as an 
environmental conflict between farmers and nomads, run the risk of becoming mouth pieces for 
a regime that has shown itself to be at least partially responsible, if not at the heart, of the 
violence in the Sudan. 
Luckily the region is also home a complex coping strategies, that allow inhabitants of the 
Sahel and Sudan in particular to cope with environmental and political upheavals. There has also 
been evolution in the collective response to insecurity in the region. In the pre-colonial period, 
populations in the region utilized a number of strategies to deal with fluctuating rainfall, 
including shifting cultivation, nomadism and lai^e-scale migration to areas with adequate rainfall, 
along with the exchange of produce and people (Kassas 1970). During the wet periods of the 
late-nineteenth century populations expanded rapidly. When rainfall patterns began to fluctuate, 
in the late 1950s, farmlands and forests were exploited more intensively and populations began 
to drift to permanent waterholes and towns (Tully 1988: 53). Population movement brought 
new pressure on natural resources. The burgeoning urban poor stripped trees for firewood and 
herders brought their herds closer to permanent wells. There, their well watered livestock 
stripped the land of the shrubs that were keeping the sand dunes at bay. 
The ecologically fragile north of Darfur has never fuUy recovered from droughts that 
afflicted the region from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. Numerous studies have looked at the 
effect of prolonged drought and mass migrations on the social and economic situation in the 
region. However, Suliman was the first to examine the effects of these forces on the prevalence 
of armed conflict. 'On dx one hard,' he wrote 'the inplicxdons cf emirmnental degradation are carfvned to 
the eocmanrk ard social spheres; on the other, the resulting oorfiicts are explained in terrre (f their elhrnc ard 
pditiad rmrtifetatians' (Suliman 1997). 
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I am arguing that the two approaches can be combined, but in the Sudanese context 
there seems to be a casual, rather than causal, relationship between environmental degradation 
and conflict. There are also a number of alternative responses to such environmental pressures, 
the most common being migration, will be discussed subsequentiy. 
Research the world over has shown that economic pressures associated with colonialism 
and global trade induced unsustainable practices that increased the local vulnerability to 
desertification, famine, and starvation (Tiuton 1997). Oliver-Smith notes the "socially created 
pattern of vulnerability" that Spanish-induced changes in building materials, design, and 
setdement patterns induced in Andean cultures, contributed to higher mortality during a 1970 
earthquake in Pern (1994). The pressure for economic development, modernization, and growth 
through means such as mining, deforestation, urbanization, and hydroelectric dams, can lead to 
dramatic environmental degradation, loss of food security and increasing disease vectors, thus 
elevating vulnerability to natural and infectious hazards (Scudder and Colson 1982, , Cemea 
1990, Shipton 1990, Hailu et al 1994, Lerer and Scudder 1999). 
Of the groups affected by the drought, the BeRa of Northem Darfur reacted with 
greatest resilience. The drought caused a near total change in the way of life of most BeRa. 
Prior to these changes the majority were cattie nomads who also practiced some farming and 
camel herding (Gore and others 2003). By 1985 the BeRa had abandoned their catde for camels. 
Many also abandoned their villages in Dar Zaghawa and moved to more fertile regions of Darfur 
(Tobert 1985:213).^' The BeRa have also increasingly turned to trade. The trade networks they 
maintain reach westwards to N^eria and north to Libya and enable them to rival the power of 
Jallaha traders from the central riverain area of Sudan. 
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The majority moved to El Fasher, Kepkabia, the Goz Maalia area, El Daein, and Al Liat province where they are now a 
majority. 
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With this as a backdrop, one can now examine the conflict between the Rizeigat and the 
BeRa who migrated to Dar Rizeigat. The Rizeigat and the BeRa came into conflict on at least 
two documented occasions before the current war, in 1986 and 1996. The cause of the conflicts 
was similar on each occasion. In the first case, ]udiyya was used effecrively to avert violence; in 
the second, ten years later, it failed. 
E l Da'ein town is the centre of a province historically dominated by Rizeigat. Hsre, m 
1986 — in the town itself and in some rural constituencies of E l Da'ein where the BeRa 
population was increasing — tensions between the two groups caused an armed stand-off. At 
this point the Commissioner of Nyala, of which E l Da'ein was then a part, intervened. A 
prominent BeRa named Hussein Dawsa was asked to act as Ajvadi and a Judiyya meeting was 
convened. This mediation has been unusually well-documented. Below is a transcript from an 
interview with Hussein Dawsa (Mohamed and Badri 2005). Though his account of the events 
surrounding the 1986 standoff is highly st>4ised, it highlights some of the ways in which Judiyya. is 
conducted. 
V^xnlrmdoedDadnfromNyala, I demanded that ead? party be placed separately in a sdxxjl 
buildaig. I wts aaonpanied by d^Ajamd 
I-wmt to doe Rezaiga (mrp first ard rdmked doem, "Do you -mnt to betray your bdoved late 
Nazir, leho inuted your Zaghawa brodxrs to come and Hie wth you^ Giie me the mmes (f these 
Zaghawa iiho atuse troMe and I mil take them wth me, hand-ci^ed, to Nyala!" 
Then I vent to the Zaghawa carrp ard started rdtikir^ them, "Is this doe wcyyou behaie to 
your hosts!" Then I asked them to mite daim on a pieoe cf paper all that they denunded frcm doe 
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Rezaigzt and to select txienty persons to represent them as spokesmen and gwTt than a mandate. 
ReaSng doe list cfdeminds, I tare doe paper intopieoes and threwdxmawty 
Then I 'went batk to the Rezaigtt carrp and dentmded the same doing First (fall, the 
Rezaigtt denanded that the Zaghawa r^nesentatiies be reduoBd to fifteen and they wrote dam tuenty-
fiiB dermnds. When I read them, I oomnvnted, "I aoaspt all your cbmrds except two cf them Firstly, 
the chmndfor expdling the Zaghawa fixmyourDar because dois is in contradiction cf the constitution 
Seoordly, preientir^ Zaghawa from taking imter from a imter-yard is irhumme. You carmat cause 
yourbradxrs to die cf thirst" 
They asked me, "before ve g,i£ you an answer, tdl us about the Zaghawa demtndsl" I told 
dxm, "dx Zaghawa haie no denunds to make All the demxnds doat they made I rejectedard tore 
dodr paper to pieces". Upon hearing dm, they started shouOng "Gixe us hack ourpaperi We have no 
demands as isadl". 
I tock the two delegites to the gyierrvTEnt authorities to document doe reconciliation in witir^ 
andcameback to erjoydxfotst that dxRezaigtt had prepared for us. 
A number of factors allowed Dawsa to accomplish his task (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 
30). First was his lineage. As the son of the Sultan of the KobarA BeRa Dawsa he was 
respected and well-versed in the role and skills of a good Ajwtdi. Secondly, Dawsa had also 
served as a goverrmient officer among the Tuer/Waggi section of the BeRa so he enjoyed the 
respect of both Tuer and KobarA dialectic groups and had the experience of many other conflict 
resolution conferences (Mohamed and" Badri 2005: 30). Finally, he had the support of a central 
government that wished to avoid escalation of the conflict, in a North-South border area, that 
was strategically important for the war against the SPLA. 
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A decade later the conflict flared up again. The initial spark was the division of E l Da'ein 
province mto five new constituencies. The Rizelgat candidates for local and parliamentary 
elections were assured victory in three of them; Abu Jabra, Abu Matariq and Firdos. However in 
the town of E l Da'ein itself the Rizeigat were a minority. ^ ° Another constituency, Asalaya, was a 
mixed constituency with a BeRa majority in the north and a Rizeigat majority in the south and 
west. And most of the inhabitants of the last constituency, Adalia, were Ma'ali. The results of 
the 1996 election were not surprising. In E l Da'ein town a BeRa backed Bamo (Kanuri-Bomu) 
candidate was elected, the same would have probably happened in Asalaya if the ballot boxes 
had not been burned by mobs of angry Rizeigat. Soon after this the Rizeigat began attacking 
BeRa vill^es. This was ostensibly as retaliation for a perceived increase in banditry by armed 
BeRa (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 31). The BeRa put up stiff resistance, sending non-combatants 
back to the safety of Nyala or Dar Zaghawa itself, and purchasing lar^e quantities of weaponry 
which inflicted heavy losses on Rizeigat horseback raiders (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 32). The 
Government's position was that the violence was instigated by members of the opposition 
Umma Party, then baimed, which draws much of its support from the West (Mohamed and 
Badri 2005: 33). 
It took government officials from Nyala some six months to bring the situation in E l 
Da'em under control to the point where they could convince the waning parties of the need for 
mediation. The conference, which was held in E l Da'ein in late March 1997, was aimed at the 
"practical coexistence between Rizeigat, BeRa and other communities in the area" (Mohamed 
and Badri 2005: 33). Like most government-sponsored Judiyya, the twenty-six Ajamd were 
selected by the government. The Ajamd selected for the Judiy^a included elders from various 
communities in Darfiu- and Kordofan (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 33). The Government 
30 
The BerA/Zaghawa and Bamo (Kanuri) combined probably made up a slight majority of the town's inhabitants 
(Mohammed 6 Badri 2002: 31). 
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appointed an N I F cadre as chairman. A technical committee, headed by the provincial 
magistrate, was also created to investigate claims of deaths, injuries and damage reported by the 
parties. The subsequent document was used by the Ajaieid as the basis for their judgments 
regardir^ blood money and other forms of compensation (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 34). 
Once the conference was convened it followed the usual pattem. The parties listed their 
grievances and demands. These betrayed a broad-based anxiety about the growing economic 
power of the BeRa and fear of their political ascendancy. According to Rizeigat delegates the 
problems were as follows (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 34): 
• armed robbery by the BeRa 
• over-representation of BeRa traders in local markets; 
• the fact that the BeRa had secluded themselves and not taken part in communal (i.e. 
Rizeigat) customs 
• failure of the BeRa Chzla to act according to communal (i.e. Rizeigat) customs, though 
part of the Rize^at Nazirate 
• the arrogant behaviour of the BeRa; 
• BeRa accumulation of wealth and aspirations for leadership positions; 
• the ascribed intention on the part of the BeRa as a whole to establish a "BeRa Greater 
Home" extendi:^ from Tchad to central Sudan. 
The Rizeigat representatives demanded the repatriation of recent BeRa imnigrants, 
registration of those who stayed, respect for Rizeigat suzerainty, the abolition of the BeRa 
OnTxkyya and the consolidation of scattered villages into lai^er ones (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 
34). The list points to a realization by the Rizeigat leadership that the BeRa were not being 
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assimilated into the Rizeigat polity. By disbanding the BeRa Orrvdiyya they hoped to make them 
easier to assimilate. Those BeRa, who were under the guardianship of a Rizeigat village or camp 
and thus a dependant minority, would be allowed to stay. Those who had come on their own 
accord and establish villages in vacant land would have to leave. 
According to the BeRa delegates on the other hand the problems were different: 
• he failure of the Rize^at to accept the result of the 1986 elections 
• the 1996 destruction of the Asalaya ballot boxes 
• Rizeigat racism 
• jealousies of BeRa political and economic success 
• competition among the two groups for access to land 
• Rize^at double standards when dealing with BeRa and Rizeigat bandits 
• the Rizeigat tendency to make every isolated incident a communal issue 
For future peaceful coexistence the BeRa also demanded that the conference condemn 
the Rizeigat as aggressors, that Diyx and other compensation payments be accurately assessed 
and payment ensured and that looted animals be recovered and Rizeigat herders not be allowed 
to cross the railway line in their northward movements until the agreements were honoured and 
implemented. The Ajawdx!h.tn made a determination of the actual causes of the conflict and 
armounced a long list of recommendations. They ai^ed that the effects of incidents of violence 
had been magnified by struggles over power, by the proliferation of firearms, by the tendency of 
the Rizeigat to monopolize economic resources and by the "absence of political, administrative 
and security capabilities in the area before and during the armed violence" (Mohamed and Badri 
2005: 34): 
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The Ajamd made twenty-two recommendations for the restoration of peace, includir^ 
the following: 
• the BeRa Omk should not set up a parallel administrative structure. After the 
conference, he would act as an ordinary Onda within the Rizeigat NazircOe. the 
Government should equip the authorities in the area with the necessary equipment and 
manpower for the maintenance of peace and order 
• commissions shotild be formed to tour villages and camps, informing inhabitants about 
the terms of the reconciliation agreement. 
• a mechanism for the implementation of conflict resolution should be established, headed 
by a high-status presidential appointee (Mohamed and Badri 2005: 34) 
It can be seen that the deliberations of the conference aired the grievances of the two 
groups in a controlled and systematic way and that the recommendations of the A janid were a 
serious attempt to tackle them, at least at the immediate level. The only recommendations that 
were actually implemented, however, was the payment of Diya.. However these payments were 
subsequently halved by central government. The Khartoum regime then went a step farther by 
paying half of the Diya required from the Rizeigat. Although the full sum of compensation was 
received, the act was seen as a violation of neutrality on the part of the central Government'^ 
There was a further criticism of the conference; that it concentrated on immediate 
grievances and did not address the underlying demographic causes, namely the distress migration 
that had brought the BeRa from Northern Darfur and the question of the political rights of such 
migrants dwelling in the communal Daroi other ethnic groups. There was also scepticism about 
the likelihood of the implementation of the recommendations of the Ajawd, which they 
There is a precedent in an 1970s settkment berween the Rizeigat and the A'weil Dinka. On this occasion the entire stun was 
paid by the Government, though it never reached its intended beneficiaries. 
221 
themselves were aware, hence, the stress in their judgment on the dissemination of information 
and the actual implementation of conference recommendations. 
The above 1996 conflict in similar in natvire to a case study from John Davis' work in 
Libya. In his 1987 work Libyan Politics, he examines a case from the Kufra region of southern 
Libya. In this case two sections of the Zuwtyu tribe: the Manmia and xhe Aiskd Ardra. In 1975 
with a new local government structure the snailer Aulad Arrira were able to take control of the 
local covincil from the Manmia. The latter felt that xht Auilad Anira could only have done this 
with the help of the Teda section of the Gur'an who live in Kufra region. Thing were made more 
complicated by a plan to setde the Teda on land vacant land in the region. When things turned 
violent it was not simply due to animosity between the ethnic groups but rather to the changes in 
traditional power relations. Foremost among these was the prospect of the Teda gain access to 
real power in the region (Davis 1987: 150-153). 
During the current armed insurrection in Darfur, there have been numerous 
government- and communally-sponsored initiatives aimed at bringing about a peacefxal 
setdement with competing attempts made by civil society, the opposition, the ruling party, the 
parliament and the federal government (International Crisis Group 2004: 13). More recendy, 
these have taken place in parallel with internationally sponsored peace talks between the 
Government and the SLA and the JEM. Some of these processes partake both of the traditional 
style of Judiyya and of international-style mediation. But most of them have, in the final analysis, 
been co-opted or blocked by the central government (Intemational Crisis Group 2004: 13). It is 
doubtful whether the Government's own sponsorship of Jtddzyya meetings is any more committed 
than in the run-up to the war in the 1990s. 
222 
In Februaty 2003, for example, the Government of Sudan announced a "Mechanism for 
Extending dx Authority cf the State" (MEAS), and requested the regional traditional leaders and 
government appointees to come up with suggestions for the restoration of peace in the region. 
Hundreds of leaders were invited to a consultative forum on security in Darfur, which took place 
in El Fashir 24-25 February 2003. The result was a consensus that the government should open 
a dialogue with the rebels. The committee then went about setting up four subcommittees on an 
ethnic basis^ ^ to meet with rebel leaders and civilian populations (International Crisis Group 
2004: 13). The Fur and BeRa committees reported back with the grievances and demands of the 
rebels. Their only condition for attending was that Ajaiiid should not be chosen on an ethnic 
basis. At this point the Sudanese army went on the offensive and the proposed talks never took 
place. 
In another attempt this tme in June/July 2003, the Minister of Education, Ahmed 
Babiker Nahar, a BeRa, and the Govemor of the Nile State, Abdalla Ali Masar, a Rizeigat, both 
senior officials in one of the two factions of the divided Umma party'^, launched their own 
initiative to negotiate a setdement with the rebels in Darfur. With President Beshir's approval a 
delegation of thirty traditional leaders and government officials entered an SLA stronghold 
(International Crisis Group 2004: 14). The SLA set three preconditions for entering the talks: 
that they should address the political roots causes of the rebellion; that the Government should 
not refer to them as bandits; and that the Jaryamed be disarmed. On this occasion the Minister 
of Education went as far as to say that the rebel cause was "just and rational in some of its 
aspects, and was amenable to give and take", (Intemational Crisis Group 2004: 13). The two 
government officials recommended that the Government open negotiations with the rebels. 
Once again these did not take place (ICG 2004: 14). 
Fur, BeRa, Arab, and non-specific 
A splinter faction that broke off from the UMMA party and entered the Government. 
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Another initiative was launched January 2004 in Nairobi by Vice President Taha and 
Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige, the former governor of Darfur, now an opposition leader in exile. 
Dira^e used his influence to persuade the SLA and JEM to take part in talks to open up the 
region to humanitarian assistance. But the talks collapsed when the Government abruptly pulled 
out (International Crisis Group 2004: 13). Around the same time Hassan Bargo, a BeRa 
government minister, launched a competing initiative. The meeting between Baigo and the 
Consultative Council of the BeRa resulted in a statement that promised an increased number of 
government positions to BeRa. Peace talks resulting from this were scheduled to take place in 
Tchad but never materialised (ICG 2004: 13). 
Various groups in Darfur have tried to initiate peace processes without Government 
participation. The Nazirs of the Midob and Zeyadiya have made attempts at reconciliation (Flint 
and de Waal 2005: 122-126). In Dar Masaalit an agreement was reached between the Sultan of 
the Masaalit and the recendy appointed Arab arms. The agreement specified that the Arab 
groups would keep their A rrirs, but under the nominal authority of an elected Sultan (Flint and 
de "Waal 2005: 122-126). This ensured that the numerically superior Masaalit would always be 
able to elect one of their own as Sultan. 
Even the groups from which the Jar^aisBed are recruited have, on occasion, sought to 
negotiate with their victims. The Artir of the Awlad Zeyd of West Darfur approached the 
Masaalit Sultan and made an agreement by which they would vacate the Masaalit land, that they 
occupied in exchange for access to pastures (International Crisis Group 2005: 11). The Awiad 
Zeyd, it has been suggested, are the victims of their own success as raiders, much as the Rizeigat 
were in northern Bahr el Ghazal, during the late 1990s. Their looted herds need to move more 
frequendy and farther for pastures and water and thus they have come to value security 
guarantees from their neighbours and erstwhile victims. When stock keeping becomes more 
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important than raiding and the search for safe pastures becomes a higher priority than further 
predation or rivalry for power, traditional reconciliation mechanisms may reassert themselves, as 
they have done, in some cases, between the Baggara tribes and the Dinka of northem Bahr el 
Ghazal. 
The Sudanese government has done its best to derail these communally sponsored 
initiatives by playing off one group against another. When the Ma'di were given their own 
Nazirate this served the function of maintaining tension between them and the Rize^at. Neither 
of the two groups has been drawn into the war in Darfur. The Government has also replaced 
certain uncooperative leaders, such as the Maqdum of Nyala, an action that may be understood 
as a warning to others who aspire to make peace independendy (Flint and de Waal 2005: 122-
126). 
Of the local peace initiatives another bears mention. That is the initiative launched by 
the Nazir of the Rize^at, Saeed Mahmoud Ibrahim Musa Madibu in 2005, which has the 
distinction of being the least talked about, the most problematic for the Sudanese regime and 
also the most promising. The Madibu initiative is des^ned to extend peace in South Darfur. 
The Southern Rizeigat have made agreements with the Birgid and Daju and Begio (groups, it 
may be noted, that have already been disarmed by the Government). There has also been a 
recent rapprochement with the Ma'ali to the north, a group with which the Rizeigat have had 
recurrent feuding relations (Flint and de Waal 2005: 122-126). In 2004 the Rizeigat Nazir look a 
leading part, along with other traditional leaders, in a Libyan-sponsored peace conference in 
Tripoli, with representatives of the JEM and SLA This produced a Darfur Tribes Initiative 
which called for the reestablishment of effective NatiwAdrrmstratim in Darfur. 
225 
The Nazir of the Rizeigat might be thought an unlikely candidate for the role of 
peacemaker. His predecessor as Nazirpresent Naza's elder brother- was responsible for the 
mobilization of the Rizeigat, as government allies, in the war in the South. In the 1980s and 
1990s Rizeigat militias, with Government support, repeatedly raided SPLM/A controlled areas in 
northern Bahr el Ghazal. Although the raiding profited militia members, the price was that it 
restricted the access for Rize^at herds to the dryseason grazing in the Dinka area. Despite 
pressure from the central government to become similarly involved in the war in Darfur, the 
present Nazir has stated that he will not raise a militia unless Dar Rizeigat itself is attacked 
(Tanner 2005: 23). The interests of the southern Rizeigat in Darfur are also rather different from 
their interest in the Dinka grazing grounds to the south. They have litde to gain there. As a 
result the Rizeigat and their Nazir sxt an unexpected force for peace. 
What is becoming increasingly apparent is that the wider problem of Darfur can only be 
resolved by intemational mediation, but the many local conflicts that are both exacerbated by it 
and wrapped up in it, can only be solved by a local process of mediation. The conditions for this 
do not cumendy exist, as the Government has shown itself unwilling to sponsor such 
proceedings in good faith, or enforce their recommendations. For Judiyya to be effective there 
needs to be clarity in the relation between central government, local authority and indigenous 
leadership. This requires integrity in administrative officials and an understanding on their part 
of the history of indigenous political institutions, an vinderstanding beyond what is necessary for 
a policy of divide and nJe. It may be necessary to define the nature of Dars more clearly, 
perhaps redefine them entirely by asking, for example, whether they are ethnic homelands or 
administrative units and what rights might minority groups within the dar have vis-a-vis the 
majority. 
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C H A P T E R 8 
J U D I Y Y A A M O N G R E F U G E E S 
/ Majlis ai Uga/a a wa Mahkama: Dajfuri/udiyya in Tciadien camps 
']i^icl> S^ei^^sf Are you asking ai^out t/;e Nasara S/jeik/;s or t/;e o/c/ Slreiklrs?'... 
oM tAe dre SireikAs wi/Inot ire Slreiklrs w/ren we return to Darfur tlreirautlrority 
ends Aere'. 
'J^of Tire SlreiMl>s/mm Darfurtl>ey are not Slreiklrs now... Tlrey are in Tclrad... 
tlrey are just refugees... l>y god tlreyjust stay tire re all day mis keen fwretcl>esj in 
tl>eir tents' 
Before beginning with our analysis of conflict resolution among Darfuri refugees in 
eastern Tchad, it should be noted that as with most aspects of this study, conflict resolution is 
case and camp specific. Since the position of figures in traditional authorities varies from camp 
to camp, so too does their authority and as a result their ability to rhitigate conflicts. This study 
win focus mainly on the practice of Judiyya. in Mile rather than Am Nabak. The reason for this is 
simple and revolves around the relatively unchanged position of traditional Sheikhs in Am 
Nabak. Judiyyn in that camp is practiced exacdy as it would have been in Darfur. The Sheikh of 
HabUah, the Anir of Girgira, the Sultan of Tundebey/Tuntoubay and the brother of Sultan 
Dawsa of Tine are all present in the camp. These villages and their leaders represent the vast 
majority of Kobe and Kapka BeRa in Darfur and as a result Judiyya proceedings pan out exacdy 
as they would in Darfur. Mile with its mainly Galla and Tuer population provides us with a 
much more rich, and in cases novel Judzyya. tradition, which out of necessity has adapted to life in 
Tchad to a much greater extent than Am Nabak. 
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Mile's administration is based on a template used by the UNHCR in nearly all refugee 
and IDP camps. Thus, Mile is divided into 10 zones, each with five blocks of approximately 80 
tents or 350 inhabitants. Each zone is headed by a do^de zone or Shakh al- zone:, and each block 
by a d)^de bUxk or Sheikh al ham The ck zone or Sheikh al- zone are selected from among the 
do^de bkxk or Sheikh al harr. The camp also has a Ccmnttee Prindpal or Majlis al-Sheyuk, which has 
16 member the 10 do^de zone or Shakh al- zone and six other 3 of whom are women. Though 
tasked with the management of the camp, they simply rubber stamp decisions already take by 
either CNAR, CARE or UNHCR. 
Mile and Am Nabak were managed by 45 CARE staff members based in Gureada who 
made trips to can^ every weekday from 0830 to 1530, security situation allowing. The Sheikh al-
zcne are selected from among the Sheikh al harr. The camp has a Principal Committee or Majlis 
al-Sheyuk, which has 16 members; the 10 Sheikh al- zone and six others 3 of whom are women 
(Interview with Ibrahim Idriss Sabil and Fatima Muhammad Khamis; Mile, Tchad 23/12/2005). 
Most of Mile's inhabitants, who are from at least 50 different villages in Dar Galla and 
Dar Tuer, arrived chaotically over a long period of time. As a result, many do not know if their 
Omda or Shakh is present in the camp. The fact that each of these villages may have had a Shakh 
of their own means that including close to fif ty traditional leaders in the management of the 
camp is not wholly feasible. Those Sheikhs who are present are given few roles in the CARE-run 
administration. The Mahkamt, or court, is the one exception. The Mahkamt forms the basis of 
the legal system of the camp. The court itself grew out of the CARE created Majlis al-Ugda'a. 
This committee is organised by zone, with each zone having a three-member committee. Each 
committee then selected one member to represent them on the camp wide Majlis al-Ugda'a. 
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The committee which was supposed to have only 10 members (one per zone selected by 
the Sheikh al- Zone) was mired in problems from the very beginning. Many of the Sheyuk al Zonat 
put themselves up for positions on the oarmittee des sages/Majlis al-Ugtla'a, though few had legal 
or customary law experience. Others simply placed their close friends on the court. Soon the 
committee began to frantically seek the help of the 'old Shdkhs', many of whom had decades of 
customary legal experience. It was at this time that Yousuff Terayo Nour an expert in Islamic 
jurisprudence, and the head of the Komoi law court prior to the conflict, was also invited to sit 
on the committee. 
After an initially shaky alliance between the Mahkarm and Majlis al- Ugda'a, two separate 
entities emerged. The Majlis al- Ugzla'a was used almost exclusively for the intra-zonal problems 
and disputes. The Mahkarm became the legal system of the camp, in the same way /sense that a 
Mahkarm or court is the legal system of a village or group of villages. When asked, members of 
the Mahkarm stated it had ten members, one from each zone, not all of whom had been Sheikhs 
in Darfur. In fact, the number of members will depend on the case. Cases in which the plaintiff 
and the defendant are both from the same Be A Ahoixht BeRa may have only one or two court 
members. Namely, the Omk of the Be A Ah, since he is best able to mediate between his 
people. 
What emerges is a picture of a dual system of administration and two avenues for conflict 
resolution. A t rmrry paras there appear to be two oarplemsntary systerrs (f adrrmstratian. There is a mdl 
d^iried, Tidl <xledUNHC3i/CARE adrrenis But there is also a isdl d^ined, not 
so Tsdl oiled shadow adrrimtratioru It appears that the refugees prefer to have their problems dealt 
with by an Orrdt or Sheikh from their Airr Ke Be or Be A Ah in the first instance. I f this is not 
possible, they will approach a Sheikh with whom they are familiar. There is a long established 
tradition among the Darfuri BeRa of having a Sheikh, or more frequendy, an Orrda from one's 
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Airr Ke Be or Be A Ah travel to ones area of residence to deal with communal problems. It 
would appear that even long term displacement has not stopped this tradition. 
In this way all refugees have a choice between the UNHCR/CARE established Sheikhs, 
whom they call Nasara Sheikhs or white people sheikhs and the Sheikhs from Darfur known as 
Old Sheikhs. Small domestic cases are handled by individual Sheikhs from either administrative 
system, most refugees however seem to have a preference for larger or more persistent problems 
to be dealt with by the Mahkanu. 
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2. Malrkama Case Studies 
In Mile camp there is a well-defined system of escalation and referrals when a case is 
dealt with by the Old Sheikhs. The Mahkamt, being the functioning embodiment of ciistomary 
law in the camp, deals with most disputes that require Islamic or customary BeRa legal input. 
The main cases brought to the Mahkanu include cases of: 
Divorces 
Adultery 
Fraud 
Hieft 
Homicide 
And a host of other minor offences 
As a rule of thumb, I have observed that cases are brought to the Mahkama only if there 
is a dispute as to who is in the r^ht, or if there is a need to setde the amount of Diya. Thus, if a 
thief was caught red-handed the case would not reach the Mahkarm. I f someone was accused of 
theft and swore on the Qur'an to the contrary, then the case would be taken to the Mahkanu. 
Most BeRa prefer to have their case dealt with in cvistomary Judiyya councils, since the 
fines are lower and the accused are generally better treated than in state prisons (interview with 
Onk's secretary Salih Muhammad Shumu of Adar close to Kepkabia: Mile, Tchad 07/02/2006). 
This, however, does not mean that the Judiyya council is a toothless legal system; high fines, 
chastisement and the possibility of reprimanded to police custody all await persons found to be 
in the wrong. 
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The ideal way a case would proceed in the Mahkamt is as follows. A dispute would be 
brought to the attention of one of the members of the Mahkamt by one of the parties. I f the 
case involved parties from different A irKeBeh or Be A Ah then the case could not be dealt with 
by a single Sheikh and thus brought to the Mahkana. When the proceedings begin the Sheikh or 
Chida rather than representing the people of his constituency in a biased fashion uses his moral 
authority get them to agree to the stipulations of the Mahkarm. When a suitable agreement 
caimot be reached in these cases, the accused maybe remanded to the Tchadien state authorities 
in Gureada or Biltine for trial, much as they would have been handed over to state authorities in 
Darfur. 
Thus, if no solution is found in Mile court, the case will be referred to Gureada. Cases 
can go back and forth like this for some time. Since it is the practice in Eastem Tchad and 
Darfur to release suspects to their local traditional court for a setdement. Thus, a suspect who 
has been arrested in Mile will be taken to Gureada or the Regional capital Biltine. However, if 
the wronged party agrees to mediation he will be released on his own recognizance. The 
Mahkarm in Mile will then try to come up with a setdement that is acceptable to both parties. In 
cases of abuse or divorce this usiuUy means the return of some part of the original bride wealth. 
In more serious cases of assault or murder this involves the payment of Diya. If an agreement is 
reached the suspect will be freed as soon as the Diya is paid. I f a setdement caimot be reached 
he will be returned to prison in Gureada to await a trail, which can take from three months to a 
few years. 
Additional delays may be caused since Omits and Sheikhs, resident in one camp, may be 
called upon by members his Be A Ah present in other camps or by members of the Mahkamt, 
to sit in council to solve a dispute. When this happens Ckrdas will request a pass from the NGO 
running the can^ and trek to the camp that has asked for his presence. There he will hold 
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meetings with members of his Be A Ah and in some cases may be invited to sit with the 
Mahkarm. These treks and meetings usually occur without the assistance, or indeed knowledge, 
of authorities in the camp. 
Refugees (including the old Sheikhs) see litde problem with the two systems of Sheikhs. 
Most view it in the same way they viewed the government administration and Natiie 
Adrmnstratkn in Darfur. What does concern the CM Shakh is their lack of inclusion in the 
running of the camps, for behind the scenes the Old Sheikhs still have a lot of influence and are 
well respected and sought after for advice. It seems however, that they have not been properly 
included in the official running of the camp. 
What follows are two fairly typical case studies of Judiyya proceedings at the Mile 
Mahkamx. Though the names of the parties have been altered to protect their identities, all else 
has been present as closely as possibly as it took place. The case studies not only show us 
Darfuri refugees in Tchad are practising Judiyya, but also how it has been altered by the 
challenges of exile. 
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Qzse Study 1: Badr 
Research notes 11-04-06 0930 
Badr is the rdadie (f ny interpr&er Salih and the nephewcf nty nei^bour Adam A stodzy man cf 
tmtyfi'W, Badr is dwiys am^i vith a gizzly looking krnfe, six or seven Hijay* eado mdo about six orseien 
Warqa and a pair (f sunshades. I had alwzys thoi^ that Badr look as tho^ he mxdd be rnore ccwfortable on 
the hatd^idd rather than -wmkring around ainiessly here in the carrp. As it turned out, vhen I did enquire 
about his badzgvund I Tios correcL Badr had been in the rdydlionjkm 2003 to about 2004. HehadoanEto 
Mile after the batde cf Gir^ra ishen the gjnemnent and Jargatieed had been driim out (f soudoem Dar Kobe 
(Darfur). During the fi^otir^havieiEr nTost (f the irhzbitar^ 
ended tp in r^ ^^ ga? carrps. Badr airfided in me that this he dedded not to return to the frart line since all 
thepecpkhehadbeenfi.^7tir^Jbrwerenowsc^inTdxui Naw he spends nrst cf his tirre in ny translator 
Salih's home(nhcsecousin is rmrriedtoAdarrj) orinny tent, just Icur^r^ 
Oierrvrrangone cf the rrvre prcmnent carrps members Shakh Narja Khalif cfKerer^ ozme to speak 
to Badr. The Sheikh ims awonpanied by his half brother Qmla Haroun Sulirmn cf Abu Gamra leho had 
arriiE in Mile from Konoun^ oznp to zisit his rdatiie a Jew days prior. I had interdemi the bnthers a Jew 
days agp and zrns interested to fird out vhat they vanted wth Badr. They irfonred me that they came to speak 
toBadrabouta wy seriate matter, but iwdd say no more. 
Interviewer what problem^ 
Narja Khali^ you know... he beat a woman. 
A Hijab is a rope or leather strap to which Warqa (leather pouches containing protective Qur'anic verses) can 
be attached. 
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Interviewer Why? (directed at Badr, who was stretched out on my floor looking 
nonchalant. 
Badn Tell him. (directed at Salih) 
Salih: She was the wife of his brother and was not pregnant for him (his brother). 
I ckdMrjot to press and imtead asked Badr if I could gDmdj thefoUauingdzy. He 
invrediatdya^miandaskedfhewJtddbeinthebook I zms witir^. Salih had explained rr^isork toBadrin 
a my that l^ him wth a distinct irrpression that 1 ims miting a book about the important pecple in Mile. 
Badrim thrilM that he mtsrvm one cf these inportant people. 
The Judiyya coundl at doe hcsre cf Sheikh Narja Khalf the (half bnxher cf Omda Harom, the 
headcfBadrandAiesha'sKimuBeA Ah. 
7 
ngk to hfb Orda Haram Sdimm, Shdkh Narja Khalf, Salih (hidden by a pillar) and two f Na^ja Khalfs sons 
discussing the case cf Badr in the hone cfNarja Khalif. 
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In these hwTiie swroundir^ cases rar^r^Jkmth^tommkr, and adultery to oarpensation for faulty 
gDods, iiere discussed Badr's case wis perhaps one (f the mare oonphc cases dealt idth by the Mahkamt. 
Badr's kvther^s Aiesha liwd in Mile vhile her hushznd works in Libya. In late 2004 she became 
pre^nt, thot^ her husband had not been to Mile for oier a ysar. Aiesha daimed that she wis raped by the 
Gur'ari^ iihile gzdxrir^ firewood, Badr houeier did rat bdieie her ard along vid} tw other urddent^ied 
indivduals attacked A iesha. Badr told me his vntentkn vas to force her to reieal the name cf her loier and 
partner. Indns regzrd Badr ard his oonpardons smmled in their task, dxy also suaseded inbeatir^Aiesha so 
badly that she lost her baby, ard had to be hospitalised 
Immediatdy after doe assadt Badr did the honauraHe thing and surrerdsred himdf to the carrp 
authorities "ishopronpdy took him to the Tdoadien state prison After twenty days in prison Badr 
mis released In fact Badr as a menher cf the Kurru Be A Ah nas released to his Omit, Haroun Sulimin 
Gard isho had trazdled from Konoun^ t^xn hearing that Badr mis imprisoned in Gureada. Omia Haroun 
ocrfided in me that at doe tine he hcped to haze bodo the case cf adultery ard doe assault dealt wth by himdf 
sinoe bodidxzictins ard the perpetrators Tiere firm dxIQmu Be A Ah. Houeier due to a host cf problem the 
court date mis ddayed 
First, they had to miit for Aiesha to reoauer vhido took some time. Next Badr vho had been sent to 
Kcnour^unalAiesha's rdadaes oooleddoum, zient toIridini otrrp to zisit relatizes and it took some time toga 
a mssage tohimaskir^ him to return for doe trial By doe time Badr returned Omda Haroun's traidpemit 
had expired and he had to mtit on the carrp staff in Kanoungi to put a anodoer request in to CNAR vhid) 
agiin took seme time. HouevsrvhenOrxkHarx^unmisreadytotrazdAiesha'srdati^ 
dedckdtohawtherrtttterbnx^ b^oredxMikMahkannheackdbyMandubMusa fibril instead 
For some unexplained reason the term Gur'an is numberless. It can be used for plural or singular, individuals or 
the entire tribe. In many ways the Gur'an are seen as an entity rather than a people in both Tchad and Darfur. 
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B^jre Mi^a ocM (kd wdo the rmtter tra^cfy str^ uthentmcfhis scwis viere killed vidm the space 
(fa Jewrrvndjs. The first died nhile fi^Tting agtinst JargavBed and gjiBmnsnt (f Sudan fim£s in Darfifr ishile 
the aher mts rmrdered urvkr sonvithat questionable dmtnstanoes in north Darfur. Musa nho had lost all (f 
brothers arid the TTujority (fhis saz to the oorfiia took tinv cfffiromhis duties to peifijrmthe requiredfiineral 
rituals. The, the case cfBadr and A iesha had to be postponed yet agtin When the di^t had setded mare than 
sezen moTths had passed sirKS the assault andthe day I arriued at the honE(fNarja Khalifto sitinmthe latest 
roimi (fpTxxsedin^. 
The actual proceeding for doe case had hem ongxng since Badr had been rdeasedfircmprisan, mdo 
Omda Haroun updating Mandub Musa Jihril about Bad/s location and Musa ke^nng Omda Hanxm up to 
date as to doe progress cf A iesha. Today, hoieeier would be the first tirre Badr had came face to face iiith 
A iesha's rdatiies since the assault The case had been bra^ badz to Mile sinoe the nujority (f people imolied 
liued in Mile, but also because A iesha's rdatiies fit that Orda Haroun ims not gwig the case doe attention it 
deserued 
When everyone inudied, and a healthy amount (f people not inuoked, had fimlly gtdxred at Sheikh 
Narja's ham the prooBedin^ begin Eieryone spoke in BeRa Ah ard the entire proceeding ms recorded and 
translatedformebySalih later in dxeieni)^. The Jtddzyyaaxtndl mis oonposedcfSheikh NarjaKhalif, Omda 
Haroun and Sheikh Hatha. The accusations put ftjrmrd by A iesha's rdatiies nhen the Judiyya isas oonzened 
isere actually far more darm^r^ than anyone had initially suspected A iesha's father ard male rdatiies davred 
that Onzk Harvm rather dxmtryi}^ to track cbmdxtw ether accused had been shdterir^ them in fQjnour^ 
They also claimed that the Orda, Badr and doe odoer accused had planned far Badr to take doe fall far doe 
assazdt sinoe the identities cf the odoer perpetrators mis yet unkrKJim. 
At this pant in time rrunycf the manbers (f the Judiyyn committee approadoed Badr ard asked hhnto 
g.T£ the odoer assailants, a request Badr r^ed This only sened in enragng the relatives cfAiesha, ishothen 
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twriBdmC>rikHcm)mardcuxi6edhm duties as an Oivda, sirxs it is his responsibility to 
brir^aUcftheperpOrators totheJudiy)a(xmm^ In his d^enoe (^nda Hdroim stated that only Bac^ 
the names (ftheothertmnenandas hehadr^edtogfiEthemup is there ims little he or anyone eise ozn da 
The two sides and the msdiator Omda Haroim reado a stakmtte. For the next three days I returned to the 
Mahkanu ady to the see the sarne saeres and ddxites play thenisdus oM Then, on the 17'' April 
2005 one last atterrpt mas made to soke doe matter udihout the interventim (f the head cf the Mahkamt Musa 
Jihril This attmptabo failed ard as a resuk it ms agmi that the rrutterwM haw 
Mahkarm isith Musa Jihril presiding over the matter. 
At doe Mahkarm the inherent Jlam <f a legd system based on respect for dx moral standing (f a few 
key iruRudmls vere cpddzly expaed After d)eproceedir^ descended into a shouti^^rratdobetuB^ 
A iesha and Omda Haroim, it leas decided doat Judiyya could not take place if bado parties mren't present 
C>nda Harotm mis adanunt doat bodo sides vbsre iruked preset doe defendant, andAiesha, 
the aca^er. The ei^ or so odoer Sheikhs and Omdas on doe Mahkarm all a^eed that doe A iesha's family rnts 
indeed correct doat doe Judiyya could not go formrd until doe odoer aojced men rrade themsdies knaim to doe 
court Badr zdoo had become nv)e and rrvre agitated as doe (MxiteragpiarTS^ 
Badr- is nonsense. / talked to my uncle Musa seven times, / ta/ked to t/?e 
Aies^a's ^tAer t^/ee times, / ta/ked to t^e Omdas assistant Adam two times, 
and t^ey a// said l>eat ^ er. Ner/at/:>er... / spoke to /?im t/?7ee times and every 
time /?e said heather. Nowie is saying somet/:)ing di^erent 
At this paM in time the male rdatiues cfAiesha stood and d^endedher and thdrfarraly's hcavourfrom 
Badr's-vedxd onslai^oL Badr risir^to his feet continued to rrtJze^vurdbr&dzir^rei^^ 
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Badr- W^erie is /?e<' M;eT^ is t^e/at/;ero/t^e c^i/df' Vou{'Aies^a's ma/e ne/ativesj 
am a//^i^^ing ^im and/am /;ere at t/;e court... /don't care i/you wi//not 
hring Aim Acre, / wi//not name ot/>ery-
Aiesha's father (rather less agitated and upset than before Badr made his revelations)- //t/)at is 
t/?e case my/riend t/re matter cannot l^e so/ved /;ere zev must take it to t/fe 
po/ice. 
At the rnmtim(f the pdicE th irniilxn (f the Mcdjkar^ Jibd tried one last tine to brir^ 
the parties to an affv^raiL Theycurnst^wthlhesdtdmvhichl thoi^ms likdytom})ii. Badr nould tell 
Musa the mnes cf the others inwlwd in the beatir^ andAiesha's fawily would nans the fadxr cf the djild 
Body parties houeier r^ed this deal, ead) mntir^ some kirdcfgrantee that the odxrwMldnarre die person 
doey Here hidir^ first As a restdt (f dm irrpasse Badr mas taken to dx carrp security post and from there to 
Gttreada prison to aimit trial by doe Tdxidien state authorities. 
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Case Study 2: The run A imy Bride 
Research notes 12-04-06 07:30 
This case rewked around the mtrria^ cf a your^ rmn from the Bu/eyara and a norran cf the Dawa 
Be A Ah or sections cfthe Tuer cfDar Galla. The bride ms in fcut kidnapped ardfonjed irito rmrria^ as a 
resdtcfah^runrdr^feidbetviBenthetw)farr£ies(bM Ah) nho still reside in Dar 
Galla. In order to escape this rrarria^ the bride fled to Mile; to seek r^i4^w^ 
thecarrp. SirsEtheoMpkiJiErerrarriedbyldrissRahrntnHarba, inDarfwr, he acted as a r^rresentadie cf the 
fanHy (fthegvom, vho wre present at these pnxeedir^. 
The fadxr cf the ^ ocm wtnted the rmrria^ to me honoured ard far the partners to rentdn to^dxr. 
The father (f the brick homwr mints a diwnefor his dzt^jter, vhomhe clain^ is threaterdngto (ximru siddde f 
forced to return to her husband Sheikh Idriss RahnnnHarba wzs asked to brir^ a r^rresentatiie cf the ^vm, 
but none turned since the roads from their ulL^ in Dar GalU 
The Shdkh also cUinnl that the pnjblenj had arisen ordybeoiii^e the fath^ 
disliked the grxm Thefathercf the gnxmhom£r had sert a rrsssa^wth his sister's sen to the Mahka -
Ft^ert^ey so/ze t/;e matter or marriages between tAe Bideyara and Dawa s^ou/d cease. 
The nvnijers (f doe Judzyy^ coundl doen called far a recess vhik th^ Afierafaw 
minutes they dedckd dxtt they could not continue until the bride arxl gnxmieere present to address the numerous 
allegttions. Thus, dxpnxEedir^mjuM be susperuM until the bride ard gmom could a^ 
fkm-uhidj there wuld be two alterrizti'ies: 
1. the rmrria^ is salza^ 
2. there is a rieedfor a dizcnve ard the bride walth is returned to gmcm's f^ 
Urfortunatdy, the security situation alor^ the border neier inprowd and the case wts in limbo up to die time I 
l^theregan 
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The above cases each demonstrate the strength and weaknesses of the Mahkarm. Both 
cases were still unresolved by the time the research was completed and the Badr's court case had 
been ongoing for months. However as stated before the role of the Ajawd'is not to hand down 
harsh punishments or dispense rough justice but rather to restore social harmony. In both cases 
to the Ajawid failed to achieve this due to the constraints placed on them due to camp life. 
These constraints ranged from logistical problems of getting defendants to attend cases; to a lack 
of support from the UNHCR and camp authorities. An interesting fact is that in spite of these 
problems individuals still prefer to have the cases heard by the Mahkama and are willing to wait 
several months to have a hearing. This may be due in part to the fact that local Tchadien courts, 
like their Sudanese counterparts in Darfur, create more social cleavages than they heal. In his 
work on mediation within a Punjabi village Steve Lyon highlights a similar trend. He writes: 
Pakistani courts, at present, do not serve dx rde (f rndrtairmrg comnwity harmony 
Shari'at, -uhich gpiems farrsly laisi ard the crirrinal dvl code <f Pakistan inhid) ^vw out cf 
British tradition, ideally, operate on a leryd^hentprensse (Lyon 2002: 69). 
When viewed in this light the above case studies are interesting for a number of reasons. 
Even though the Judiyya proceedings were unable to bring about a successful setdement, the 
cases highlights not only the role played by Ajxeadi, but it also illustrates the impact of 
displacement on traditional mediation. The failure to successfviUy end conflicts or to get Ajawid 
to act in a manner that is deemed proper is an increasing problem in the camps. It seems that 
with no higher traditional authority many sheikhs have become forces in their own right. 
Thus, as with traditional mediation in Darfur, reconciliation was characterised by the 
implicit involvement of the whole society. The peace message would then be conveyed and 
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become incorporated in the people's oral tradition. The community therefore serves as the 
repository within which conflict resolution was performed. Noleen Turner argues that in Africa: 
A n indkidual is perodwdprirmrily as an extension or represerOation cf doe gfxoup to -vJoido he 
or she bdcn§, other as a menixr cf a farrihy, dan, lirea^ vlla^ or other grouping The Ooddental 
idea cf doe autorxumous person, endowd mth indivdual ri§7ts and respcnsdydities is a lery different 
conception from that cf doe 'communal' African person. This doen eKplains doe c^mndie African 
approach to oarfiict as a sodally andpsyddadly ixtal function. There is a shared perceptim cf carflict as 
a structuring or omstitutixe force in oommurml chairs, inhere wdl-regdated adiersarial ocrfrontations 
prcnide fitdr^ drcumstanoes for the bhtntir^ cf sodally thrmtening tensions. In dew cf the fraglity cf 
sodal ties betmen rrenixrs cf an African community, actual or potential oarflict situations haw 
oonsistendy dxdlen^ the traditicpial ^rnus for rraintainir^ the dosdykrut oomnmdty Ife. Eado 
Afiiam speed) cammuraty has its own code cf custcsrs for ahadr^ arrtagjmrrs, condliadr^ disputants 
and ultintitdyre-estaHishir^amvrnmd accord (TvLmer 2005: 126). 
This holds true for Darfur and also among Darfuri refugees in Tchad. One of the main 
functions of IdaraAhalia in Darfvu- and NdhimAl-Hilla in Ouaddai was to act as a judicial system, 
and in this role Judiyyt was paramount. In the past the Old Sheikhs in Darfur had three ways of 
exercising power 
• the allocation of land 
• the collection of taxes 
• the ability to setde conflicts and act as mediators 
Their lives in the camp today have deprived them of all but one of these functions, thus 
they take their role as mediators very seriously. In a situation that has come to characterize 
NGO and UNHCR interaction with the refugees the traditional roles and responsibilities of the 
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various refugee stake holders were ignored. The wealth of experience in matters relating to 
customary law possessed by the old Sheikhs was ignored even when the ccmrmee des sa^ or Majlis 
al- Ugzla'a' council of sages was created. The Ugda'a, which was supposed to be composed of 
three men from each zone who were kno-wdedgeable in traditional matters seemed like a perfect 
opportunity for traditional Sheikhs to be included in the camp's administration. 
However like so many other programs implemented by the UNHCR and its partners, 
there was litde follow through. Educated Tchadien local staff cared litde if Sheikhs had a role in 
the camp and offered the program litde time or input. As a result, most Sheikh al-Zonat 
interpreted the mandate to form a committee of wise men, as a chance to place two close allies in 
two of the slots and invariably reserving the final place for themselves. Needless to say in my 
time in the camp the committee was never convened, in full or in part, and few refugees knew of 
the committee or its function. 
"When it became clear that most of the members of the Ugda'a' had only a rudimentary 
knowledge of traditional customs and customary law, the Mahkarm took shape as a separate 
entity from the Ugda'a'. Many refi^ees confessed they chose to bring their matters to this court 
to be heard instead of the defunct Ugda'a'. What is irrportant to note is that the Mahkarm in Mile is 
seenas afidlyfled^fiavtixjrdnglegdinstitiaimfordxcar^ It is afurxtionir^court 
capable cf nuUtfyir^ mtnia^, settingfines ard r^errir^ cases to the court in Gureada ard Bikine. However, 
it is a court without a budget. The cost of books, pens and other stationary items needed to 
record rulings, fines and correspondences from Gureada or Biltine must be bome by the head of 
the court. 
In spite of their short comings traditional courts have a major advantage in comparison 
to state courts since their processes are substantially informal and less intimidating, with the 
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people who utilise these courts being more at ease in an environment that is not foreboding. 
Keesing describes the process of settling cases out of court as 'informal litigation' which 
underlines the need to look for more subde and undramatic legal processes side by side with 
more formal legal systems (Kees'mg 1981:322). This is true of the Mahkana where the Ajawid, 
who preside over traditional courts are generally charismatic and familiar with the people that use 
the courts, are revered to an extent that judges are not. 
The role of the members of the Mahkana is not to hand out harsh punishments that 
deter Mile's residents from transgressing the law, as would be the case in a Westem court. 
Rather, it is the role of the court members to act as representatives, facilitators, mediators and 
arbitrators where necessary. In the case of the Mahkarm it seems as though this role is impeded, 
rather than facilitated, by the moving of proceeding back and forth been the carr^ court and the 
Tchadien state courts. Bennett, writing on similar practices elsewhere in Africa, highlights the 
undesirability of this overlap in jurisdiction which could lead to fcmmshcpping and actions being 
removed from a wrong court to the correct forum, with consequent loss of time and money 
(Bennett 1991b:69-70). 
In fact it appears that in Tchad at least, this fyrum shcppir^ leads to a decline in the 
importance of traditional courts. This decline is not just limited to the camps, but affects the 
host populations as well. As new facets of economic life, and interactions with larger 
(sometimes state) entities and institutions, become more complex, there is pressure on traditional 
mediation and courts to modernise and change practices. In many instances even these 
adjustments will not deter individuals from shuffling between traditional and state courts as they 
seek to maximise the perceived benefit of each. 
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Mohamed and El-Amin (Mohamed and El-Amin 2001) found that for the most part 
cxistomary mediation still functions effectively in tradition-bound communities. Their work 
highlights the fact that even when rural communities move to urban settings en mass, such as 
those who moved to Khartoum's IDP camps and squatter setdements, they continue to resolve 
their conflicts through customary mediation. In fact they rarely resorted to, often nearby, 
modem state law courts. However the general trend is one of uncertainty for the future of 
Judiyya and other forms of traditional or customary mediation in Dar Galla. As a result the post-
independence years have been characterized by a steady escalation of violent conflicts. Even the 
increased frequency of failed government-sponsored Judiyya, conferences has worked to increase 
the perception'of a system in crisis. Nothing has done more to threaten Judiyya and Idara Ahalia 
as a whole in Dar Galla than the current ShartaHs close association with Omar Bashir, his abuse 
of his position and the persistent allegation that he has endangered the lives of prominent anti-
government BeRa. Many refugees and f^;ures in Idara A halia readily admit that they no lor^er 
consider him their Shartai and -w^en they return to Darfur they will set up a Presidervy that rotates 
among the various Be A Ah m Dar Galla every four or five years. 
E .A. Mukhtar reported that in a forty-year period(1957-1997) 29 government-sponsored 
conferences were held to resolve inter^roup conflicts in Darfur. By contrast, only one 
conference was held during the colonial era in Darfur (1916-1956) (Mukhtar 1998). The colonial 
authority appears to have held only one major conference to settle disputes among camel 
nomads of northem Darfur (Midob, Zeyadiya and Berti) and their counterparts in northern 
Kordofan (Kababish and Kahwala). Astonishingly, five conferences were repeated for the same 
camel nomads in the first forty years of independence (1957-1997) (Mukhtar 1998). This pattern 
of repeated conferences for the same conflict has actually become the norm in Darfur (and the 
rest of the Sudan in fact), as the following Judiyya table illustrates: 
245 
Tah/e 12:/udiyya Meetings in Dajfur 
Place: Northern. Darfur 
Parries: Midob; Kababish 
Date: 1957 
Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS; 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: Soudiem Daifur 
Parties: Rizeigat; Ma'ali 
Date: 1968 
jConyenor^/Mippoit^^ 
PqHticd jiirisdictiqn: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: Northern Daifur 
Parties: BeRa; T^ititwrn Rizeigat 
Date: 1969 
'Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS; 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
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Place: Southern Daifur 
Parties: BeRa; Biigid| 
Date: 1974 
iConvenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
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Place: Babanusa 
Parties: DmlKi; Rtteigat 
Datell976 
,Gonvenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS; 
Outcomes: 
DoGumient references: 
Place: WdelJFursaiii Sou 
Parties: Beni Halba; Nor&em Rizeigat 
Date: 1976 
.Convenors/supporters:. Traditional nilerj 
Pol^caJ jurisdiction 
Dutcomes: A conference oi^anized by traditional rulers was able to brmg an ei^^ 
violence; 
Document references: Harir 1994 
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Place: Rahad el Berdi, Southern Darfur 
Parties: Ta'aisha; Salamat 
Date: 1980 
^Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
^Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: Southern Darfur 
Parties: Northern Rizeigat; Beni Halba, Bitgid, Daju and Fur 
Date: 1980 
Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS; 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: Northern Darfur 
Parties: Kababish and Kahwala; Midob, Berri and Zeyadiya 
Date: 1982 
Convenors/supporters: GoS; 
Political jurisdiction: GoS; 
.Outcomes: This conference was one of many - organized both by the Government and 
locdjbadejs - t ha t j ^^^ to bring an eiid to cogflict over resources amqiig the^ 
groups. The conflict abated when extreme drought conditions forced many to leave the 
region and as a result lessened pressure on resources that remained^ 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
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jPlace: Dar Rizeigat, Squtfaem Darftir 
Parties: Misseriya; Rizeigat 
Date: 1984 
iConvenors/supporters: GoS 
jPolitical jurisdiction: GoS 
.Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: Dttr Wzeigat, Soudiem^I^ 
PargesTRizeiga^^BeRii 
Date: 1986 
Convenors/supporters: Tradirional rulers^  
1^3|itical juredi 
Outcomes: Cessation of violence 
Dociunent references: Mohamed aiid Badri 2005 
Place: Katalia, Southern Datfur 
Parries: Gimr and Mararit; Fallata! 
pate^WA^ 
Convenors/supporters: Traitiqnal ruleis 
Political jurisdiction: GoS; 
.Outcomes: Cessation of violence 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: Um Lebesa, Southern Darfur 
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Parties: Beni Halba; Northern Rizeigat 
Date: 1987 
Convenors/supporters: Traditional rulers 
Political jurisdiction: GOS 
Outcomes: Cessation of violence 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Northern Darfiir 
Parties: Fur; BeRi 
Date: 1989 
Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jiuisdiction: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: E l Fashir 
Parties: Fui; Arab tribes 
Date: 1989 May 29 
Convenors/supporters: Governor of Darfur, Masaalit Sultan 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hariri 1994 
Place: Jebel Marra 
Parties: Fur; Arab tribes 
Date: 1989 May 29-July 7 
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Convenors/supporters: Sultan of Masaalit 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Gore 2002 
IntemarionalCnsis Group2004 
Place: Abu Karinka, Soufliem IDatfur 
Parties: Ma^lijl^eRa 
Date: 1990 
Convenors/supporters: 
Political jurisdictionKjOS 
Outcome: A conference ^^ ^^ ^ w^^A^^kjo bring an end to 
violence] 
Document references: Gore 2002 
jWacej^  Amtejb^ ^ J^i^r 
Parries: Ta^haTSalamS 
Date: 1990 
Convenors/supporters: Traditional rulers' 
Political jurisdiction: GOS 
Outcomes: Cessation of violence 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Buiam, Southem Daifur 
Parties:^Habba ^ u Daiag 
Date: 1990 
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Convenors/supporters: Traditional rulers 
Political jurisdiction: GOS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Buiam, Southern Darfur 
Parties: Habbaniya; Northern Rizeigat 
Date: 1990 
Convenors/supporters: Traditional rulers 
Political jurisdiction: GOS 
Outcomes: A conference organized by traditional rulers banned the Northern Rizeigat 
from entering Habbaniya lands and thus ended the conflict. 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Katalia, Southern Darfur 
Parties: Gimi; Fellata 
Date: 1990 
Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Hbriri (1994) 
Gore 2002 
Place: Eubum, Southern Darfur 
Parties: Gimi; Ta'aisha 
Date: 1990 
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!Convenors/supporters: Traditional rulers 
PoUticd Jurisclictiori: 
Outcomes: A conference organized by^  trainorial j rdei^^"^^ ?!'|£_|o„^J[i5g_B?L^i]id^J9 
violence; 
Document references: Gone 2002 
[Place: Zalii^ei 
Parties: Fur: Arab tribes 
Date: 1990 
(jorivehors/supporters: GoS; 
Polmcd jurisd^^ 
Outcomes: 
Document referencies: Gore 2002 
Place: ETFasheir 
Partiesj^  Maiari^^ Beni JHDus sein; BeBi 
Date: 1991 
jConvenprs/supporters: GOS: 
PoUticdJunsdi^ 
Outcomes: A recoiiciliation coiifererice was organized, blood xnoneY was^paid, andjiiost 
of the recoiiiineridations were implemented. As ajesult the confHct hasjnot 
Docioment references: Gore 2002 
Place: Kas, Soutfaem Darfur 
Pardes:^ur; Beni Hajba 
D ^ T i 9 9 i 
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Convenors/supporters: Traditional ruler^ 
jPolirical jxirisdiction: GOS; 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Shea'iia, Soutfaem Daifur 
Parties: Bitgid; BcRS 
Date: 1991 
jGjnvenors/supporters: 
PoliricdjujisdQction^C^^ 
(>xttornes: 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: DarMassalit, I^iftir 
Parties: Massalit; Arab Groups 
Date: 1996 
Convenors/supporters: GOS 
Political jurisdiction: GOS 
Outcomes-
Document references: Gore 2002 
jPlace: Par Rizeigat, Soutfaem Daifur 
Parties: BePLk; Rizeigat 
Dat^ri996 
ponvenors/supporters: GOS 
0 
Political jurisdiction: GC^ 
254 
Dutcomes: This and many subsequent conferences (notably also in 2000), hayg jmde 
similar recommendations that have never been fuUy implemented. The conflict eventually 
'merged with the wider war in Darfurj 
Document references: Mohamed and Badri 2005 
Place: E l l V e i n 
Parties: Rizeigat; BeRA 
Date: 1997 
^Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Nyala 
Parties: All Darfur tribes' 
Date: 1997 
Convenors/supporters: GoS, 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
.Outcomes: 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Geneina 
Parties: Massalit; Rizeigat; otibeis; 
Date: 1998 
Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS; 
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Outcomes: 
Document references: Gore 2002 
Place: Kepkabia 
Parties: BeRl Beni Hussein 
Date: 1998 
Convenors/supporters: Traditional Leaders 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: Interview with Mandub Musa Jibril 
Place: Dar Rizeigat, Southern Datfur 
Parries: BeRk; Rizeigat 
Date: 2000 
Convenors/supporters: 
Polirical jurisdiction: GOS 
Outcomes: The conference made recommendations that were not fully implemented. 
Document references: 
Place: Kulbus 
Parries: BeR^; Gimr 
Date: 2000 
Convenors/supporters: GoS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
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Outcomes: This government-sponsored conference in 2000 was able to put an end td 
violence and collect blood money. Pfcwever, conflict flared up again in 2001 andJias 
jmei^ed with the current civil warj 
Docimient references: Gore 2002 
Place: Tine, North Darfur 
jParries: BeRi; Awlad Zeyd 
Date: 2001 
iConvenois?supporters: GOS 
Polirical jiuisdicrion: GOS; 
putcomes:"This conference, convened by GoS to ^resolve conflict over wells and 
pastures, was perceived by the Zaghawa as biased. It was followed by Zaghawa attacks 
r»n g r t y p j T i m p t T t in^ a^ ^^ ^ the formarion of the SLA 
Document references: 
l^ace: Adar, Nqrt^ ^ 
Parries: BeRk; Beni Hussein 
Date: 2002 
Convenors/supporters: Traditional Rulers 
Political jurisdiction: 
^Outcomes: the Nazir of die Beni Hussien and the On:da of the BeRa of Adar called the 
Imeeting after a series of escalatory attacks and kidnappings following the robbery of a 
group of Beni Hussein trader by BeRa youths. Meetings were held both in Adar and in 
Kepkabia. An agreement was reached in which diya from the BeRa to the^emHussein 
would ensiire the rekase of seve^ ^^  the pareiits of the 
alleged robWrs^. Hqweve^ could take^place a jpiing^eRa heixler was EMed 
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a group of Beni Hussein. The BeRa tried to link this issue to the wider setdement and 
elders from both communities agreed that once the BeRa had paid the diya/ransom they 
would settle the matter of the murdered herder. However before they covild do this the 
current conflict empted. 
Document references: Interview with Salih Muhammad Shumu 
Place: Switzerland 
Parties: GOS; SPLM/A 
t>ate: 2002 January 
Convenors/supporters: Goverrunents of US, UK, Norway, Switzerland 
Political jurisdiction: Switzerland 
Outcomes: This meeting brokered a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains, which led to a 
reduction in violence, reactivation of trade', return of some displaced people, and 
increased involvement of aid agencies. An unarmed international force, the Joint IvfGlitary 
Commission QMQ was established to monitor the ceasefire. The ceasefire held up to the 
signing of the CPA, though many issues remained about use of land and natural 
resources. 
Document references: Jenatsch 2003 
Place: E l Fashir 
Parties: Fur, BeR^ (SLA): GoS 
Date: 2003 February 24-25 
Convenors/supporters: GOS 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
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.Outcomes: This "consultative forum on security in Darfur", convened with traditional 
leaders by GOS, produced a consensus that the government should open a dialogue with 
the rebels. However, the envisaged process was not carried through] 
Document references: International Crisis Group 2004 
Place: Abeche 
Parties: GOS; SLA 
Date: 2003 August-September 
iConvenoi^/supporters: Chad 
Political jurisdicrion: GoS 
Outcomes: 
Document references: International Crisis Group 2003 
Place: Garselba 
Parties: Darfuris includii^ diaspora^ 
Date: 2003 September 14 
Convenors/supporters: SLAi 
Politicd jurK<£ 
.Outcomes: 
Document references: International Crisis Group 2004 
Place: Abeche' 
Parties: GOS; SLA 
Date: 2003 October 26-Nov 4 
.Convenors/supporters: Qiad 
Political jurisdiction: GoS 
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Outcomes: 
Document references: International Crisis Group 2003 
Place: N'djamena 
Parties: GOS; SLA 
Date: 2003 December 15-16 
Convenors/supporters: Qiad 
Political jurisdic^^ 
Outcomes: 
Document references: International Crisis Group 2003 
Place: E l Da'eiri 
Parties: Rizeigat, Berti, Birgid, Ma'ali, Begio, Daju 
Date: 2004 
CbnverioR/supporters Rizeigat 
Political jurisdiction: GOS 
Outcomes: The Nazir of the Rizeigat mobilized other traditional leaders to try to sue for 
peace. The result was an agreement with the Birgid to the north-west, and rion aggression 
pacts with the Berti, Daju and Begio. Tliere has everi^  beenj. rapprocheriKrit 
Ma'ali to the north 
Document references: Flint and De Waal 2005 
Place: Geneina 
jParties: Masaalit; Arab Groups 
Date: 2004 
Convenors/supporteri: 
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PoHticd jumdicrio 
!Outcomes: In Dar Masaalit an agreement was reached between the Sultan of the Masaalit 
and the recently appointed Emirs of the Arab tribes. The agreement called for the .Arabs 
to^keep their Emirs who would nominally be under the elected Sultan, thus ensuring that 
the numerically superior Masaalit would always elect one of thjsir own as Sultan] 
Document references: Flint and De Waal 2005; 
(The above is an updated table compiled by the author in 2004 for the Localp&tcEprocesses in Sudan a hasdine 
sttufy Bradbury, Mark, John Ryle, Michael Medley & Kwesi Sansculone-Greenidge. Local peace processes in Sudan a 
baseline study (Rift Valley Institute, April 2006) hnp://www.riftvalley.net/inside/pdf/SLP_Final_Report_2Q05.pdf). 
Key to the understanding of customary mediation and conflict resolution is the concept 
of conflict as a communal concem or issue. As a result, the society as a whole was seen as 
having ownership of both the conflict and its resolution. Thus, with conflicts seen in this light 
local level mediation increasingly becomes the focus for successful conflict resolution. In built in 
this 'peace biddir^fromhdcfwapproado' is the understanding that traditional approaches of conflict 
resolution are an important component of many African societies. Among people from Darfur 
and Tchad a dispute between individuals involved their entire segmentary lineage. Similar to 
John Davis work for Libya it was the sheikhs of these lineages who were responsible for making 
peace. He writes, " bta the peace had to Ix acoEpted hy aU ??rniKrs cf the tribe, least some odoer person not in 
thepeace-mdziiigmjddrestmeatheqmrr^, (Davis 1987: 101). 
An often touted cause of conflict in Darfur and Sudan in general is competition between 
herders and farmers. According to Hom of Africa expert John Markalds, ethnicity is to some 
extent a factor in conflicts in the region. This is in part due to the struggle between groups for 
access and control over ever dwindling resources. Thus, herders not only clash with 
agriculturalists but also with other herders with whom they are in competition. On many 
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occasions such clashes escalate into serious violence (Markakis 1993. Fukui, K. & Markakis, J 
(eds) 1994). According to Fukui and Turton, there are certain elements of social organizarion 
that serve the "midwifery" role to he^hten or lessen the intensity and in some cases the durarion 
of conflicts (Fukui & Tuiton 1979). 
In many societies traditional codes of conduct ensured that common rules of engagement 
were observed. Generally, during a lull in conflict or hostiliries, the parries to the conflict will try 
to setde the dispute. Among the Txirkana for instance, when there was any serious conflict, the 
elders would call a traditional peace conference. Such meetings would be open-ended so that all 
the participants had time and opportunity to air their grievances and views. Then a bull would 
be slaughtered and its blood collected and sprinkled into the air as a way of binding the 
community to the peace covenant. As a gesture of reconciliarion the whole group would eat the 
meat together. Thereafter, feasting, singing, dancing and celebrarion would continue for several 
days. The whole society would thus be part of the agreement and anybody who violated it could 
suffer some calamity (Augsburger 1992). 
Augsburger provides us with another example of traditional mediation at work among 
the Luo and the Maasai of Kenya. Here negotiation and reconciliation would be arranged by the 
elders. The elders and the community at large would assemble at one point along their common 
border. Then: 
place their spears aier it A <kg iwuld ihen be slain and cut in half and its Hood sprinkled along the 
border. Then, mothers tsadd exdmi^ babies uith dx "eneny" gmp and suckle them The marriors 
mxddalso exdoan^ spears. Prayers zeculd then be cffered by the elders andapnfcund aerse pronounced 
on any coTe nho attenpted to cross the border ard create havx to other side. After stddo an agreement it 
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mxdd be cdmost inpossihle for the tuo sides to fi^ agzin (paraphrased from Augsburger 1992: 
276). 
Traditional mediation in Darfur is also characterised by the implicit involvement of the 
whole society in reconciliation. Therefore the wider community itself becomes the repository^ 
within -wdiich conflict resolution was performed and knowledge of practices stored; with 
mediators (elders) representing the norms and values of the society, especially on moral issues. 
AU Mazrui argues that the involvement of respected elders in conflict resolution is the defining 
feature of mediation on the African continent (1994: 41-42). Such elders are expected to 
advocate a setdement that would accord with commonly accepted principles of justice in terms 
of custom, virtue, and fairness, and reflect community judgement about appropriate behaviour. 
Thus, to break or renege on a setdement was to defy the moral order of the society, not just the 
mediators. 
Thus, as Jannie Malan points out: 
A typkal imrEdiate gcal is to muh anagmrert ishido indudes wore than merdysdzi}^ the problem or 
TBcdfyaTg the ir^ustioe. What is spedfimUy airred at in the seard) fir duroHe peaae, is ^rtuire 
reooraliationand, nhere necessary, r€stitiaimardTdoaMitatian(^A2i\aii 1997:24). 
This search for a durable peace means that the key focus of traditional, mediation was the 
reconciling of protagonists with each other, rather than on establishing right and wrong. Thus 
punishment was not aimed at retaliation, but rather at restoring equHibrium, usually through the 
mechanisms of restitution, apology and reconciliation. There was emphasis on justice and 
fairness, rather than crime and punishment. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCL.USION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Reoccurring Patterns Recur... Again 
... And Again 
Since the very beginning of the discipline, anthropologists have been interested in how 
social systems are altered by conflict and migration (Colson 1973, Oliver-Smith 1977). 
Anthropologists have shown subtle changes in some of the adaptive coping strategies utilized by 
populations in the developing world in response to uncertainty, caused by drought, conflict, and 
forced migration (Turton 1977). In some areas of the world, people have long had to deal with 
major social dismption. In areas such as the Sahel, drought, famine, and political insecurity have 
led to the development of a number of complex coping strategies, including, wide trade links, 
exchange, raiding and migration. 
The starting point of this research was that conflict and violence can be seen as a foci for 
irmovation and social change. Oliver-Smith notes, hazards and disasters challenge the structure 
and organization of society (1992, 1994, 1996, 1999). Forced migration is no exception. 
Numerous studies of migration have shown that displacement can stimulate a range of social 
responses. This particular work was concerned with the effect of displacement and conflict on 
leadership and conflict resolution. The case of the BeRa refugees now resident in Eastern Tchad 
is no exception. However, the challenges thrown up by displacement have led to varied 
responses. These responses have largely been determined by the camp organization. Thus, the 
responses of refugees in one camp to a specific problem are rarely replicated in other camps. 
Since the structure of the camp and more in^ortandy the conflict resolution options available to 
refugees will also vary. 
264 
Suggestions For further Study: 
The thesis has looked at the resilience and change in traditional systems of authority, 
with a specific focus on traditional systems of administration and conflict resolution. In doing so 
it has examined social change and social continuity among the BeRa refugees in Tchad by 
looking at the effects of conflict and conflict induced miration on their traditional forms of 
leadership. More specifically, leadership expressed through the ability of elders to be /l;^izea/and 
thus to achieve Judzyya. Key findir^s, though numerous, have included the fact that Judiyya has 
continued in spite of four years in the refugee camps. Figures in Idara Ahdia from Darfur, 
though unable to form reliable links with counterparts in Ndhim al-HiUa in Tchad due to ethnic 
rivalries and tensions, have been able to establish working links with Tchadien civil authorities, 
much as existed in Darfur prior to the war. However, as with any topic of this level of 
complexity and intricacy there are aspects which could not be dealt with in this study. Further 
research is still need in the region. Detailed studies are required on: 
• The pre-colonial and current relationship between the various traditional 
rulers in the region, namely the Sultan of Dar Sila, the Sultan of Ouaddai, the Sultan of 
Dar Masaalit, the Sultan of Dar Gimr, the various BeRa rulers, the historical Sultan of 
Darfur. 
• Linguistic studies are needed to determine the genetic distance between 
Tama, Daju and BeRa Ah languages, to see if there is indeed any scientific validly to the 
oral histories of a common origin for these ethnic groups. 
• A major shortcoming of this work lies in the fact that both Am Nabak 
and Mile are predomirutely BeRa camps. As a result this study is clearly focused on 
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social change among the BeRa. Further study will be needed to see if the same processes 
are taking place in camps inhabited by other ethnic groups. 
• Another shortcoming of the work is the fact that it is very much a male 
dominated study. The fact that Idara Ahalia and Judiyya are male domains meant that a 
study of these systems is a study that will inevitably underestimate the role of women in 
BeRa society. 
• Further study is need to examine customary mediation in Ouaddai in 
more detail. 
/udiyya andA/awu^ 
Recentiy, conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR) have become global 
concerns. A host of organizations, individuals and institutions have taken up reporting and 
writing on conflict and conflict and conflict resolurion. Though there is a growing body of 
literature on techniques of conflict prevenrion, management and resolurion in the Westem 
world. However, in the developing countries detailed studies have been somewhat lacking and 
even worse there is a general presumprion that what applies in the Westem world will also apply 
in developing countries. Thus, there is a growing need for case specific examinations of conflict 
in the developing world. 
In the Greater Ouaddai-Darfur Region few comparisons can be made with the Westem 
world. Ouaddai and Darfur, influenced by both African and Middle Eastem cultures, and 
colonized by the Ottoman Empire, French and British may present useful experiences that 
deserve being looked into by scholars in Africa, the Middle East and the Westem hemisphere. 
However the key difference between conflict resolurion in the westem world and Africa Ues in 
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the fact that conflicts erupt among identity groups rather than among individuals, as is common 
in the West. 
What exists in rural Darfur and Tchad is a compensation systenL To the region's 
inhabitants ^oarpersatim is justioe. That is, if the Diya is paid or if the camels that were taken are 
returned the guilty party is no longer guilty. A murderer who has paid Diya is theoretically free 
to walk the streets. He has paid for his crime-literally. This may be a litde different to Western 
justice system with its emphasis on individual sanctions. However, the fact that all individuals 
have the right to choose between the traditional court in Mile and the civil court in Gureada, or 
Am Nabak and Iriba, means that an individual chooses the court they think most capable of 
dispensing justice. In the same way they could choose between the village courts and civil 
government courts in Darfur, prior to the current conflict-
Communally sponsored customary mediation needs to be acknowledged and 
strengthened, as they are now the only mechanism for resolving conflicts in areas where state 
institutions are non-existent or ineffective. Instead central government policy in the region is 
often antagonistic towards traditional leaders and have gready impaired the effectiveness of 
customary mediation. To redress this several steps need to be taken: 
• Firstiy, the Ajawd must be allowed to propose setdements that solve 
conflicts by addressing the root causes of violence rather than suggesting government-
desired solutions. 
• Secondly, the government must become a facilitator of peace by being 
unbiased. Facilitation of peace means effective government support of A jawd decisions 
and an effective role in implementing them. 
• Finally, a new more consistent policy must be formulated in regards to 
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the various Dars. This wiU have to be accomplished through extensive consultations with 
national, regional and local stakeholder and can only be achieve through universal 
'African St)4e consensus'. 
If implemented these steps could halt the recent decline is success of Judiyya 
conferences. Most Judiyya conferences, and government sponsored conferences in particular, 
fail because they don't address the root causes of conflicts. Other reasons for this failure lies in 
the changing nature of Darfuri society. One should not be surprised that after hundreds of 
ysars, traditional forms of social sanction have become less effective in controlling individual 
attitudes and behaviour. Higher levels of education and urbanization, have all led to a more 
circumscribed role for traditional mediation. Although rural communities in both Darfur and 
Ouaddai, seem by and lai^e to have held this change at bay, recent conflicts have played a large 
part in loosening individual ties to systems which they see as reactionary or tainted due to their 
links with the state. 
Also, for the last thirty years, small arms have found their way into the hands of ordinary 
tribesmen. As highlighted in previous chapters conflicts in the region have had a profound 
impact on Darfur. In many instances retreating Tchadien troops, seeking safe haven in Darfur, 
brought with them their weapons and offered them for sale at affordable prices (Mukhtar 1998). 
Government sponsored Judiyya often fails because post-independence central governments have 
been consciously undermining it in an effort to weaken Idara Ahalia, Successive regimes have 
either ignored or deliberately weakened Judzyya and Idara Ahalia in attempts to gain, consolidate 
or extend their power in the non-Statal/ Core areas of the Sudan. As a result the urban elite have 
always perceived figures in Idara Ahalia as either 'colonial stooges', or 'backward reactionaries', 
depending on their political leanings. The same unelected regimes have often regarded Idara 
Ahalia and its supporters as strongholds of political conservatives. Thus, both the October 1964 
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government, as well as the 1969/1970 regime, were uncharacteristically united in their decision 
to do away with Idara Ahalia. Though Ickra Ahalia outlived both military regimes, the damage 
done to it by the creation of a parallel administrative system has haunted mral Darfur up to the 
present time. 
All Sudanese regimes, elected or dictatorial, have tended to manipulate ethnic divisions. 
In the Fur-Arab of conflict 1987-1989 each of the two principal political parties (the Umma and 
the DUP) was allegedly syirqsathetic with one of the conflicting groups (Mukhtar 1998). The 
biased nature of the cmrent regime and its use of the state security forces against civilians has 
been much easier to discern than previous such attempts at ethnic manipulation. As a result 
most independent observers are convinced that the central govenunent has an overt Arab bias 
(Mukhtar 1998). A large portion of the MarMx, Omdas, and Sheikhs I interviewed cited this as a 
major factor in the cyclical nature of conflict in the region. Interestingly, Mukhtar (1998) 
highlights the same concerns in his own work with Ajainid and ]ucliyyx. Most Ajamd he 
interviewed mentioned that: 
antag:xTistk centred policies tomrds them made them disinterested in dx job and its 
fimctkn Secondly, group vspresoTtativs ni^ not be lehole-heaTtedly in favxtr cf a^eements reached 
They are less iMing dxr^bre to oomey oar^erence resoludons ^[ktiidy to tnbesnen at the grassroots. 
(Mukhtar 1998). 
With this as a back-drop it is not surprising that an increasing frequency of parties 
ignoring the rulings of Judiyya councils has become the norm This problem is only exacerbated 
by the fact that often times conference decisions are largely ^ nored, or even worse, not properly 
disseminated to parties in conflict. 
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Mediation_it seenas woris best in Darfur arid Ouaddai when the moral we^t of 
communities that see each other as not only social but moral equals, is brought to bear. This is 
important, since as mentioned in the this work traditional forms of conflict resolution rely on 
Common cultural heritage and are dependent on subscription to a particular set of norms j 
Furthermore it is the adherence to the core principles that makes mediation and conflict 
resolution possible. Similarly, one group is in a clear position of po werj)rhighe£^st2m 
vis the other mediation is unlikely to succeed] 
Acknowledging these facts it is clear that for Judiyyt to have any impact on the conflict 
between refugees and host communities in Tchad, a new approach must be formulated. It is 
imperative that a new contract be drawn up between UNHCR, the implementing partners and 
more importandy, the refugees and the host communities. In the case of the BeRa, the fact that 
traditional figures in Idara Ahalia are still respected an seen as the custodians of the histoiy and 
legal traditions of specific Be A Ah and regional groupings, is promising. However it is 
important that such figures be given a bigger role in the decision-making process. 
Traditional forms of conflict mediation and resolution, like traditional systems 
administration, have proved to be remarkably endurable. In the Greater CXiaddai-Darfur Region 
these systems represent a form of customary law that in many cases has more legitimacy than the 
state run legal system However, the system of NOUTE Adnimtratim still haunts the current, 
decayed administrative system of Darfur. Idara Ahalia recognized and strengthened one of its 
most important aspects: the quasi-judicial authority of the Ajaudd and their ability to mitigate 
conflict when supported by a government that is effective and even-handed. The restoration of 
NadwAdmmtration in its historical form is not a possibility in Darfur, even in a time of peace. 
Environmental deterioration, mass displacement and associated social transformation have 
altered the political landscape. But the recognition and reincorporation of elements of traditional 
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authority will need to be part of any solution to the current crisis. In Darfur, ethnicity has 
become an unprecedentedly fraught issue. Part of the solution must lie in the positive aspects of 
Idn-based social networks that are exemplified in traditional mediation practices 
The institution of Mutamma al Sulh faces problems, however. Traditional leaders who 
acted as Ajatsid are, with some exceptions (such as the Rizeigat Nazir) are seen as less powerful 
now than in the past. This is due, on the one hand to curtailment of their powers by central 
government, and on the other to the growing strength of militia commanders with different 
notions of accountability to the communities they hail from. Some groups in Darfur have begun 
to ask prominent officials, rather than elders and notables, to act 3S Ajainid. But the connections 
that officials are likely to have to the central government are problematic, laying them open to 
accusations of bias and inefficaciousness. 
Even as it attempts to constrain and manipulate local leaders, the Government 
recognizes the importance of the political language of traditional authority. The A rmcOe system 
introduced in the 1990s is an example of this.'^  The A rrirate is a political institution that has 
powerful reverberations elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking world, biit ^ 4^ 575 were unheard of in 
Darfur. That the central government should attempt to extend its control by creating new forms 
of traditional leadership indicates the endurance of an idea of legitimacy rooted in local 
hierarchies. The state, in an attempt to project its power into this zone, has over the years 
adopted a number of strategies, from abolishing IdaraAhalia to remoulding the system to suit the 
state's purposes. Each of these is an attempt by state with limited govemance capacity to project 
power to the periphery of the state. In allowing local post holders to dispense justice in the form 
of Judiyya the state admits it lacks such capacity, or perhaps legitimacy, itself. Thus, as the state's 
Amirs in Dar Masaalit and new Magdums, and Nazirs in Nyala and Dar Birgid. 
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ability to project power increases, there is an inevitable showdown between IdaraAhalia and the 
forces of the central government. But even then there is the acknowledgement that IdaraAhalia 
is still the system that is accepted by the masses. This is highlighted by the case of Idara Ahalia 
in Adar, where the new Onk was made responsible to the Mahafis rather than the local figure in 
Idara Ahalia. The central government could have just as easily appointed a local representative 
with more power but lacking the traditional tide of Orda, but chose to confirm the appointment 
of an Omda. 
The institution of Judiyysi is by no means defunct in Darfur, even though it may have 
become less effective there is no lack of peace negotiations. The problem is that the 
recommendations made as a result of Judiyya. processes are often not implemented. It can be 
seen from the record of past conferences if they were implemented conflicts would be less likely 
to recur. The failure of central government to implement the conclusions of peace meetings, 
even those it has itself convened, may sometimes be unintentional. Although the state in Sudan 
has shown itself capable of projecting force to peripheral areas like Darfur, this does not mean it 
is capable, even if it wishes, of providing good government there. 
As in Darfur it seems that the strengthening and better inclusion of figures in Idara 
Ahalia and Ndhimal-Hilk is imperative to the peaceful relation between communal groups in and 
around the camps. In Darfur this task falls solely on the shoulders of the central government. 
Successive Khartoum regimes have deliberately instituted policies designed to either de-legitimize 
or do away with Idara Ahalia. These numerous policy shifts have had an impact. Key to this in 
both cases is the enforcement of DiyA. 
In rural areas of Darfur, and now in Tchad. Judiyya mdAjawd act as a means to transmit 
information and demands between groups in conflict until a solution is reached. However the 
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real purpose of Judiyya is not punish those who are found to be guilty, but rather to create 
conditions in which communities and individuals can return to a state of social harmony. In 
most cases this harmony can be restored through compensation. This is perhaps a key feature of 
the work of the Mahkarm and Judiyyi in general. Ji^yjajs perhaps fcst^es^ a system 
for restoring social harmony and equilibrium through compensation for wrongs rather than 
justice, as a result the payment of Diya is central to a peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
Diyx, in Judiyya cases represents a general acceptance of who was right and who was 
wrong, as the party in the wrong usually pays Diya- or at least a greater amount of Diya. Thus, 
without explicitiy stating, or blaming one particular party, the act of paying and accepting Dzya. is 
an acknowledgement of one's position. As a result, the payment and amount of Diya become a 
key sticking point in most Judiyya proceedings. 
neA^£jfort 
Though the aid effort has, generally speaking, been well managed and provides for the 
needs of the refugees, in some aspects many of the policies have been short sighted. The lack of 
real host community participation and more importantiy, poor camp location has made the lives 
of the refugees even more precarious. Ironically, many of these issues could have been dealt 
with through traditional forms of communal mediation as practised both in Eastem Tchad and 
Darfur. However the story of the Tchadien refugee camps is perhaps best described as a tale of 
missed opportunities, or perhaps, of short term, rather than of long term planning. From the 
initial site selection, to the 'selection' of the camp Sheikhs, the aid agencies failed to properly 
consult with the refugees, or host communities, for that matter. As a result conflict between 
refugees and host communities is the single most pressing issue surrounding the camps. Many 
of these issues and problems could have been avoided if there were timely and frank discussions 
between the aid agencies, UNHCR, the refugees and the host community. It is clear that in all 
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the camps there needs to be clear and concise conflict prevention, management and resolution 
(CPMR) procedure. 
The links between Ouaddai and Darfur though strained due to the influx large amounts 
of refugees is none the less far reaching and unlikely to be tom asunder anytime soon. As a 
result it is necessary for the aid agencies to do what they can to mitigate conflict between the two 
communities. However, with agency staff usually rotating after six months in most cases, there 
is litde to no institutional memory. Thus, planning long term policy initiatives becomes 
secondary to the day to day management of the camps and more short term policy goals. 
T^e Futurv 
The BeRa as an ethnic group have shown themselves to be a most resilient people, 
having overcome drought, famine and conflict induced migration, both in the recent and distant 
past. However, such strategies are not without their risks and drawbacks. Among the BeRa 
refugees, their five year sojourn in eastern Tchad has become, not only a damning sign of the 
international community's inability to protect the lives of innocent civilians, but also a depressing 
and dangerous situation for the refugees themselves. Conflict between refugees and between 
refugees and the host communities, have at several times threatened the entire aid effort. As 
violence is exported wholesale from Darfur to Eastem Tchad -in many instances with the 
complacency of the Sudanese regime- conflict resolution techniques become even more 
important. 
Whilst it is clear that as yet traditional systems are most successfvd when resolving intra 
ethnic conflicts, traditional mechanisms also have the potential to be a powerful relationship-
building tool across communities. The reason for this is that traditional elders are largely 
respected by the majority of people from all ethnic groups and certain traditional beliefs and 
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methods transcend ethnic divides, namely where they are concemed with revealing the truth and 
encouraging forgiveness to achieve true reconciliation. Thus, traditional mechanisms hold the 
capacity to build solidarity and inter-cultural understanding between ethnic groups within the 
camp and the host community. 
The continued resilience of traditional leadership systems within the camp is also 
dependent upon each community's perceptions of these systems. It is evident that the reliance of 
youth upon them is largely rooted in the strength of the socialisation processes within their 
respective communities. Thus, Darfuri refugees continue to seek out their old sheikhs, who are 
seen as repositories of knowledge and able to bring about real social cohesion through conflict 
resolution. 
The perceived strength of traditional systems among displaced people both within Am 
Nabak and Mile refi^ee camps can also be attributed to the apparent weaknesses of the newer 
institutions established in the camp. In overlooking the traditional values and cultural norms 
which are so inherent to the social relations both within and between the BeRa and the host 
communities modem mechanisms for conflict resolution discount the breakdown of 
relationships which ultimately lead to violent conflict. Thus, the capacity of these institutions is 
limited to short-term conflict resolution because they do not seek to rebuild the relationships 
which are required to achieve long-term sustainable peace. There is an apparent absence of 
respect and trust in the modem stmctures amongst the majority of refugees interviewed. 
Despite having sustained their relevance it was observed during this research that 
traditional leadership positions are considerably challenged and compromised within the camp 
envirorunent. Many refugees throughout the camp implied that modem actors can be the most 
appropriate actors to respond to conflicts specific to the cair^j environment, such as the 
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distribution of food rations and pass permits. Persistent conflict with the host community over 
resources is a particular example because it concerns land which is the legal ownership of the 
local people. Although the majority of refugees interviewed feel that traditional leaders are the 
most respected forms of authority, they stressed that ending the resource-based conflict requires 
a solution at higher levels than that of grassroots level conflict resolution. 
Additionally, traditional conflict resolution processes can become compromised within 
the displacement context. For example, although the elders from the camp and community 
frequently convene to resolve conflicts, the refugees recognise that the host community will not 
accept the punishments and compensation levels that the refugee elders request. Therefore 
punishments tend to be biased to take account of the sensibilities of the host community, and 
the refugees, in order to maintain peace, accept less harsh penalties and generous compensation 
levels than those deemed fair by their traditional law or host state law. It is evident that the 
situation of displacement experienced by refugees continues to have a s^nificant impact upon 
how the relevance of traditional leadership systems is perceived by their communities. In turn, 
the resilience of traditional mechanisms in the long term is dependent upon how and whether 
adapt and respond to conflicts specific to the displacement context. 
The future of the BeRa and their traditional systems of leadership are, for better or worse, 
linked to the current conflict in Darfur. The factors weighing heavily in favour of the continued 
relevance of traditional systems are multiple. In this volatile and often neglected region it has 
allowed them to frame their struggles in an ethnocentric manner. These systems endure because 
they allow the BeRa to mobilize along Air Be, Be A Ah and, occasionally, pan-ethnic lines. 
The endogenous leaderships systems of the BeRa allow them to pool resources in times of crisis, 
such as drought or famine, but also enables them to pool man-power when threatened. Such 
was the case in 1989 when two young Tchadien military officials, one a Bediyat and the other a 
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Dirong, fled to Darfur to start a rebellion to overthrow the dictator Hissene Habre. In this way 
Idris Deby Itno and Abbas Koty were able to mobilize their Ttier kin gainst Habre and his 
Gur'an co-ethnies. Idris Deby Itoo was able to play on his family links to Air Ke Be rn, the Dar 
Galla region to mobilize hundreds of Darfuri BeRa recruits to his cause. The current crisis has 
also caused a new round of fragmentation among the BeRa, particularly those of Darfur. As the 
Darfuri rebel groups fragmented along ethnic and clan lines so too have their BeRa supporters 
and vice versa. 
The resilience of traditional systems in the environment of displacement can be 
understood firsdy as a result of the continued effectiveness of traditional mechanisms in practice, 
and secondly on how their strength is perceived by their respective communities. Traditional 
forms of leadership evidendy have most use and greatest effectiveness in resolving conflicts 
between members of the same ethnic group within the camp. Many refugees claimed that this 
effectiveness is attributable to the fact that such traditional systems are grounded in the cultural 
norms and values of their society which provides the basis upon which traditional leaders are 
able to assist in rebuilding broken relationships between members of their communities. The 
bottom up approach of traditional systems to conflict resolution also instigates participatory 
practices which give communities a sense of ownership over the resolution process which is 
foundational to the building of sustainable peace. 
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A P P E N D I C E S 
The largest and perhaps two most important groups in the region are the Maba and the 
Fur. As stated previously both groups show similar histories of having been the core group of 
their respective state each assimilating or conquering others as their states expanded. 
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Litde is known of the origins of the 250,000 or so Maba (Ethnologue 3) known in Arabic 
as Wadai and in Fur as Ba?^ or Bar;^. Speaking a NHo-Saharan langue of the Mabang family 
which included Maba proper and Marfa (Ethnologue 3). Today as in the past are the dominant 
278 
ethnic group of the Ouaddai highlands and the lost rulers of the state of Ouaddai. Mainly 
agriculturalists the Maba are divided into a number of tribes the largest being the Kodoi, Awlad 
Djema, Malnga, Mandaba, Mandala and Kondongo. The Kajanga, Karanga, Kabga, Ganyanga, 
Kashamre and Marfa are Maba speaking tribes that are said to have been assimilated sometime in 
the past (Doombos & Bender 1983: 50). 
Our knowiedge of the Fur on the other hand is more substantial. Speaking a Nilo-
Saharan of Fur family which includes only Fur and Amdang of BUtine Tchad, the Fur's original 
home land was probably deep in the Jebel Marra area or in Jebel Si. Numbering probably close 
to 800,000 Fur oral tradition links the southward expansion of the Fur to the spread of Islam 
and the growth of the state (O'Fahey 1980: 72). 
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ft^e /irst unnamec^ Sultanj gradua/fy spread /slam and l?is empire sout/r, 
i^y sending in turn to t/;e king of eac/; /;i//and te/iing Irim "Become Mus/im, or/ 
wi///iglrtyou". Given suclr an a/temative most o/t/re peop/e/kd sout/; and 
I'ecame Fertit, leaving muc/r of wlrat is now Darfur uninl/ai^ited. Tire Sultans 
used to luring people o/tl?e east to occupy tire empty lands. (Al Tunisi 1965) 
The about is an extract from the work of an IS'*' century explorer al Tunisi. The term 
Fertit is the generic term use by the Fur to describe the non-Muslims living to the south who 
were considered enslavable. What the narrative tells us is that this status was something acquired 
by the ancestors of the Fertit who at some point in time coexisted with the ancestors of the Fur 
and may have been one ad the same. Further validity is added to this by a well known Fur myth 
that even today tells that the ancestors of the Fur and Fertit were brothers ¥ir and FiraZ 
respectively. Thus the expansion of the Fur ethnic seems to be a process of assimilation and 
displacement of a host of related ethnic groups the remnants of which can stiU be found, such as 
the: Fertit, Shatt, Banda, Bingi, Kreish, Gula, Yulu and Kara in Bahr al Ghazal and other such groups 
in Tchad, CA.R. and southern Darfur (OTahey 1980: 73). As a result of this history there are 
clans of Kara {FertO} in Jebel Si; Gula {Fertit) in Dar Lewing known today as the Daalir^, the Shatt 
(Daju) of ylrufl/ia known today as the Hajarar^ (OTahey 1980: 75). 
The case of Dar Fertit perhaps needs further explanation, for it was here in the southern 
edge of the Sultanate where the state was at its most destructive. The name Fertit was given by 
the Fur to the numerous non-Muslim living south of the Bahr al-Arab or Kiir river, which 
cumendy marks the south border of Darfur and previously marked the farthest southem extent 
of effective Fur government. Note the use of the term effective government as opposed to 
effective power, the two being closely related but by no means the same thing. The Sultanate did 
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not govern Dar Fertit not in the same way it governed the Competition Zone; Maqckm^K. not 
appointed, the Shartai was not stationed there; no attempt was made to spread Islam. The state 
merely busied itself with raiding the region for slaves. These raids were swift unprovoked and 
brutal with Fertit being transported north to be sold in Libya and Egypt. 
In this way the Sultans demonstrated that they had the ability to project power to Dar 
Fertit in the form of annual, bi-annual (and later whenever the mood took them) campaigns 
enslave the Fertit, but showed no desire to govern in the region. The reason for this is 
some-w a^t unclear, it may be due to the fact that Dar Fertit would be cut off from the Fur 
heartland during the rainy season when the river Kiir flooded. Or perhaps because the Fertit had 
no desire to be govemed by the Darfur and could have abandoned their village at the sight of 
their northern ne^hbours. But I suspect that the fact that mounted cavalry was useless in this 
wooded region made the Fur Sultans feel that the region could only be govemed through colony 
like those of the Kunjara placed at the border between Darfur and Ouaddai or like the Masaalit 
colony set up in south Darfur (Kapteijns 1988). Setting up such a colony in Dar Fertit would 
have been problematic due to the problems of communication during the rainy season and thus 
the region remained outside of effective government. 
The actual border between Darfur and Ouaddai was never a static frontier, it receded and 
ebbed as the power of each state receded and grew. The border itself was a combination of 
garrisons, no man's lands and petty chiefdoms, the exact assemblage and power of each also 
depended on the ability of each state to project effective power to this region and to out 
compete local elites. Here in the border zone of both states, each tried to co-opt local elites an 
petty chief to their cause. 
In the main these local elites took the form of traditional rulers of in many case multi-
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ethnic regions, in spite of this the regions were usually named after the largest ethnic group or 
the ethnic group of the ruler. Between these sultanates that paid tribute either to Darfur or 
Ouaddai there existed a no man's land that marked the limit of formal government by either 
state. The actual size and position of the no man's land depended on the relative power of the 
two hegemonic state vis a vis the other. The existence of a buffer region between states is a 
common feature of Sudanic African. Such regions existed between Ouaddai and Bagirmi, Dar 
Tama and Darfur and after 1874 between Darfur and Dar Masaalit (Kapteijns 1985: 20-22, 
Doombos & Bender 1983: 58). 
Ethnic groups in the Ouaddai-Darfur Border Region 
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Movmg from south the border bet^ ^een Ouaddai and Darfur was composed of: 
Region Historical Notes 
Dar Fongoro 
Dar Sinyar 
Known as Gele, by the Fur, the Fongoro occupy the 
southernmost portion of the Ouaddai-Daifur border. The region has 
always been sparsely populated due to the tsetse fly infestation. Dar 
Fongoro was the private estate of the Fur Sultans and the inhabitants 
had to supply the royal family with an annual tribute of slaves and 
honey (Doombos & Bender 1983: 58). The region is home to a 
number of small mainly agricultural ethnic groups; namely: the 
Fongoro, the Kujjarge, the Formono (Fur-Sinyar heritage) etc. 
North of Dar Fongoro lies Dar Sinyar, named after the main 
ethnic group in the region. The Sinyar speak a Nilo-Saharan language 
of the Central Sudanic family and number approximately 12,500 
Ethnologue 2) souls mainly on the Tchadien side of the border. Their 
main centre is Fora Boranga a town located on both sides of the Tchad 
Sudan border north of Mongororo, near the confluence of the Kaja, 
Azum, and Salih rivers. The region is now divided by the border 
between Tchad and the Sudan, but in the past it was an integral part of 
Darfur, until annexed by Dar SHa sometime between 1860 and 1880 
(Kapteijns 1985: 17). The Sinyar were ruled by a Sultan who paid 
tribute to Darfur and controlled trading and slaving routes to the 
Dar Sila Daju 
linking Darfur with Dar Fongoro and Dar Runga; as well as the 
pilgrimage route from West Africa to Mecca, which passed through 
Ouaddai and Darfur. 
Sometimes known as Dar Sila Daju, after the region largest 
ethnic group the Daju. Speaking a Mlo-Saharan language of East 
Sudanic family the Daju of Dar Sila number approximately 65,000 
(Ethnologue 1). The region is located mostiy in on the Tchadien side 
of the Tchad-Darfur border, west of Dar S'myar and Dar Masaalit, with 
only a few villages falling in Darfur. Their main centre is Goz-Beida. 
The present distribution of Daju suggests they may have at one time 
been the dominant ethnic group in southern Darfur and even areas of 
Kordofan (Bender 2000: 46). Numerous Daju speakii^ ethnic groups 
dot this part of the Sahel, namely from west to east, the Daju of 
Mongo in the central Guera region of Tchad; the Daju of Dar Sila in 
die southem most region of the Tchad -Darfur border, the Daju of 
Npla-Logawa, located in Logawa to the north east of Nyala; the Begio 
of south Darfur, in the village of Kubbi; Shatt of southem Kordofan, 
occupy the Shatt Hlls Southwest of Kadugli in the Nuba Mountains; 
the L^iri of Southem Kordofan, live to the north east of Kadugli; and 
die Nya^ulgule of Bahr al Ghazal who live in only one village and 
number about 1000 and live in Southem Sudan, on the Sopo River just 
above the Sopo-Boro confluence. 
The Dar Sila region is currendy home to a Sultanate which is a 
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Dar Masaalit 
Dar Erenga 
Darjabaal 
successor state to the Daju kingdom in southern Darfur. The Daju of 
Dar Sila claim to be migrants from Darfur who arrived in the region 
around 1700 A D (Kapteijns 1985: 17). However it is more likely that 
this date represents the foundation of the Sultanate as an independent 
entity in itself; rather than the arrival of the Daju who may have 
already been present in the region prior to this, or in fact indigenous 
to the area. There is no doubt that the clan of the Sultan were 
descendants of refuges from the Daju kingdom of southem Darfur 
and may have set up a petty state chiefdom in the Dar Sila region as 
early as the 1400s. Historically and even today the Sultanate has 
maintained a lai^e degree of autonomy from both Darfur and 
Ouaddai 
Named after the largest ethnic group in the area the Erenga 
never formed an autonomous entity of their own. Rather the Erenga, 
Asungur, Girga, Dula, Awara an other were immigrants from Dar 
Tama and Ouaddai, and each was ruled by a Malik or king (Kapteijns 
1985: 16). 
Located in the Jebel Moon region, the Jabaal or Milieri was 
incorporated into Darfur at the same time as Dar Gimr, to which it 
may have paid tribute (Kapteijns 1985:16). 
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Dar Tama 
Dar Gimr 
Dar Zaghawa 
Dar Gur'an 
Next was the land of Dar Gimr, located in Darfur. The exac 
number of Gimr is unknown, they speak Arabic rather than a M l o -
Saharan language like their ne^hbours and claim to be Misseriya 
Arabs. The region was conquered by Darfur in the early 1700 | 
(Kapteijns 1985: 16). The Fursha was made tributary to Darfur, late 
the term Fursha was replaced by that of Sultan. 
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2.-BeRa Ktns/jip 
Though the history of the Eastern Lands, Diaspora and the Camps is discussed in the 
main body of the thesis, a litde ethnographic bacl^round to the BeRa society is provided here to 
familiarize the reader with the BeRa. 
Kinship is perhaps the most esoteric, specialised and often the most ambiguous branch 
of social anthropology. At the same time the study of kinship is seen as somewhat scientific for 
a discipline like socio-cultural anthropology. Thus, the study of kinship differs from "cfce trviy 
(Hffiadt areas cf sodal anthrcpdoQi -the study cf rdi^on, for oistance- (mhere) iag4eness is cfien mistaken fir 
pTxfamdkf (Barnard 1984:1-2). 
With this in mind what follows is a brief description of BeRa kinship terminology, an 
attempt to give the reader the necessary tools to fill in the profound vagueness associated with 
kinship, by highlighting three types of kinships data collected: 
• Categjmd such a kinship terminologies 
• Jtmtl or normative precepts and preferences, such the rules regarding the 
choice of the ideal spouse 
• Behaiioural which utilises the categories of the former system and us justified by 
references to the latter 
It must be noted that these three typologies are not totally independent of each other and 
can be studied accordingly, since genealogies are often moulded to explain, fix or reinforce 
current political, social and communal state of affairs. Kinship data will be present using a fairly 
common typology: 
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K i n Type A 
father F 
mother M 
brother B 
sister Z 
son S 
daughter D 
husband H 
wife W 
parent P 
child C 
sibling G 
spouse E 
This system was chosen, over others, since khasihe adianta^ cfnot sqmnknng the louer case 
letter d^mtias in the mod dass^kation system As a result e means ego, y and o can be used to 
denote younger and older, thus one can say FyBWB or in the case of ego's relative age FBWBy. 
Or ns male speaker m woman speaker, cs, ss opposite sex and same sex respectively. Thus e-
WZ, means ego's wife's sister, e— sister in law, means ego addresses the person as sister in law. 
Though they rarely think of kin in overall categories. The BeRa really have three 
categories of kin. 
There are three types of K i n in BeRa A h 
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Catego?- Members Jural Position 
JCeD person related to yo\x through female 
relatives. For example e -EFQ e-
SZor S, aunties 2S or Z . 
e-MZS or Z 
eFZSorZ,eMBSorZ 
They are classified as fictitious 
sons or daughters, 
e— D or Ke D ege or my 
sons/daughters. 
JCeD— e mamava^vaaXRvaaX 
uncle 
or ^a/a maternal auntie. 
All KeD^xs. unmarriageable 
partners for ego. 
All Kzdow2^rs. unmarriageable 
partners for ego 
Note ePBS o r Z is not.KideyhxA 
alia gii^ur/kossz gtl>urot uncle's 
son 
Ahagite/e/kossita/e or uncle's 
daughter 
Ai^azndi ^oss/mcnn father and 
uncle respectively. 
All AM/ejy arc marriageable 
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eMB Of Z or S not 
marriageable 
e F B or SZor S marriageable 
note coiasin's child is formally called 
daughter and you are expected to 
help in the negotiation on their 
wedding 
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J: BeRa Lt/e Cyc/e Rituals 
While a resident of Mile refugee camps, I had the privilege of witnessing numerous 
weddings, deaths and births. Though not directly related to my work, these events, like BeRa 
kinship terms give us a glimpse of integral aspects of BeRa society. 
SAD£N/Birt^ 
When a child is bom the baby is usually kept indoors for a few days then named seven 
days after they are bom. O n the day of naming a sheep is usually slaughter if they parents can 
afford it, in the camps the N G O usually provides new mother with a pound of sugar, a basin and 
a few other items for the baby. The newborn's name is actually chosen by the mother from a list 
of three or four names suggested by close relatives. It is unclear whether the mother privilege of 
choosing the infants name is a new custom brought on by the life in the camps and the greater 
right provided to women there. However most BeRa/claim that this was the case even in 
Darfur, though mothers often choose the name reo[mrErukd,\)j^^\shusband's. 
N/RR LB/Marritge 
Since there is no coming of age ceremony the next key stage in the BeRa life cycle is 
marriage. The BeRa Ah word for a wedding is actually Be Air Ow/a which means entemTg the 
house. The BeRa recognise two forms of marriage, they are alliance marriages and individual 
marriages. The former are marriages arranged by fathers and mama matemal uncles. They 
usually take place with Ktde or no input from the bride and groom. The second from of union 
are those in which the impetus for the partnership has come from one or more of the individuals 
to be married. The preferred practice in this form of union is for young couples whom wish to 
get married to first approach their elders. This usually takes the form of a prospective suitor 
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approaching: the father and mtrm of the bride, the mother of the bride and the brothers of the 
bride once he has all of their blessing he can approach the bride and confirm his intentions to 
her. After this negotiations will begin between the fathers and mama of the bride and grown to 
set a suitable Te^ or bride wealth. In the past bride wealth was highest among the northem 
Ennedi groups, followed by the eastem then westem BeRa, with bride wealth for Bilia reaching 
as much as 30-50 camels^ ''. Among the Eastem Tuer/Waggi BeRa bride wealth is usually: 
15 cows or 10 camels 
a sack of sugar (50l^s) 
a jerry can of oil 
200,000 Sudanese Dinars^* 
The bride wealth goes to the mother of the bride, since the sugar and oil will be used for 
the weddii^ ceremony. The cows however are the brides and even in the event of a divorce or 
annuhnent of the marriage she will keep the cows. One the day of the weeding the groom is 
expected to bring clothes for the bride, Ba^Ehikktm/Millet and sheep for the feast. The groom 
is supposed to stay at the home of the bride for at least seven days. Older BeRa stated that in 
the past the groom stayed up to a year at the bride's mother's house and it may have been even 
longer in the distant past. These days though the bride does remain at her mother's home for 
the proscribed time, but most grooms leave after the wedding night. This may hint to the a 
matrilocal past for the BeRa. 
All BeRa males aspire to multiple wives. As soon as a man is financially secure he will 
begin to look for a second wife, as Islamic tradition allows up to four wives. The practice among 
" 2005 camel price 200-500 pounds 
2006 Sudanese Dinar 200,000 equals close to 500 pounds 
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the BeRa is similar to what Barth observed among their southem neighbours the Fvu- with each 
wife to maintaining her own household and her children residing with her (Barth 1967). In fact 
only newlyweds, husbands with only one wife or the poor couples wiU live together permanendy. 
In most polygynous marriages the husband will have his own home in the same village of his 
first wife, other wives may live in this village, but it is also common for a man to choose a 
second wife in a town or village some distance away. The latter is usually the case among 
herders ,who frequent the same villages years after years, as well as with traders. The husband 
will frequent the home of his various wives when he can. In the camps in Darfur and Eastem 
Tchad the BeRa stiU show a preference for polygyny, when possible, some men having multiple 
wives in one camps or multiple camps. 
When a couple part ways the wife is supposed to keep possession of everything that they 
jointly owned, except the children, who belong to their father. In reality however even elders 
cannot stop a husband from leaving with his herds and flocks, however most brides are able to 
retain the ten cows that were originally part of the bride wealth. The joint property is viewed as 
the wife's since it is assvimed that the husband will take up residence with one of his other wives 
or build a new home when he remarries. She keeps everything you gave her except the children 
which belong to the father. 
A husband simply says D£J^£G£ / / • I diwroe her! then calls on those who negotiated the 
wedding to do a divorce 
£L£/Deat^ 
Funeral rights are probably the most overtly Islamic BeRa custom, with a traditional 
Islamic Sadaqa or death ceremony taking place. Friends and relatives of the deceased will brig 
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food and money to help with the ceremony, which takes the form of a simple Islamic burial after 
Qur'anic recitations. 
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GLOSSARY 
A/su/^a a/gal'a/i 
Amirate 
AM/S 
(Arabic) Camel herders (literally "camels") 
(Arabic) tribal reconciliation. 
an administrative division, smaller than a Dor, called an 
A nirate. The A rrirate was a term that was new to Darfur. 
The A rrir was, typically, interpolated between the highest 
tribal authority, and the Omda, this previously the second-
highest, but now relegated to third position. 
The African Union Mission in the Sudan is the body 
tasked with monitoring ceasefires and human rights 
violations in Darfur. AMIS peacekeeping force was 
founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops, by mid-2005, 
its numbers were increased to about 7,500. 
Ansar 
AU 
Sudanese religious sect founded by the Mahdi. The 
Mahdi's great-grandson Sadiq al-Mahdi heads the Vrrvm 
party, the political expression of the Ansar. 
Created in 2002 the African Union is a renamed OAU, it 
current runs the AMIS- African Union Mission in the 
Sudan. 
AwLzd 
Baggara 
(Arabic) tribal section or clan 
(Arabic for "catde") A collective term used for cattle-
owning nomadic Arab tribes in southern Darfur and 
southem Kordofan, including Rizeigat and Misseriya 
295 
Da?fur The name Darfur refers to both the pre-colonial state 
(1400s-1917) and the modem region in the Sudan which 
includes West, North and South Darfur. 
Diya The term Di^ often translated as blood money is actually 
a colloquial contraction of the word Fadiyya, which means 
the sacrificed . Fadiyyen the plural of Fidiyya was the 
name a corps of soldiers used by Saladin during the 
Crusades and also the crack troops of Saddam Hussein's 
Iraqi army. 
Fa/Iata /Fe//aea Refers specifically to the Fufulde-spealdng catde nomads 
spread throughout the Sahel from westem Senegal to the 
Nile. In Sudan, though, it is used to refer to members of 
any group of West Africa origin i.e. Fulani, Hausa, Kanuri, 
Takuri. 
Fury an (Arabic) Horsemen or "knights", term first used for the 
Beni Halba horse-mounted militia men who fought against 
SPLA incursions into Darfur and subsequendy other 
militias. 
Fursha Name given to the Masaalit official who acts as a tribal 
head equivalent to a Fur Shartai 
Greater Ouac/dai-Daffur Fegio^'da.t writer means Darfur, the Tchadien border regions of 
Ouaddai, Wadi Fira, and the eastern borders of B .E .T . 
(mainly the Ennendi region) and Salamat. 
Nakura (Arabic) A 'grant' or 'estate'. A grant of land m Darfvir, 
historically administered and taxed on behalf of the Sultan 
of Darfur either by a local ethnic elite or an administrator 
(usually a Fellata holy man, or Nuba eunuch). 
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/daraAlra/ia (Arabic) Native Administration, established under Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium rule. 
//zam Manawi morally binding, rather than Iham Qamm legally binding 
/s/amic Legiori founded in 1972, Mummar Gaddafi's al-FaUaka al-Islansyz 
or Islamic Le^on as drawn from numerous Sahelian nauons, 
notably Sudanese Ansars of Sadiq al-Madhi who were 
waging a low intensity war against Numeri, and Tuaregs 
from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The Legion was a 
part of Gaddafi's dream of creating a Greater Islamic State 
of the Sahel. After their defeat by Tchadien forces these 
heavily indoctrinated and well trained Arab Legion recruits 
return to their home countries spreading a parricxilar brand 
of racism and instability across the Sahel. 
A/- /ali/iyya/p The word Jahiliyyah actually means ignorant, and Al-
Jahilian the (time) of ignorance i.e. the pre Islamic period 
/anjaweed (jargaudd, jir^md eB;)Combination of the Darfuri or 
Qiadian Arabic words jan or jirm (evil spirit) and 
jaisBed/jawuk (horse). Before the current civil war in 
Darfur, the term was used to describe bandits from ethnic 
groups of African and Arab origin. Today its use is largely 
confined to those from Arab groups 
/udiyya 
Kalam a/ wataneen 
(Arabic) Mediation 
(Arabic) People's talk, colloquial term for tribal peace 
meetings. 
Mana/a'a- Usurfructury system or Marmfa'a in Arabic, which allows 
the use and possession of land that actually belong to 
another. 
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The term which is best described as dgs«f for a paramount 
ruler. A Mandub acts as a representative with jurisdiction 
over a number of Omdas 
Mara^ee/ (Arabic) Nomad migration, or the routes used by it 
Mura^ken (Arabic) Nomads. Commonly used to refer to government 
sponsored militias drawn from Rizeigat and Misseriya Humr. 
Mutamarata/su/^ 
Nahus 
(Arabic) Reconciliation conference 
Gjpper drums given to chiefs by the Fur Sultan in 
installation ceremony. 
Nazir In Northem Sudan, a tribal chief with powers designated 
by the Government, superior to an arrir, ondx or shakh. 
Naztrate The geographical area of a ncav^s authority. 
OAU The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or 
Organisation de lUnite Africaine (OUA) was established 
on May 25, 1963. is the African continent's main regional 
body, similar to, but not as effective, the Organization of 
American States in the Americas. Often described as a 
talk shop for African dictators the primary achievement of 
the O A U was the dismantling of the colonial regime on 
the continent. Viewed as ineffective in all other areas the 
O A U was replaced by die African Union on July 9^ ^ 2002. 
Omda A tribal chief in Northem Sudan h^her than a 
Government-designated shakh, but lower than a mzir or 
anir 
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Omodiyya 
Ouaddai 
The geographical area of an Omda's authority. 
The name Ouaddai refers to both the pre-colonial state 
(1650s-1905) and the modem Tchadien region. The latter 
occupies and the truncated southern portion of the 
former. 
S/?aTtat (Daju or Kanuri language) The name of the administrative 
unit below a Dar. The official who heads this unit is 
known as a Shartai 
In Northem Sudan, a traditional social leader. In some 
areas shdkhs are designated with official powers by the 
Government, at an inferior level to nairs and omdas. 
SLA 
SPLA 
Sudan Liberation Army -Darfuri Rebels 
Sudan People's Liberation Army- Southem Sudanese 
Rebels. 
Tunjur 
ZuTga 
The Tunjur, are widely credited as being one of the 
earliest dynasties in the Central Sahara. Most likely 
Nubian refugees from the Nile region the Tunjur 
probably arrived in the region in the mid 1300s and took 
control of both Darfur and Ouaddai through 
intermarriage with the local Dynasties. They were 
expelled from Ouaddai in the 165s and fled to Kanem to 
become integral figures in the court of the Kanembu 
Mai/king. Tunjur can still be found in the Kanem region 
of Tchad today. The Darfuri Tunjur intermarried with 
the Fur who finally superseded them, today they are lai^e 
numbers of Tunjur in North Darfur. 
Literally 'blues'. In Darfuri arid Chadian Arabic is used to 
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mean 'black people'. The term Asmd 'black' in 
Arabic has negative connotations and is not normally used 
to describe those of the Muslim faith. In riverain areas of 
Sudan the corresponding term is Kudra, meaning, literally, 
"greens". In both regions Arabs are referred to as Htmm 
"Reds". 
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